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Preface / Voorwoord 
Je weet nooit wat de toekomst brengt, maar het voorjaar van 2017 zal me allicht bij blijven als één van 
de meest hectische periodes in mijn leven. In januari besloot ik tezamen met mijn promotoren om het 
einde van mijn aanstelling als assistent niet af te wachten om mijn doctoraat af te werken. In plaats 
daarvan zouden we proberen de thesis in te dienen in april om dan hopelijk te verdedigen in het begin 
van de zomer. Op professioneel vlak stond ik dus voor een drukke periode, en op privé-vlak was het 
niet veel beter: we bouwen aan een huis, ik werd peter van Jerom, mijn 2-jarige dochter vraagt veel 
aandacht en mijn zwangere vriendin af en toe ook. Bovendien staat het voorjaar – uiteraard – gelijk 
aan koers. Het aangekondigde wielerafscheid van Tom Boonen verhoogde het stressniveau nog wat 
meer. Hectisch dus, maar kijk, het lijkt er op dat we alles tot een goed einde gaan brengen. En ik wil 
uitdrukkelijk de nadruk leggen op ‘we’, want alleen was ik niet geslaagd in deze onderneming. 
Daarom is een woord van dank hier zeker op zijn plaats. 
In de eerste plaats ben ik mijn promotoren erkentelijk voor hun begeleiding. Wat mijn doctoraat 
betreft was Professor Buysse ontegensprekelijk mijn belangrijkste klankbord. Ik verwijs doorheen 
mijn doctoraatsthesis vaak naar academische artikels, boeken, etc. Spijtig genoeg bestaat er geen type 
referentie waarmee ik naar de talrijke discussies en feedback momenten met Jeroen kan verwijzen. Er 
waren geen taboes en soms waren de discussies confronterend, maar ik ben nooit met een negatief 
gevoel buiten gewandeld bij Jeroen en het onderzoek ging er steeds op vooruit. Professor Van 
Huylenbroeck was de laatste jaren iets minder aanwezig op de faculteit, maar ik apprecieer zijn steun 
en coaching in het kader van mijn onderwijsopdrachten. Guido verstaat de kunst om iemand snel 
vertrouwen en verantwoordelijkheden te geven en tegelijkertijd beginnersfouten door de vingers te 
zien, een aangename manier van werken.  
In addition to my promoters, I would also like to thank all of the jury members for reading the PhD 
thesis thoroughly. Some of the comments were hard to address, but all of them were helpful and 
considerably increased the quality of the document. 
Als assistent werkte ik, behalve met mijn promotoren, ook samen met professor Ludwig Lauwers en 
professor Wim Verbeke. Ludwig, het was voor mij een waar plezier om tezamen met een 
geïnspireerde lesgever de cursus doorheen de jaren te verbeteren. Ik had ook steeds het gevoel dat 
mijn input ten harte werd genomen. Wim, het vak aan de faculteit Diergeneeskunde is organisatorisch 
één van de minst evidente, maar ik vind het wel fijn om af en toe eens uit mijn comfortzone te treden. 
Ook jouw input bij het derde hoofdstuk van deze thesis wordt zeer geapprecieerd.  
Obviously, I want to thank all of my colleagues. I tried to list all colleagues with whom I shared an 
office, but they turned out to be too numerous. Compared to the day I started, only Bérénice, Gwen 
and Evy (also co-author of the 3rd chapter!) are still present. I am afraid to miss out on one of you and 
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therefore I will not name all of you individually (except for those mentioned above). I really enjoyed 
the atmosphere in our office which allows us to assist and help each other, but also question and 
challenge each other. This is very valuable in the type of work we do. In 2012, I was hesitant to quite a 
super-job and leave superb colleagues at the LEI – Wageningen UR in the Netherlands, but you all 
made it worthwhile. In Ghent, I found an environment full of opportunities to develop myself, attend 
courses, grow a network, participate in congresses, participate in proposals and projects, travel, and 
enjoy sufficient freedom to manage work-life balance. I truly believe that if you are willing to seize 
these opportunities, the process towards a PhD is more interesting than the actual diploma itself.  
Work is fun, but fun is even more fun. At our department, it is not too hard to motivate people for non-
professional activities. Multi gracias to Juan and Hans with whom I try to play squash without hitting 
each other too much. High five as well to the colleagues who are willing to make use of any excuse to 
have a drink. Especially the trips to bicycle races are memorable. We even ended up at the ‘derny 
criterium’ in Wetteren once, I think this demonstrates perseverance. 
Van Gent naar Kruibeke. Het is niet mijn ambitie om zeer persoonlijk te worden in een voorwoord van 
een doctoraatsthesis, maar ik zou in het bijzonder mijn ouders willen danken voor de voortdurende 
steun en alle kansen die ze me hebben gegeven om te studeren. En daarna nog wat bij te studeren. Nu 
ik zelf vader ben begin ik stilletjes aan te beseffen dat ik hen allicht een hoop slapeloze nachten heb 
bezorgd. Misschien was al die steun toch niet zo evident als ik toen dacht.  
Behalve mijn eigen familie moet ik ook mijn schoonfamilie bedanken. De combinatie doctoraat-
nieuwbouw was gedoemd om te falen zonder jullie steun in de vorm van een tijdelijke woonst en 
praktische hulp. Ik ben gezegend met een schoonpa die al eens graag in een ruwbouw werkt en de 
echte werfleider is geworden. Ik verdenk hem er van dat hij mijn verbouw-skills nog niet volledig naar 
waarde schat, maar ik beloof beterschap Pat. 
Ik las in enkele andere voorwoorden van doctoraten ook dankwoorden voor de vrienden. Nu durf ik in 
mijn persoonlijk geval er toch sterk aan te twijfelen dat het zootje ongeregeld dat ik mijn vrienden 
mag noemen ook maar enige positieve invloed heeft gehad op het behalen van een doctoraat. Maar het 
dient gezegd: ik kan op jullie rekenen (zeker vanaf de late middag), alles kan, niets moet, en er wordt 
nooit van iets een probleem gemaakt. Het is steeds zeer ontspannend om jullie te zien. 
Afsluiten doe ik in stijl, met Ineke, Flo en ons dochtertje-in-spe. Ineke, ik weet natuurlijk al lang dat ik 
met mijn gat in de boter ben gevallen met jou. Toch verbaasde ik me er over hoe makkelijk je het me 
de laatste maanden hebt gemaakt. Ik weet niet of de verhaallijn van de afstuderende doctoraatstudent 
Bob in de televisiesoap Thuis er iets mee te maken heeft, maar je vond het blijkbaar normaal dat ik 
veel werk had en je klaagde nooit wanneer ik ’s avonds en in de weekends achter mijn computer ging 
zitten. Indien Thuis er effectief iets mee te maken heeft wil ik ook de makers van Thuis bedanken, we 
zijn nu toch bezig. En dan nog een klein woordje voor een klein meisje. Flo, in tegenstelling tot je 
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mama kon jij niet begrijpen dat mijn doctoraat even het middelpunt van de aarde was. En je had 
natuurlijk gelijk: het allerbelangrijkste ben en blijf jij (nu wordt het toch persoonlijk). De volgende 
jaren ga je met een tandje minder op de klasfoto’s staan, maar ik ben er zeker van dat je de ster blijft. 
Binnenkort komt er een zusje bij, het kan alleen maar nog beter worden. 
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1. Natural resource management: the oldest topical problem 
This thesis is focused on the economic analysis of policy instruments that aim to sustain the extraction 
of wood from forests. Forest management, together with all other types of natural resource1 
management (and exploitation), has become a highly topical problem in the light of the ongoing 
discussions on climate change. Academics have also paid close attention to natural resource 
management. Figure 1-1 demonstrates how this has resulted in a steep increase in the (indexed) 
number of publications on the topic of natural resource management across all academic disciplines2, 
compared to the body of publications in the entire field of economics. The index year is set in 1996, 20 
years ago. The number of publications on forest governance has increased more rapidly, reaching an 
index of over 30,000 in the year 2016.  
 
Figure 1-1: Overall number of publications in the field of economics, related to natural resource and forest 
management.  
NOTE.- Data presented per query for period 1964 – 2016, Index year 1996 = 100. Data: Web of science query on “natural 
resource management” and “forest governance”, and the total number of publications in the field of economics. In reference 
year 1996, a total of 1180 economic publications were recorded via Web of Science, 273 publications addressed natural 
resource management and 1 single publications addressed forest management issues. In 2016, these numbers increased to 
respectively 4396, 2089, and 322. 
The increased academic interest in natural resources has resulted in the emergence of ‘Resource and 
environmental economics’ as a sub-discipline within economics (Perman 2003). However, the 
attention paid to natural resources in economic theory is not just a contemporary phenomenon. Perman 
(2003) described how resource and environmental economics has its roots in the era of the industrial 
                                                     
1
 Perman et al. (2003) define natural resources (or natural capital) as all naturally provided stocks. A non-
exhaustive list includes aquifers and water systems, fertile land, crude oil and gas, forests, fisheries and other 
stocks of biomass, genetic material, and the earth’s atmosphere. 
2
 Web of Science records over 100 scientific disciplines reporting on the topic of natural resource management. 
Important examples are Economics, Ecology, Geography, Forestry, Anthropology, …  
Introduction 
3 
 
revolution in Europe. Natural resources and environmental issues were already major concerns for the 
18th and 19th century classical economists. Adam Smith (1776) was the first to stress the importance of 
markets in resource allocation. Thomas Malthus (1798) and David Ricardo (1817) furthered Smith’s 
conclusions and considered natural resources (and notably land) as determinants of national wealth 
and growth. They assumed that land had limited availability and was a necessary input for production. 
The limited availability should eventually result in a steady-state economy3. Conservationist thinking 
first appeared in the work of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who attributed amenity values to land (e.g. 
intrinsic beauty of the countryside). 
Going back even further, the Old Testament commands mankind to properly manage natural resources 
and prohibits unnecessary waste (Sedlacek 2011). In Greek mythology, King Erysichthon of Thessaly 
was cursed after cutting down all the trees in the sacred grove of Demeter. He needed the wood to 
build a banqueting hall, which was considered a waste of natural resources. The curse was an 
insatiable hunger which eventually made King Erysichthon of Thessaly eat himself (Robertson 1984). 
The oldest reference to natural resource management is found in one of the oldest written texts ever 
found: the epic of Gilgamesh, from the Babylonian era, ca 1200 BC. The epic describes how King 
Gilgamesh makes use of cedar trees for the first time as the raw material for the construction of a city. 
Before Gilgamesh, forests were considered too dangerous to enter, and no cedar trees were extracted. 
Gilgamesh for the first time ‘domesticates’ nature (Sedlacek 2011). 
To summarize, natural resources and the environment are indeed topical issues in the light of the 
current climate change debate. However, the attention given to natural resources is not a contemporary 
phenomenon. The relationship between mankind and natural resources has been documented 
throughout our entire history and economists have devoted ample attention to these issues since the 
18th century. 
2. Background 
2.1. Importance of forests 
Economists rightfully pay a great deal of attention to forests since, in the context of problems 
associated with climate change and biodiversity, they are important for two reasons. First, forests 
provide services that can mitigate the current and future effects of climate change on people. CIFOR 
(2016) provides a non-exhaustive list of mitigating services provided by forests: regulating waterways, 
protecting soil, cooling cities and entire regions. In rural areas, forests can prevent communities from 
losing all income and food sources in the case of (climate change initiated) disasters and agricultural 
                                                     
3
 Hence, they did not advocate, or predict unlimited growth or wealth accumulation. 
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crop failure. This thesis does not discuss the (biological) nature of the processes in detail. Second, 
forests are key in halting climate change. The FAO (2016a) identified four major roles for forests in 
climate change: 
1. Forests can potentially absorb one-tenth of the global carbon emissions projected for the first 
half century into their biomass, soils, and products ‘and store them in perpetuity’4. Research 
presented by the The Global Carbon Project (2016) finds that forests can store up to 31% of 
annual emissions; 
2. In contrast, forests contribute about one-sixth of global carbon emissions when cleared, 
overused or degraded. Simultaneously, The Global Carbon Project (2016) reports that 
deforestation (not including forest degradation) accounts for 9% of global emissions; 
3. Forests react sensitively to climate change; 
4. Sustainably managed forests produce fuel wood as a less harmful alternative to fossil fuels. 
Tropical forests are particularly important in this respect, as they account for 55% of the global forest 
stock. In addition, the Amazon basin and the Congo basin are the largest contiguous blocks (Pan et al. 
2011, Hansen et al. 2013, Doetterl et al. 2015). 
For these reasons, forestry has acquired a prominent role in initiatives that aim to address climate 
change, since the start of an international coordinated initiative in Kyoto, Japan, 1997 (FAO 2016a). 
More recently, this resulted in the organization of the FAO’s XIV World Forestry Congress, in 
Durban, South Africa, 2015. This congress provided a key message to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the potentially important role of forests for the 
adoption of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development (FAO 2015a). The message targeted policy 
makers prior to the start of the negotiations on the new climate change agreement in December 2015, 
Paris, France. Chapter 2 of this thesis has been presented at the XIV World Forestry Congress.  
2.2. Deforestation and forest degradation: definition and drivers 
The second role identified by the FAO (2016a) describes how clearance, overuse, and degradation of 
forest increases carbon emissions and threatens forests. In the context of carbon emissions, the most 
commonly used terminology is forest degradation and deforestation. Olander et al. (2008) define both 
concepts as follows:  
• Deforestation: a measurable, and sustained decrease in crown cover below a 10-30% threshold 
                                                     
4
 The usefulness and reliability of studies that aim to calculate carbon storage capacity ‘in perpetuity’ is not clear 
as a tree cannot store carbon in perpetuity. In addition, the prospected carbon emissions also are subject to a 
degree of uncertainty. 
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• Forest degradation: a loss of biomass density without a change in the area of forest cover (i.e. 
the decrease in crown cover does not fall below the threshold) 
The measurement and quantification of deforestation and forest degradation is challenging because it 
requires a combination of remote sensing and field inventory measurements. This is a time-consuming 
and expensive activity (Goetz et al. 2015). At present, the lack of reliable data on deforestation and 
forest degradation impedes the discussion on both phenomena and their contribution to carbon 
emissions and climate change (Federici et al. 2015, Doetterl et al. 2015, De Frenne and Verheyen 
2016). Countries seem wary to publicly share information on their forest cover and forest change. In 
2013, Brazil was the only country to produce and share spatially explicit information on annual forest 
extent and change (Hansen et al. 2013). However, this discussion goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Earlier research has identified numerous drivers for deforestation and forest degradation. While often 
those drivers differ between regions, in general the main cause of deforestation is commercial 
agriculture – including commercial livestock and major crops – followed by subsistence agriculture 
(Hosonuma et al. 2012, Kissinger et al. 2012). In addition, mining, hydroelectricity, and other 
infrastructure projects also put pressure on forests. New roads can indirectly impact on forested areas 
since they open up new areas to settlers and for agriculture.   
Forest degradation is mainly driven by wood extraction and logging, ‘followed by fuel wood 
collection and charcoal production, uncontrolled fire and livestock grazing’ (Hosonuma et al. 2012, 
Kissinger et al. 2012). Also, in the case of forest degradation, some drivers might be more influential 
in one region compared to another5. 
FAO (2015c) calculated how 129 million hectares of forested area have been lost since 1990. Also, 
taking into account the changes in natural forests over planted forests, 239 million hectares of forested 
area have been lost. This lost forest area is larger than the Democratic Republic of Congo, or 78 times 
the size of Belgium. The forest loss is mainly in the tropics, while the temperate forest area has 
slightly increased in size (Keenan et al. 2015). This thesis acknowledges the usefulness of planted 
forests as providers of wood, resources, and economic development. Nevertheless, natural forests are 
more valuable as a provider of ecosystem services (Gamfeldt et al. 2013).  
The above describes a negative trend in the global forested area. However, some regions experienced a 
recovery of their forested area. According to Barbier and Tesfaw (2015), forest recovery is occurring 
for decades in developed regions, but more recently also occurs in developing countries (e.g. 
Bangladesh, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, India, Morocco, and Vietnam). Mather (1992) 
first introduced the concept of ‘forest transition’ to refer to the turnaround from deforestation into 
forest recovery. In the rationale of forest transition, a decline in a country’s forest cover predominantly 
                                                     
5
 Hosonuma et al. (2012) distinguished regions at continent level (i.e. Africa, Asia, and Latin America) 
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occurs in the country’s early stages of economic development. Following this period, the forest area is 
likely to (partially) recover through the conservation of remaining primary forest, the emergence of 
plantations and reforestation. As such, the forest transition coincides with the country’s era of 
economic prosperity. This offers a ‘long-run perspective on land-use management; a country that is 
deforesting today may not necessarily continue to convert forest land in the future but eventually 
transition to a stage of forest recovery’ (Barbier and Tesfaw 2015). 
Empirical data of Hansen et al. (2013), gathered through applied earth observation satellite data, 
compares the global forest loss and the global forest recovery. They found higher losses (2.3 million 
square kilometers) compared to gains (0.8 million square kilometers) from 2000 to 2012.  
2.3. Consequences of unsustainable forest management 
The second role identified by the FAO (2016a) indicates that deforestation and forest degradation 
contribute about one-sixth of global carbon emissions. Both phenomena are a consequence of the 
deployment of human activities in forests. Federici et al. (2015) investigated the emissions more 
thoroughly by making use of the most recent Forest Resource Assessment6 by FAO (2015c) and 
considered the impact of deforestation and forest degradation separately. They found that emissions 
through deforestation have decreased significantly (from an average of 4.0 Gt CO2 per year during 
2001-2010, to 2.9 Gt CO2 per year during 2011-2015). Longitudinal analysis demonstrates that as 
such, the importance of land-use change in global CO2 emissions decreased from 36% in 1960 to 9% 
in 2006-2015 (The Global Carbon Project 2016). Brazil accounts for half of this reduction on its own, 
indicating that deforestation remains problematic in other countries and regions. Indeed, tropical South 
America is held responsible for 1.3 Gt of CO2 emissions, but simultaneously Brazil managed to 
achieve the largest decline in annual forest loss (20 000 km2/year) in this region. This indicates that 
other countries in the tropical region experience greater percentage of forest cover loss (Hansen et al. 
2013). Note that part of the carbon emissions related to land-use change is a consequence of specific 
(accidental) events. Increased fires during dry El Niño conditions in Asia for example resulted in 
above average emissions in 2015 (The Global Carbon Project 2016). Concerning forest degradation, 
Federici et al. (2015) observe an opposite trend: emissions from forest degradation have increased 
three-fold (from 0.35 Gt CO2 during 1991-2000 to 0.9 Gt CO2 during 2011-2015). 
Note that the decreasing emissions from deforestation do not suggest deforestation has been halted. In 
contrast, due to continuous deforestation and forest degradation, forests perform worse as a net carbon 
sink at global level. During 2001-2010, forests removed 2.2 Gt CO2 per year. However, they could 
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 These assessments monitor the state of the world’s forests on a five to ten year interval. The most recent 
available assessment was published in 2015.  
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only remove 2.1 Gt CO2 per year during 2011-2015. As such, forests have lost 5% of their capacity to 
contribute as global carbon sinks (Federici et al. 2015).  
A well-known indicator for the human pressure on nature is the environmental footprint7 (Galli 2015). 
The environmental footprint quantifies the ‘human appropriation of natural capital as a source or a 
sink’ (Hoekstra and Wiedmann 2014). This provides an estimate of the surface of land required as a 
resource and the surface of land needed as a carbon sink. At present, human appropriation of bio 
productive area requires the equivalent of 1.6 Earths, with per capita footprints being much higher in 
high-income countries compared to middle- and low-income countries (Global Footprint Network 
2017).  
A two-step procedure determines the environmental footprint. At the first stage, ‘unit’ environmental 
footprints are calculated for a single human activity or process. At the second stage, those unit 
environmental footprints can be aggregated in order to calculate the footprint of a product, consumer, 
producer, or for an entire geographical region. Hence, the footprint can also be calculated at global 
level by aggregating the footprints of all human activities across the globe (Hoekstra and Wiedmann 
2014). 
Aggregation also allows us to determine the share of the footprint related to demand for forest 
products within the global environmental footprint. Three types of primary products compose the 
overall forest products footprint: fuel wood, wood and pulp used as raw material to produce derived 
wood products (Lin et al. 2016). The forest products’ footprint can be interpreted as the area of forest 
land which is needed to supply the required volume of wood for fuel and derived products8. In 2016, 
the forest product footprint accounted for 9.63% of the total global environmental footprint (Global 
Footprint Network 2016). This is a higher share than the footprint of built-up land9 (2.26%) fishing 
grounds (3.10%) and grazing land (5.58%). Only cropland (19.85%) and the carbon footprint 
(59.57%) account for higher shares in the total global environmental footprint. Note, however, that the 
carbon and forest products’ footprints are presented separately. This results in an underestimation of 
the contribution of forests to global carbon emissions, since forest degradation and deforestation has 
an indirect relationship to the carbon footprint10 (Lin et al. 2016).  
                                                     
7
 This metric only considers the aspect of bio capacity (to produce for example fuel wood and wood products) in 
order to assess the impact of human pressure on nature. It does not take other negative externalities into account 
(e.g. pollution, loss of habitat,…) (Galli 2015). The environmental footprint is different from the ecological 
footprint which quantifies the amount of the Earth’s energy that someone uses. 
8
 The footprint of forest products is calculated by comparing wood harvests to annual net growth rates of forests 
at global level. The required data for these calculations stems from numerous databases including FAO statistics 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Lin et al. 2016). 
9
 The built-up land footprint equals the area of bio productive land which is occupied by human activities. 
10
 The carbon footprint equals the required forested area to sequester carbon emissions. The amount of carbon 
which can be allocated to a specific region/country depends on the conversion factor which is calculated by 
taking four factors into account: 1) yield of productive land required to absorb carbon, 2) amount of carbon into 
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2.4. Sustainable forest management: climate change mitigation and 
economic opportunity 
According to Federici et al. (2015), maintaining and increasing the importance of forests as a carbon 
sink can be achieved through: 
• Avoiding deforestation 
• Avoiding forest degradation 
• Afforestation of degraded land 
Theoretically, both deforestation and forest degradation can be avoided through sustainable forest 
management (Brandt et al. 2016). Hence, sustainable forest management becomes an important 
instrument for climate change mitigation (and biodiversity conservation). Sustainable forest 
management does not necessarily imply that the forests should become non-productive. Instead, 
forests are, and should be, ‘more than trees’ and are essential for food security and improving 
livelihoods (FAO 2015a). This is confirmed by Canadell and Raupach (2008) who state that ‘with 
political will and the involvement of tropical regions, forests can contribute to climate change 
protection through carbon sequestration as well as offering economic, environmental, and 
sociocultural benefits’. Also the outcomes of the FAO’s XIV World Forestry Conference stress the 
economic importance of forests by emphasizing the role of ‘forests, trees, and forestry in national 
economic development’ (FAO 2015a). 
An non-exhaustive list of economic benefits of the presence and exploitation of forests in a region 
includes employment and income generation in forest restoration, forest conservation, wood 
production and wood-based manufacturing; tenure reform which can guarantee local communities’ 
rights; payments for forest-related services; providing food, energy, shelter, fodder and fiber; and 
sustaining agriculture (FAO 2015a, FAO 2013). 
The reason to stress the economic importance of forests in sustainable forest management is twofold. 
First, the economic importance of forests at present is considerable. The World Bank (2016) calculated 
how forests annually generate a gross value added of about 1% of the global GDP, this is the 
equivalent of 560 billion euro. In some countries, forests account for a more important share in 
national GDP (e.g. 6% in Cameroon). About 350 million people depend on forests for subsistence and 
income. Of those, 60 million people are completely dependent on forests11 (Newton et al. 2016, World 
Bank 2016).  
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yields (Lin et al. 2016). 
11
 An entire debate on the definition of ‘forest-dependent people’ exists. Newton et al. (2016) nicely provided an 
extensive overview of the different aspects of forest-dependency and indicated that, depending on the applied 
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Second, avoiding the use of wood prevents forestlands from generating economic rents. A vast body 
of literature argues that forestlands with no or low rents are more prone to conversion into other uses 
which generate higher rents (e.g. agriculture, plantation forests, pasture). In this context, safeguarding 
the long-term wood stock in sustainably managed forests can generate competitive rents and avoid 
land conversion (Agrawal et al. 2008, Angelsen 2010, Brandt et al. 2016, STTC 2016). Other research 
comes to conflicting conclusions, however, as proof cannot be found that sustainable forest 
management which simultaneously allows wood extraction avoids deforestation (Blackman et al. 
2015, Brandt et al. 2016) or forest degradation (McDermott et al. 2015). 
2.5. Initiatives to promote sustainable forest management 
As mentioned, sustainable forest management and reforestation are key in the concept of forest 
transition. However, forest transition (recovery) cannot solely be explained by the stage of economic 
development or level of GDP per capita. Numerous authors describe how forest transitions in low- and 
middle-income countries are also influenced by institutional aspects such as the rule of law, forest 
policy and regulatory quality (Barbier and Tesfaw 2015), property rights, level of corruption 
(Wolfersberger et al. 2015), and market distortions (Barbier et al. 2017). Hence, governance quality is 
assumed to be crucial for forest transition. Sloan (2015) however urges caution ‘in designing specific 
government policies to encourage the forest transition’. In Panama, he observed how forest transition 
might as well be the result of gradual transformation of economies (e.g. a shift in employment over 
several decades from agricultural to off-farm activities).  
Governance is not only key in facilitating forest transitions. It also is key in developing sustainable 
forest management techniques. Numerous initiatives promote sustainable forest management 
practices. These initiatives are too different in scale and funding, scattered, and region-dependent for a 
comprehensive overview to be provided. Instead, this section discusses the main international 
strategies to promote sustainable forest management, and focuses on the strategies that are further 
discussed in the following chapters of this thesis. Afforestation strategies are not discussed in detail 
because they link less to sustainable forest management. Nevertheless, international organizations pay 
ample attention to afforestation projects12.  
In recent history, one of the main international initiatives is REDD+, short for ‘Reducing Emissions 
through avoided Deforestation and Forest Degradation’. REDD+ emerged out of the UNFCCC 
                                                     
definition, very diverse numbers can be found for forest-dependent people. The estimate applied by the World 
Bank research is a rather nuanced number. Estimates mentioned by the European Sustainable Tropical Timber 
Coalition, for example, mention 1.6 billion forest-dependent people. 
12
 E.g.: numerous afforestation and reforestation projects are covered under the clean development mechanism. 
However, the uptake of these projects proceeds slowly, however. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2013). Afforestation and Reforestation Projects under the Clean 
Development Mechanism. Bonn, Germany. 
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negotiations and aims to provide financial incentives for developing countries to halt 
deforestation, conserve biodiversity, and mitigate climate change. The financial incentive 
represents remuneration for the carbon captured in trees, or avoided carbon emissions. This 
remuneration should be funded through the emergence of a carbon market. Ultimately, this should 
also encourage sustainable development and reduce poverty in the countries concerned (IIED 2017). 
At its start in 2005, REDD+ was known as REDD (without plus) and mainly aimed for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. At UN COP-16, it was decided to add three new 
elements. A plus was added (resulting in REDD+) to stress the additional foci: 
• Conservation of forest carbon stocks 
• Sustainable management of forests 
• Enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
As such, REDD+ aims for forests which simultaneously contribute to poverty alleviation and 
ecological issues (climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation and sustaining vital ecosystem 
services) (UN REDD 2017). 
Since 2005, over 500 REDD+ projects have benefited from financial support. Those projects 
considerably differ in nature. Angelsen and Rudel (2013) describe how the efficiency of forest 
conservation strategies within the context of REDD+ depends on the phase of forest land use. In the 
situation of large forest cover and limited deforestation, a region should implement projects with a 
focus on improved forest management. Regions facing deforestation should implement projects which 
generate payments for reduced deforestation. If the forested area is about to recover, or in the process 
of forest transition, the REDD+ projects should focus on reforestation. 
However, most of these projects received funding from multilateral and bilateral donors (e.g. the 
World Bank, UN REDD initiative). Only ten percent of these projects received funding through 
the carbon market, which was the initially intended source of funding (Fletcher et al. 2016, 
Corbera and Schroeder 2011). This indicates that the implementation of REDD+ faces problems in 
securing funding. In addition REDD+ faces difficulties in overcoming opposition by local 
communities who are suspicious of outsiders’ interference (Hajjar and Kozak 2017, Sunderlin et al. 
2015, Yasmi et al. 2012). Consequently, the future for REDD+ has started to look less bright. Fletcher 
et al. (2016) describe how the UNFCCC COP21 Paris agreement still mentions REDD+ as part of its 
forest conservation strategy, but that the market-based mechanism to generate carbon credits has 
already finished. More in particular, they claim that the required remuneration (i.e. at least the revenue 
they seek to offset) is too high. 
McDermott et al. (2015) identify two other ‘widely promoted strategies to govern tropical forests’: 
state-based legality initiatives and non-state eco-certification. Both strategies are trade-based 
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governance initiatives that aim to foster explicit demand for wood which is extracted legally, out of 
sustainably managed forests, respectively (McDermott et al. 2015, Elliott 2000). A certificate 
demonstrates compliance with the legality and sustainability requirements, respectively. It is expected 
that a high demand for certified wood products stimulates compliance with the legality or 
sustainability standards on the supply side of the market. This can positively impact on sustainable 
forest management practices and forest conservation (Damette and Delacote 2011).  
Hence, like REDD+, both initiatives adhere to the idea that sustainably managed forests should allow 
wood extraction. However, unlike REDD+, the legality and eco-certification initiatives require a high 
involvement on the demand side of the wood market. Consumers are an involved party in the final 
stage of the value chain and should not be considered as interfering outsiders. This approach could 
prevent the community-outsider conflicts which often impede the implementation of REDD+ projects 
(Yasmi et al. 2012). At present, no specific reference has been found that describes a lower risk for 
community-outsider conflicts in the case of legality-, or eco-certification. However, a Web of Science 
query which combines ‘outsider’ and ‘REDD+’ finds 6 relevant articles on community-outsider 
conflicts13, while various queries looking for community-outsider conflicts in eco-certification or 
legality initiatives do not find relevant articles. This at least indicates that this problem is less topical 
in the latter context. Both types of certification are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
2.5.1. Eco-certification 
Eco-certification of forest and wood products became an important tool to improve producers’ 
environmental performance (Blackman and Naranjo 2012, Jaung et al. 2016). Eco-certified producers 
must comply with various sustainability standards which aim for more sustainable forest management 
(Cashore et al. 2006)14. Those standards include both environmental and social guidelines (Murray and 
Abt 2001).  
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification 
Schemes (PEFC) dominate the international certified wood market (FAO 2014a). They reported a 
combined global total of 462 million hectares of certified forests in May 2016 (UNECE 2016). This 
includes (an estimated) 29.5 million hectares of double certified forest area. Excluding the double 
certified forest area, FSC and PEFC together certify 10.9% of the global forest area. According to 
UNECE (2016), 29% of global industrial roundwood production originates from the certified forest 
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 Including: PATEL, T., DHIAULHAQ, A., GRITTEN, D., YASMI, Y., DE BRUYN, T., PAUDEL, N. S., 
LUINTEL, H., KHATRI, D. B., SILORI, C. and SUZUKI, R. (2013). 'Predicting future conflict under REDD+ 
implementation', Forests, Vol. 4, pp. 343-363, YASMI, Y., KELLEY, L., MURDIYARSO, D. and PATEL, T. 
(2012). 'The struggle over Asia's forests: An overview of forest conflict and potential implications for REDD+', 
International Forestry Review, Vol. 14, pp. 99-109. MULYANI, M. and JEPSON, P. (2015). 'Social learning 
through a REDD+ ‘village agreement’: Insights from the KFCP in Indonesia', Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 56, 
pp. 79-95.  
14
 This includes protecting old growth forests, conserving natural habitats, and encouraging local employment. 
Chapter 1 
12 
 
area. However, the regional distribution of the certified forest area is apparent. The Northern 
hemisphere accounts for 87% of the global certified forest area, while the Southern hemisphere only 
accounts for 13% (UNECE 2016). 
The geographical concentration of certified forest area in the Northern hemisphere could be explained 
by differences in the costs relating to certification. This cost consists of a direct and an indirect 
component. The direct costs are the costs of the certification process15 and do not differ regionally. 
Because the direct costs are independent of the country and enterprise, they are harder for small-scale 
producers to bear. Consequently, small-scale and community-based enterprises face greater difficulties 
in obtaining certification (Nebel et al. 2005). Small-scale producers are generally found in the 
Southern hemisphere (Dranove and Jin 2010)16. The indirect costs comprise all costs required to 
change management practices to meet certification standards (Bass 2001) 17. The magnitude of the 
indirect cost is inversely related to the quality of the current practices. This rationale is in line with 
research by Vedel et al. (2015) who found greater reluctance for providing eco-system services by 
producers with poor management practices. Poorly managed forests are mainly situated in the 
Southern hemisphere, resulting in higher indirect certification costs in this hemisphere. In addition, 
producers in developing regions also face other barriers to certification, such as a lack of information 
and political support (Damette and Delacote 2011, Carlsen et al. 2012). Low institutional quality in 
developing regions has also been identified as an obstacle to forest transitions. 
Despite these difficulties in the South, forest certification is considered a useful tool for the 
conservation of – especially – tropical forests. Traditional conservation policies, such as international 
forest conservation agreements, national forest policy reform, and the creation of additional protected 
areas, were not able to significantly reduce unsustainable logging in tropical forests (Auld et al. 2008). 
This was partly because the governments responsible for the tropical forests lack the capacity to 
adequately manage natural resources and enforce pertinent forestry and land-use regulations (Ebeling 
and Yasué 2009, Kramer et al. 1997) and to provide secure land tenure (Smith et al. 2003). As a result, 
in the last two decades, market-based instruments involving non-state actors, such as forest 
certification, have been promoted as economically attractive alternatives that are less dependent on 
public resources and governance capacity and are, therefore, potentially more effective in tropical 
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 Audit costs, certification fees, and the costs of meeting corrective action requests (CARs). CARs might, for 
example, imply changes to forest management techniques following an observed infringement during an audit. 
16
 Notice the discrepancy between the scale of ownership and production. Forest landownership is the Global 
South is highly skewed, which also implies the presence of large landowners. Large landowners might be small 
scale wood producers if they do not use all available forested area to produce wood. According to Brandt (2016), 
approximately half of the remaining global permanent tropical forest estate is used for wood production. 
17
 E.g. higher investment in infrastructure and machinery in order to be able to harvest more efficiently with 
lower impacts, higher wage costs by paying legally specified wages and providing social benefits, and 
opportunity costs of reducing wood production to sustainable levels. 
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developing countries (Gullison 2003, Auld et al. 2008). This turns forest certification into a 
transnational, non-governmental approach to environmental regulation and development.  
According to the assumption of competitive behavior, producers will only switch to certified 
production if the additional costs are compensated by a price premium (Carlsen et al. 2012). This is 
confirmed by the International Tropical Timber Council who claims that without ‘tangible benefits 
deriving from certification in terms of profitability or competitiveness, enterprises will have little 
incentive to improve forest management with higher costs’ (ITTC 2004)18. The small certified forest 
area in the Southern hemisphere suggests that the price premium does not cover the higher costs in this 
hemisphere (Carlson and Palmer 2016, Simula et al. 2004).  
It is reasonable to assume that environmentally aware consumers are willing to pay a price premium in 
order to acquire sustainably produced wood products (Agrawal et al. 2014). While certified and 
conventional wood are physically homogenous, the certified products are differentiated by their 
credence qualities (Dulleck et al. 2011). The credence qualities relate to environmental and societal-
friendly production practices that entail additional costs which require remuneration on top of the 
conventional wood price (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Ferraro and Simpson 2002, Groom and Palmer 2010, 
Dulleck et al. 2011, Groom and Palmer 2014, Carlson and Palmer 2016, Brusselaers et al. 2017). This 
price premium turns certification into a market-based instrument with voluntary price signals (Pirard 
2012, Veisten 2007). However, the price premium is not the result of a contingent valuation method 
which monetarizes the environmental and societal gains. Instead the price premium only represents the 
consumers’ marginal utility for the credence qualities of certified wood. An increasing body of 
literature analyses the monetarization of ecosystem services (e.g. Schaubroeck 2016, Scarlett 2015) 
but this discussion falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
FSC and PEFC adhere to different strategies concerning the price premium, however. On the one 
hand, FSC explicitly pursues a price premium. Depending on the type of operation and wood, certified 
products would fetch a price premium of up to 25% (FSC 2012). On the other hand, PEFC does not 
necessarily expect a price premium for all types of wood (PEFC 2001).  
FSC and PEFC do not only differ with respect to their stance on the price premium, but also in terms 
of their main approaches. While FSC has designed universal principles that must be applied locally, 
PEFC harmonizes criteria and indicators drawn up at regional level (Levin et al. 2008). Both 
certification schemes are engaged in fierce competition, which occasionally results in the questioning 
of each other’s trustworthiness (PEFC 2009). However, the competition between both certification 
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schemes is welcomed by many, since the presence of two competing global schemes ensures good 
protection of all stakeholders’ interests (PEFC 2011). 
Whether or not certification is effective in sustaining forest management and entailing a positive 
societal impact is an important discussion, but not part of this thesis. Multiple case studies have 
investigated the impact of PEFC and/or FSC. The conclusions are not homogenous. Most authors 
acknowledge a positive impact on forest conservation and sustainable forest management practices, 
and societal aspects (Damette and Delacote 2011, Miteva et al. 2015, Nebel et al. 2005, Blackman and 
Naranjo 2012). On the other hand, some authors stress the danger of overestimating the potential of 
voluntary eco-certification (Alves-Pinto et al. 2015, Lambin et al. 2014, Dauvergne and Lister 2010). 
Nevertheless, within the context of forest transitions, eco-certification can in theory contribute to 
forest recovery. Barbier and Tesfaw (2015) describe how forest transitions can, among others, be 
achieved through the conservation of primary forest and plantations. Eco-certification and legality 
verification ultimately aim for forest conservation and sustainable forest management. In addition, the 
certification schemes (and subsequently the legality initiatives) more recently developed principles for 
certified plantation management. The emergence of plantations is identified as a second driver for 
forest transitions by Barbier and Tesfaw (2015). 
2.5.2. Legality initiatives 
An increasing number of developed countries are making it unlawful to import or trade illegal wood 
(products). Illegal wood in this narrative is harvested, processed, transported, bought, or sold in 
contravention of national and international laws (European Commission 2017d). Some examples: 
• United States of America (USA): the Lacey Act was introduced in 1900 to ban the transport of 
illegally captured animals or wildlife products into the USA. In 2008, this Act was amended to 
extend its scope to include wood, paper and other forest products (Prestemon 2015).  
• Australia: the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act was passed in 2012. In accordance with the US 
Lacey Act, the Australian act prohibits the import of illegally logged wood and wood products 
into Australia, and prohibits the processing of Australian-grown logs that have been illegally 
harvested (European Commission 2017a).  
• European Union (EU): the FLEGT Action Plan was established in 2003. FLEGT is short for 
‘Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade’ and aims to reduce illegal logging by 
‘strengthening sustainable and legal forest management, improving governance and promoting 
trade in legally produced wood’ (European Commission 2017d, Tegegne et al. 2017). This 
action plan targets tropical countries in particular (Wodschow et al. 2016, Wan and Toppinen 
2016). Part of FLEGT is the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) which bans illegal timber 
imports. 
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Both the Lacey Act (USA) and FLEGT (EU) assign the responsibility for the proof of legality to wood 
operators. From this point on, this section further investigates the EU-context. 
In the EU, the EUTR stipulates the requirements of a Due Diligence System (DDS). The three key 
elements of the DDS are 1) Information: The operator must have access to information describing the 
wood and wood products, country of harvest, species, quantity, details of the supplier and information 
on compliance with national legislation. 2) Risk assessment: The operator should assess the risk of 
illegal wood in his supply chain, based on the information identified above and taking into account 
criteria set out in the regulation. 3) Risk mitigation: When the assessment shows that there is a risk of 
illegal wood in the supply chain that risk can be mitigated by requiring additional information and 
verification from the supplier (European Commission 2015b). The DDS requirements were established 
in 2013 (Leipold 2016). 
The establishment of the DDS comes with a cost at company level, this could potentially result in a 
non-tariff trade barrier (Global Timber Platform 2017, Xu 2000). Therefore, FLEGT provides the 
possibility of negotiating a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) (Lesniewska and McDermott 
2014). A VPA is a ‘legally binding trade agreement between the EU and a wood-producing country 
outside the EU’ (European Commission 2017d). The trade agreement combines legality licensing with 
multi-stakeholder processes19 which aim to address underlying problems of forest governance in the 
country concerned (Lesniewska and McDermott 2014). Addressing the underlying problems can 
require both environmental and societal efforts in the wood-producing countries. In their turn, 
environmental- and societal-friendly production practices restrict forest management options and can 
increase production costs (Van Deusen et al. 2010). An alternative to a VPA in order to bypass the 
DDS is the use of eco-certificates, which is further discussed in the next section and chapter 5. 
A country can only award FLEGT legality licenses to its operators on the precondition of an EU-
approved legality assurance system. FLEGT licensed operators gain automatic access to the EU 
market (Carodenuto and Cerutti 2014) and bypass the DDS requirements (Wodschow et al. 2016, 
European Commission 2017b). Since VPAs are bilateral agreements, the processes of negotiation and 
implementation, and the type of wood products covered by the VPA differ for each country (European 
Commission 2017b, Wiersum and Elands 2013, Van Heeswijk and Turnhout 2013). Consequently, the 
impact of the VPAs also differs across the world. At present, only Indonesia is issuing FLEGT 
licences, the procedure for FLEGT licensing is briefly described below (EU FLEGT Facility 2016): 
• Only FLEGT-licensed organisations (companies, state-owned organisations,…) can export 
FLEGT-licensed wood towards the EU; 
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 With, for example, a focus on support to civil society for independent forest monitoring, capacity building for 
forest ministry officials, public awareness-raising regarding the importance of reducing illegal forest activities or 
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• Organisations applying for a FLEGT-license at company level must pass an audit by a 
licensing authority (e.g. in Indonesia, there are 22 recognised licensing authorities registered 
with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry). Wood producers can obtain a ‘Valid legality 
or sustainable forest management certificate’. Wood operators can obtain a ‘Suppliers 
declaration of conformity’; 
• The costs of the FLEGT audit at company level are borne by the company itself (i.e. the 
wood-based industries, wood depots, traders including exporters, and small-scale privately 
owned – household or cooperative – forests); 
• A FLEGT-licensed organization must conform to the relevant legality standard; 
• FLEGT licensed companies can obtain a FLEGT license for a specific shipment by applying 
in writing to the licensing authority with which it holds a contract. The following documents 
should be attached:  
o A summary of the transport documents for all wood/raw materials received by the 
factory since the last audit (up to maximum of 12 months) 
o Summaries of Wood/Raw Material Balance-Sheet Report, and Processed Wood 
Balance-Sheet Report since the last audit (up to maximum of 12 months) 
FLEGT licenses can only be issued for products within the product scope of the VPA’s annexes. Logs, 
sawn timber, plywood, veneer and railroad sleepers are the minimum products that are covered in all 
VPAs. It is possible to include other types of products, and exclude products which can never be 
licensed. Products out of the VPA’s scope (or originating from countries without a VPA) must pass 
the Due Diligence check. Note that VPAs are bilateral agreements. Hence, if FLEGT-licensed wood is 
first processed (or mixed with other wood) in a country which does not issue FLEGT licenses, it will 
lose its FLEGT license. In this case, the originally FLEGT licensed would has to pass the Due 
Diligence check again. 
At present, the EU has signed a VPA with six countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Liberia, and Republic of the Congo. Currently, only Indonesia is issuing FLEGT licenses. 
Nine other countries are in the process of negotiation: Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. In accordance with the 
observation in the context of forest transition, it can be expected that the uptake of legality verification 
through VPAs is positively correlated to a region’s institutional quality. 
2.5.3. Interaction between different initiatives 
Albeit presented separately, a number of the identified initiatives for sustainable forest management 
interact. The European Commission (2016e), for example, describes how active engagement emerged 
with REDD+ and FLEGT in numerous tropical countries. This allows us to build on the interactions 
between the two processes (they have the same goal to some extent) and make better progress on 
Introduction 
17 
 
delivering the objectives of both. Possible benefits of cooperation between REDD+ and FLEGT are: 
advancement of forest governance reforms, clarification of land tenure, strengthening stakeholder 
engagement and balancing competing interests. 
FLEGT (and its EUTR) also closely interacts with the ‘demand-led, market-based’ initiatives such as 
FSC and PEFC (Lambin et al. 2014). Both eco-certification schemes are in full compliance with the 
EUTR requirements (Trishkin et al. 2015, PEFC 2016). For this reason, both eco-certificates are 
accepted, and explicitly mentioned as sufficient proof of legality within the EUTR (UNECE 2015), 
and eco-certified wood can pass a ‘due diligence light’ which entails lower costs. This has also 
resulted in increased investment in eco-certification schemes by wood importers who want to ensure 
sufficient supply of legal and sustainable wood (European Commission 2014).  
In addition, the European Commission (2014) rightfully refers to policies at national level in support 
of legal and sustainable wood which partially depend upon eco-certification. These national policies 
focus on ‘areas outside the responsibility of the European Commission, such as government 
procurement’. At present, government procurement is gaining momentum as a tool to foster the 
production and consumption of environmentally-sustainable goods and services (Schaltegger et al. 
2014). Once governments take environmental and societal criteria into account, in addition to purely 
economic criteria, when procuring goods and services, this is referred to as Green Public Procurement 
(GPP). On the supply side of the market, GPP must spur the introduction of innovations involving 
sustainable techniques and practices. On the demand side of the market, GPP must reduce the 
transaction costs for adapting to new products and stimulate the uptake of innovations (Edler et al. 
2015).  
An increasing number of governments at national20, European21, and international22 level, explicitly 
refer to the two main certification schemes: FSC and PEFC. Those governments recognize certificates 
as sufficient proof of compliance with the green criteria for wood. More details on GPP and its link 
with eco-certification are provided in chapter two.  
According to Gulbrandsen (2014), governments must not only support (non-governmental) eco-
certification schemes by purchasing eco-certified wood themselves. In addition, they can also support 
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 E.g. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands use their own adapted criteria and processes 
to determine whether certification schemes provide sufficient assurance for GPP. The current consensus of these 
Member States is that, in general, FSC and PEFC provide sufficient levels of assurance based on their national 
criteria. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012). Green Public Procurement a collection of good practices. 
Luxembourg.  
21
 E.g. FSC and PEFC are explicitly recognized as sector specific labels in the EC’s handbook on GPP 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016b) Buying green! A handbook on green public procurement. 3rd Edition, 
Brussels. 
22
 FSC and PEFC comply with the internationally agreed reference point ISO/IEC 17065 EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2016c). 'Green Public Procurement Criteria for Office Building Design, Construction and 
Management', in JRC (ed.), Seville, pp. 140.  
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eco-certification by providing additional services to the producers (e.g. expertise and technical advice, 
as well administrative or financial support). 
3. Objective, scope and methodology 
The second section of this chapter described the contribution of forests to climate change mitigation 
and biodiversity conservation, and how three challenges must be addressed in order to safeguard 
forests’ ecosystem services: combat deforestation, combat forest degradation, promote afforestation. 
Different types of initiatives and policies aim to address these challenges, but this thesis specifically 
on the analysis of policy options which aim to impose sustainability standards to wood production 
through signaling preferences at the demand side of the market. Figure 1-2 provides a visual summary 
of this rationale as it describes how eco-certification and legality verification can formalize the 
sustainability standards.  
The following sections provide a more thorough overview of the objective, scope and outline of this 
thesis. This overview demonstrates how three of the four chapters are situated at the crossroads of 
Environmental and Resource Economics at the one hand and International Economics at the other 
hand. Chapter 3 is situated in Consumer Economics. 
 
Figure 1-2: Scope of the thesis. 
3.1. Thesis objective 
This thesis focuses on the economic analysis of policies which aim to sustain forest management and 
wood extraction from forests by signaling preferences for sustainable wood at the demand side of the 
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market. This should impose sustainability standards to the production of wood (products). Only 
policies which (can) originate in the EU are considered.  
By setting criteria, the demand side of the market can influence the value chain in order to sustain 
forest management. This is visualized in Figure 1-2 as it positions the (theoretical) potential role of the 
wood value chain and the sustainability initiatives in order to safeguard forest ecosystem services in 
the context of climate change and bio-diversity conservation. As indicated in the lower right building 
block in Figure 1-2, the initiatives that emerge out of the demand side of the market encompass both 
non-governmental eco-certification and state-based legality initiatives (McDermott et al. 2015). 
However, governmental and non-governmental initiatives can closely interact. Governments can for 
example design policies such as GPP in support of non-governmental eco-certification. 
3.2. Policies out of scope 
All policies which do not imply consumer involvement and the setting of (legality or environmental) 
standards through signaling preferences at the demand side of the market are outside the scope of this 
thesis. The policies out of scope are visualized in the upper right building block in Figure 1-2 
(‘(International) Initiatives for afforestation & against deforestation and forest degradation’) and for 
example include REDD+ 23.  
In addition, it should be noted that the concerned policies and initiatives specifically focus on wood 
extraction, as wood is the product bought by consumers. Consequently, the initiatives focus more on 
sustainable management of existing forest than on pure afforestation projects. Note that FSC and 
PEFC do not specifically identify afforestation as a goal, although FSC does indicate that its principles 
can be applied to afforestation projects (FSC 2016). 
3.3. International impact assessment of EU-initiated policies  
Albeit this thesis focuses on policies that are initiated in the EU, there is a need to conduct an impact 
assessment of these policies at international level. This is motivated by the observation that regional 
wood markets are ‘increasingly linked through international trade and global environmental policies’ 
(Raunikar et al. 2010). These linkages, allow a pass-through effect of demand and supply shocks in 
one region to other regions’ wood markets. Accordingly, one region’s forest conservation policy can 
lead to deforestation in other regions (Gan and McCarl 2007, Sedjo and Sohngen 2013). As such, the 
interlinkages through trade can become an ‘important driver of environmental degradation’ (Heilmayr 
and Lambin 2016).  
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 In addition to all other international forest conservation agreements, national forest policy reform, and the 
creation of additional protected areas. 
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These observations and statements validate the assumption that policies that are originally initiated in 
the EU can entail a global impact. Furthermore, this assumption is strengthened by the observation 
that the EU is responsible for 20 to 40 % of global purchases of wood products (depending on type) 
(FAO 2015b). Also, eco-certification could potentially contribute towards addressing these 
international issues, as eco-certification is a transnational approach towards forest conservation (Auld 
et al. 2008).  
The need for a global assessment of policies calls for techniques applied in international economics, 
such as spatial equilibrium modelling of international trade flows and time series analysis of historical 
trade flows. The methods applied are briefly explained in the following section.  
3.4. Thesis outline: research questions and methods 
This section provides a brief overview of the remaining chapters of this thesis. Each chapter addresses 
(aspects of) a policy that aims to support initiatives which aim to sustain wood production and forest 
management through the signaling of preferences at the demand side of the market. Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 further analyze aspects of Green Public Procurement (GPP) of eco-certified wood by 
governments. This policy aims to promote the uptake of the sustainability standards set by non-
governmental eco-certification schemes. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 analyze FLEGT as a state-based 
legality initiative. The following sections discusses this in more detail per chapter. 
3.4.1. Modelling green public procurement of eco-certified wood (Chapter 2) 
The first chapter analyses to what extent Green Public Procurement (GPP) of wood in Europe 
succeeds in stimulating the uptake of sustainable wood production and consumption at global level. 
Sustainable wood in this narrative, as in many examples in reality (see section 2.5.3), is defined as 
eco-certified wood.  
This chapter modifies the standard spatial equilibrium model (SEM) by Takayama and Judge (1971) in 
order to analyze the aspired pass-through effect of GPP in the EU on sustainable wood production and 
consumption around the world. The novelty of the SEM is found in the introduction of certified next to 
conventional products. Albeit both types of wood are substitutes, the traditional multi-product models 
cannot be used. The price mechanisms between both products are not based on substitutability, but on 
the price premium. A second modification allows analysis of the impact of government spending by 
distinguishing the governments’ share of final consumption from the households’ share. The price 
mechanism uncovered enables better policy recommendations.  
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3.4.2. Measuring private consumers’ support for green public procurement (Chapter 3) 
 GPP is designed to stimulate both the production and consumption of sustainable (eco-certified) wood 
(Edler et al. 2015). Therefore, this chapter for the first time analyses to what extent private consumers 
support GPP.  
This chapter uses cross-sectional survey data through questionnaires. This allows us to establish 
distinct consumer profiles in terms of demographics, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics. The 
distinct profiles are formed using a two-step segmentation process that combines K-means and 
hierarchical segmentation. Attitudes are compared between these distinct profiles in different scenarios 
in order to uncover unconscious (self-centered) drivers for purchasing eco-certified wood. This 
chapter’s conclusions provide new insights with regard to some commonly accepted drivers for 
sustainable purchases (e.g. environmental concern, perceived consumer effectiveness, and the 
subjective norm). 
3.4.3. Historical analysis of legality requirements to wood imports in the EU (Chapter 4) 
This chapter, for the first time, investigates the impact of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) 
during the implementation process, and its entry into force, by using historical trade data at macro-
economic level. A VPA must eventually offer the possibility of issuing FLEGT licenses which grant 
automatic access to the EU’s wood market. In this context, the FLEGT license serves as proof of 
legality. This chapter’s analysis uses a Vector Autoregression, in combination with the identification 
of a structural change point. This allows us to benchmark Cameroon’s wood exports against its 
regional counterfactual. 
The case of Cameroon is selected because of the importance of Cameroon as a wood exporter, and 
because Cameroon was one of the first to negotiate and conclude a VPA (2007 and 2010 respectively). 
The VPA finally came into force in 2011 (Tegegne et al. 2017). This chapter finds an unusual pattern 
of anticipative and rent-seeking behavior prior to the VPA coming into force. This implies that the 
VPA implementation process can significantly impact on trade flows. In addition, the VPA coming 
into force appears to negatively impact on trade flows. This chapter’s conclusions provide valuable 
insights for current and future VPA negotiations. At present, the EU is negotiating a VPA with nine 
different wood producing countries.  
3.4.4. Modelling legality requirements to wood imports in the EU (Chapter 5) 
The modified SEM which has been developed in Chapter 2 is modified in order to analyze the impact 
of the legality requirements on the EU’s wood market. Two instruments can release wood operators 
from the burden of providing sufficient proof of legality: eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing. Both 
instruments imply a type of labelling (albeit they are respectively non-governmental and governmental 
in nature). Hence the modified SEM’s structure, which allows the introduction of labelled (eco-
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certified in Chapter 2) next to conventional products, also allows analysis of the impact of the EUTR’s 
legality requirements on the international trade of wood. 
This analysis’ output describes underlying price mechanisms which can explain the negative impact of 
Cameroon’s VPA coming into force, as observed in reality (Chapter 4). Understanding this price 
mechanism is essential for policy recommendations in the context of the promotion of sustainable and 
legal wood production (and consumption) by setting minimum standards on the demand side of the 
wood market.
  
 
Chapter 2.  Green Public Procurement of Certified 
Wood: Spatial Leverage Effect and Welfare 
Implications 
Abstract. This chapter presents a novel spatial equilibrium model to analyze the leverage effect of 
green public procurement (GPP) in Europe on demand and supply of sustainable wood. This leverage 
effect is an argument in favor of GPP but it has never been investigated thoroughly, or simultaneously 
for demand and supply. Our research finds that GPP provides an incentive for certification at global 
level. By tapping into previously unused potential consumer and producer surplus, the policy also 
increases global welfare. Unfortunately, these are not Pareto improvements. A trade barrier emerges 
due to the home-effect of domestic consumption patterns. This trade barrier reduces the importance of 
certification and/or welfare in some regions. 
 
Context: Modified Spatial Equilibrium Model in order to investigate the impact of Green Public 
Procurement on global consumption and production of eco-certified wood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
Brusselaers, J., Van Huylenbroeck, G., Buysse, J. (2017). ‘Green Public Procurement of Certified 
Wood: Spatial Leverage Effect and Welfare Implication’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 135, pp. 91-
102.
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1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the impact of Green Public Procurement (GPP) of wood in Europe. GPP implies 
that governments take environmental and sustainability criteria into account in addition to purely 
economic (i.e. price) criteria when procuring goods and services. This can result in a considerable 
demand shock since government procurement accounts for a substantial proportion of final wood 
consumption. Within the EU, this share is estimated at 26.88% (EUROSTAT 2015). 
GPP is gaining momentum as a tool to foster the production and consumption of environmentally-
sustainable goods and services (Schaltegger et al. 2014)24. On the supply side of the market, GPP must 
spur the introduction of innovations involving sustainable techniques and practices. On the demand 
side of the market, GPP must reduce the transaction costs for adapting to new products and stimulate 
the uptake of innovations (Edler et al. 2015).  
The EU formally introduced the possibility for GPP in 2004. Since 2014, two EU Directives 
(Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2015/25/EU) define the legal framework for public procurement. 
These directives seek to ensure greater inclusion of social and environmental considerations (European 
Union 2014). The EU initially set an indicative target that, by 2010, 50% of all public tendering should 
be green (European Commission 2016d). ‘Green’ means that the purchased goods and services comply 
with the EU’s core GPP criteria25. The uptake of GPP at EU-level has been estimated once in 2011, 
but is not systematically monitored by the EU26. This study indicates that 26% of the contracts in the 
sample included all core criteria, while 55% included at least one core criterion27. On the downside, 
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 GPP is especially applied by developed countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. FAO 
(2014b). 'State of the world’s forests, enhancing the socio-economic benefits from forests', FAO, Rome. 
25
 The European Commission has core and comprehensive criteria for GPP of a number of product groups. Core 
criteria are suitable for use by any contracting authority across the Member States and address the key 
environmental impacts. The comprehensive criteria are for those who wish to purchase the best environmental 
products available on the market. Both types of criteria remain voluntary however. The EU publishes extensive 
guidelines for public procurers on the core criteria per product group. Consequently, the core criteria differ per 
product group. 
26
 Some decentralized, non-standardized, monitoring is organized by (local) governments as the EC encourages 
all governments to quantitatively monitor the uptake of GPP and qualitatively review its GPP activities. ‘Several 
EU Member States have introduced, or are in the process of introducing, schemes to monitor national GPP 
implementation, which may set specific procedures to be followed for the gathering of information. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016b) Buying green! A handbook on green public procurement. 3rd Edition, 
Brussels. This decentralized monitoring must enable the improvement of their GPP activities. First of all because 
different aspects of GPP are monitored. Second because this overview would be biased: governments which do 
not apply GPP also do not monitor GPP activities. Unfortunately this decentralized monitoring does not allow 
for a general overview at EU-level. 
27
 The study conducted a survey in which over 850 authorities from 26 Member States participated. This created 
a sample of more than 230.000 contracts, signed by public authorities in 2009, 2010, and 2011 for a value of 
approximately 117.5 billion euro CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, C. O. E. (2012). The uptake 
of Green Public Procurement in the EU27. Brussels.  
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the ‘lowest price criterion’ remained decisive for 64% of the respondents (Centre for European Policy 
Studies 2012). 
The 50% target has not been adapted since 2010, but a Member State can set more ambitious targets in 
its National Action Plan (NAP)28. The European Commission (EC) encourages the Member States to 
develop a publicly available NAP which describes how they will green public purchases. Hence, the 
Member States are free to apply GPP differently according to their preferences/needs (European 
Commission 2016b), despite the EC’s handbook on GPP. So far, 23 Member States have established a 
NAP. 
Besides the lack of proper monitoring of the uptake of GPP, there is currently no theoretical or 
empirical basis for the impact of GPP (Georghiou et al. 2014). To our knowledge, no quantitative 
study has measured the spillover effect of GPP on private consumption. In addition, the existing 
qualitative literature comes to conflicting conclusions. Akenji (2014) finds no proof for the spillover 
effect of GPP on private consumption while other authors stress the importance of GPP for stimulating 
private green purchases (Pacheco-Blanco and Bastante-Ceca 2016, Tarantini et al. 2011). On the 
supply side of the market, only anecdotal evidence points to the leverage effect of GPP (Georghiou et 
al. 2014). The existing qualitative studies have a descriptive focus. The few quantitative studies focus 
on good practices, not on the uptake and leverage effect (Zhu et al. 2013). No study analyses the 
impact of GPP at both sides of the market simultaneously. This is an important flaw in literature since 
it is the objective of GPP to motivate suppliers to innovate towards sustainability and simultaneously 
encourage consumers to buy sustainable products and services. Unfortunately, these flaws in literature 
negatively affect the design of current GPP policies (Georghiou et al. 2014). 
This chapter for the first time quantifies the leverage effect of GPP in Europe on the consumption and 
production of green wood. The case of wood is selected for two reasons. First, governments within the 
EU are important wood consumers. They account for 26.88% of the final wood consumption29. This 
surpasses the governments’ share in overall final consumption within the EU (approximately 19%) 
(EUROSTAT 2015, European Commission 2016b). Second, wood is important in a government’s 
spending. At EU level, three of the ten priority groups for GPP at least partially exist out of wood: 
Furniture, Copying & Graphic Paper, and Construction30. At Member State level, an increasing 
                                                     
28
 For example: the Dutch government set a 100 % Sustainable Procurement target to be reached by 2015 and the 
Flemish government in Belgium targets 100% sustainable procurement by 2020 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(2011). Buying green! A handbook on environmental public procurement. Brussels. 
29
 To our knowledge, no comparative data exists which list the governments’ market shares per product per 
country. However, some individual case studies relate to the wood sector. The UK government, for example, 
purchases 30 – 50 % of office furniture EFECA (2010). 'An assessment of the impacts of the UK Government's 
timber procurement policy', London, UK. 
30
 The EC selected priority product groups based upon two criteria. First, the environmental impact of the 
product group, and the accompanying need for green criteria. Second, the importance of the product group in 
total public procurement. 
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number of NAPs stipulate mandatory rules for the use of wood in specific product groups31, despite 
the voluntary nature of a NAP (European Commission 2015a). Due to the prominent role of wood in 
public procurement, this case can set an example for other product groups which are frequently 
purchased by governments. 
If all European governments implement GPP, this chapter assumes they exclusively buy (eco-) 
certified wood. Certified wood in this narrative is the green alternative to conventional wood. This 
assumption is further explained and justified in section 2. The FSC- and PEFC-certificate dominate the 
certified wood market (FAO 2014a). In May 2015, 10.9% of the total global forest area was FSC or 
PEFC certified. The regional distribution of the certified area is, however, apparent: The Northern 
hemisphere accounts for 89% of the globally certified area while the Southern hemisphere only 
accounts for 11% (UNECE 2015).  
Certified and conventional wood are physically homogenous but the certificate indicates that their 
production processes differ. Consequently, certified wood becomes a credence good which is 
vertically differentiated by process attributes (Dulleck et al. 2011). Those process attributes entail 
additional costs for which the producers request remuneration in the form of a price premium on top of 
the conventional wood price. 
It would be incorrect to analyze the impact GPP in Europe in an autarky situation. Our research needs 
to take into account the international dimension of wood markets. Forest industries in different regions 
are ‘increasingly linked through international trade and global environmental policies’ (Buongiorno 
2003). Consequently, demand and supply shocks in one region can impact on other regions’ wood 
markets. In addition, forest conservation policies – such as certification – in one region can lead to 
deforestation in other regions (Gan and McCarl 2007, Sedjo and Sohngen 2013).  
For this reason, this research presents a novel Spatial and temporal price allocation Equilibrium Model 
(SEM) to analyze the impact of GPP in Europe. This implies that we adhere a strictly economic 
approach in this chapter, based on perfect competition. A SEM will allow interaction between spatially 
separated regional wood markets. The novelty of this research is found in the modifications made to 
the standard SEMs maximization framework. A first modification distinguishes conventional products 
from certified products in each regions’ production and consumption. Albeit both types of wood are 
substitutes, the traditional multi-product models cannot be used. The price mechanisms between both 
products is not based upon substitutability, but on the price premium. A second modification permits 
the analysis of the impact of government spending by distinguishing the governments’ share of final 
consumption from the households’ share. 
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 Seven Member States stipulate mandatory rules for construction tenders, 6 Member States have mandatory 
rules for paper and furniture, and 3 Member States mandatorily request a proof of legality for the wood used in 
the products they purchase. 
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The modified SEM’s objective function maximizes global quasi-welfare32 (Swoboda 1972) through 
the simultaneous solution of all regions’ equilibria under the assumption of bilateral trade costs. The 
equilibrium state of the model will however also provide in-depth information on each region’s 
welfare level, equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. Due to the modifications, the model also 
determines an equilibrium price premium and the equilibrium share of certified wood within a region’s 
total wood consumption and production.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 2 describes the link between 
certification and GPP. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 explains the main outcomes 
of the model in detail. The remaining section 5 interprets the particular phenomena following the GPP 
for wood, and discusses the limitation of the modified SEM. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion to 
this chapter. 
2. Certification and GPP 
If all European governments implement GPP, this chapter assumes they exclusively buy (eco-) 
certified wood. This is a valid claim for a number of reasons: 
• Certified wood production is expected to positively impact forest conservation and sustainable 
forest management practices (Damette and Delacote 2011). 
• An increasing number of governments at national33, European34, and international35 level, 
explicitly refer to the two main certification schemes: FSC and PEFC. Those governments 
recognize certificates as sufficient proof of compliance with the green criteria for wood (e.g. 
certification became a comprehensive criteria for paper products in the EC’s handbook on 
GPP).  
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 The difference between ‘quasi-welfare’ and ‘welfare’ relates to the solution of the applied equilibrium model. 
‘Welfare’ is used when a full equilibrium is attained. This requires an equilibrium in each separate market in the 
economy. In a full equilibrium, excess demand in one economy is compensated by excess supply in another 
economy. Swoboda (1972) describe how in stable economic systems, ‘forces that will eliminate any disequilibrium 
and return the system to its equilibrium position are automatically set in motion’. ‘Quasi-welfare’ relates to a quasi-
equilibrium position in which a disequilibrium in (at least) one market is consistently prevented from spreading to 
other markets and from returning the system (assumed to be stable) to equilibrium. 
33
 E.g. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands use their own adapted criteria and processes 
to determine whether certification schemes provide sufficient assurance for GPP. The current consensus of these 
Member States is that, in general, FSC and PEFC provide sufficient levels of assurance based on their national 
criteria. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012). Green Public Procurement a collection of good practices. 
Luxembourg. and EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016c). 'Green Public Procurement Criteria for Office Building 
Design, Construction and Management', in JRC (ed.), Seville, pp. 140. 
34
 E.g. FSC and PEFC are explicitly recognized as sector specific labels in the EC’s handbook on GPP 
(European Commission 2016b) 
35
 FSC and PEFC comply to the internationally agreed reference point ISO/IEC 17065 EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2016c). 'Green Public Procurement Criteria for Office Building Design, Construction and 
Management', in JRC (ed.), Seville, pp. 140.  
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• The legality of wood36 is a core criteria within the EU’s handbook on GPP. A certificate is 
accepted as sufficient proof of legality by the EC for product groups Furniture, Copying & 
Graphic paper, and Construction. Additional requirements for GPP exist per product groups 
(e.g. hazardous substance requirements for furniture, environmental friendly materials in 
construction, double printing) but the minimum requirement of legality remains valid in any 
case. 
• The use of certification in GPP can tackle the issue of limited availability of environmental 
criteria for products/services which hinders the uptake of GPP (European Commission 2016a). 
• The use of certification can make public procurement decisions more consistent (Parikka-
Alhola 2008). Consistency across the EU avoids the use of different environmental criteria in 
different geographical markets. Consistency increases the incentive for suppliers to invest in 
eco-innovation and comply with high environmental standards as it will simultaneously 
increase his/her chances of competing in multiple national procurement markets (European 
Commission 2008).  
• Testa et al. (2012) identify certification as one of the three key factors in successful GPP 
implementation within the EU37. 
• Governments increasingly are interested in socially responsive forestry administration, next to 
transparency in trade. Eco-certification complies to these concerns (Atyi et al. 2013) .  
3. Theoretical model 
3.1. Theoretical background 
Takayama and Judge (1971) developed a multi-product SEM which distinguishes substitute goods. 
Since certified and conventional wood are substitutes, it appears to be more straightforward to use this 
multi-product SEM. Unfortunately, the price mechanism in the multi-product SEM is not appropriate 
for markets characterized by the presence of certified products alongside conventional ones. The 
standard price mechanism for substitute products assumes a positive (negative) cross-price elasticity 
for demand (supply) for substitute goods (Takayama and Judge 1970, O'Sullivan et al. 2011). A price 
increase of one substitute good makes the substitute relatively cheaper. 
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 The legality of wood is further defined in the EU’s Timber Regulation. Both FSC and PEFC are in full 
compliance with, and accepted by the EU’s Timber Regulation. UNECE (2013). 'Forest Products Annual Market 
Review 2012-2013', Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 155. 
37
 The two other elements are a) ‘a strong political push through (for instance) national guidelines and action 
plans’ and b) the use of ‘innovative tools in procurement procedures such as life cycle assessment and green 
contract variants. (Testa et al. 2012)  
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However, the certified and conventional wood prices are directly linked to each other. The certified 
wood price (,	and 	,	for demand and supply) consists of the conventional wood price (, and 
	,) with the addition of a price premium (
, and 
	,). 
, and 
	, are 
expressed as a percentage increase to the conventional price: 
 , = , ∗ (1 + 
,)    ( 2-1 ) 
 	, = 	, ∗ (1 + 
	,)    ( 2-2 ) 
Hence, a price increase for conventional wood increases the certified wood price by the same 
percentage and both wood types remain equally expensive in relative terms. As a consequence, the 
multi-product SEM’s price mechanisms does not hold in this situation: the demanded (supplied) 
quantity of the certified good is not positively (negatively) related to the conventional wood price per 
se. Instead, the new price mechanism is built into the single-product SEM. 
The novel price mechanism deserves some explanation. On the demand side of the market, consumers 
of certified wood are willing to pay a price premium on top of the conventional wood price (Michaud 
et al. 2012). This price premium constitutes remuneration for the credence qualities attributed to the 
certified products. The credence qualities relate to the environmental and societal-friendly production 
practices applied in the certified production process. Hence, the credence good is vertically 
differentiated by process attributes (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Ferraro and Simpson 2002, Groom and 
Palmer 2010, Dulleck et al. 2011, Groom and Palmer 2014, Carlson and Palmer 2016). As such, the 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) is a measure of the consumers’ marginal utility, it is not the result of a 
contingent valuation method which perfectly monetarizes the environmental and societal gains. This 
turns certification into a market-based instrument with voluntary price signals (Pirard 2012). The 
boundaries of market-based instruments as provider of a remuneration for eco-system services are 
numerous, complex (Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian 2015), and not part of this research. The WTP 
for certified wood differs regionally for many reasons38. Our research builds upon the logic by 
Greenstone and Jack (2015) who link the WTP to income. They claim that “for the very poor, the 
marginal utility of consumption dominates utility gains from improved environmental quality”.  
The reason to exclude non-monetary measures for (improved) human welfare related to forest 
certification is twofold. First, the impact of sustainable forestry initiatives on deforestation remains 
ambiguous (Brandt et al. 2016). Hence, it is impossible to estimate welfare effects in terms of benefits 
                                                     
38
 E.g.: (1) the longer presence of certification in North America and Europe, (2) market failures including both 
the classic market failures of public goods and externalities, and the market imperfections more common to 
developed countries (missing land, capital, and labor markets), although missing credit markets lead to revealed 
preference measures that reflect liquidity constraints, rather than WTP. (Cai and Aguilar 2013, and Greenstone 
and Jack 2015). 
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from cleaner production related to deforestation. Second, also directly related social benefits of forest 
certification are controversial (Burivalova et al. 2017) and are likely to differ regionally. 
On the supply side, environmental and societal-friendly production practices restrict forest 
management options. Consequently, the production costs for certified wood are higher than for 
conventional wood (Van Deusen et al. 2010). The certification costs comprise direct and indirect 
costs. The direct costs are the costs of the certification process39 and do not differ regionally. Hence, 
these costs are harder to bear for small-scale producers. Small-scale producers are generally found in 
the Southern hemisphere (Dranove and Jin 2010). The indirect costs comprise all costs required to 
change management practices to meet certification standards (Bass 2001) 40. The magnitude of the 
indirect cost is inversely related to the quality of the current practices. This approach is in line with 
research by Vedel et al. (2015) who found a high Willingness To Accept (WTA) for providing eco-
system services by producers with poor management practices. Poorly managed forests are mainly 
situated in the Southern hemisphere, resulting in higher indirect certification costs in this hemisphere. 
In addition, producers in developing regions also face other barriers to certification like a lack of 
information and political support (Damette and Delacote 2011, Carlsen et al. 2012). According to the 
assumption of competitive behavior, producers will only produce certified wood if those additional 
costs are compensated by a price premium 
	, (Carlsen et al. 2012). The WTA measures the 
minimum price premium requested by a producer. The arguments above explain why the WTA will be 
higher in the Southern hemisphere.  
The regional WTP and WTA is introduced in the standard single-product SEM by Takayama and 
Judge (1971) in order to distinguish certified from conventional wood. The following parts explain the 
three modifications to the standard SEM and the modelled demand shock. 
3.2. Modification I: supply and demand function 
The SEM endogenously determines the equilibrium demand quantity of wood ,∗  and the equilibrium 
demand price ,∗  in region I by making use of the demand function: 
 ,∗ = , ∗ 1 + , ∗ △,,     ( 2-3 ) 
The demand function in our research does not distinguish between certified and conventional wood. 
,∗  and ,∗  are calculated from the baseline demand quantity ,  and the baseline demand price ,  
                                                     
39
 Audit costs, certification fees, and the costs of meeting corrective action requests (CARs). CARs might for 
example imply changes to forest management techniques following an observed infringement during an audit. 
40
 E.g. higher investment in infrastructure and machinery in order to be able to harvest more efficiently with 
lower impacts, higher wage costs by paying legally specified wages and providing social benefits, and 
opportunity costs of reducing wood production to sustainable levels. 
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as a function of the response to a price change (△ , = ,∗ −	, ). As such, the first modification 
directly introduces the price difference △ , in the demand functions. The extent to which the 
demand quantity responds to price changes is determined by each region’s price elasticity for demand 
,. 
The supply function is constructed accordingly and endogenously determines the equilibrium supply 
quantity and equilibrium supply price: 
 	,∗ = 	, ∗ 1 + 	, ∗ △,,     ( 2-4 ) 
The value of each regions’s , , 	, , , , 	, , e ,!, and e",! is based on Buongiorno and Shushuai 
(2014). The data by Buongiorno (2014) provides information at country level. This chapter calculates 
regional weighted means (based on volume) out of their data. This is necessary since country level 
information is missing for other parameters (e.g. the WTP and WTA). Five regions are taken into 
account: Latin America, North America, Europe (including Russia), Africa, and Asia (including 
Oceania). 
Figure 2-1 to Figure 2-3 present some stylized facts for parameters , , 	, , , , and 	, . Price 
elasticities e ,!, and e",!	result out of a meta-analysis. Buongiorno (2014) found a price elasticity in 
demand for (industrial round-) wood which varies between -0.05 and -0.37, inversely related to the 
income level. The price elasticity for supply varies between 0.11 and 2.84. To tighten the range, 
Buongiorno and Shushuai (2014) set the price elasticities at 0.8. 
 
Figure 2-1: Regional share (%) in global industrial roundwood production. 
NOTE.-Each reginal share is found by 	, ∑ 	,$ . Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. 
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31.93%
13.12%
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Figure 2-2: Regional share (%) in global industrial roundwood consumption. 
NOTE.-Each reginal share is found by , ∑ ,$ . Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. 
 
Figure 2-3: Demand and supply prices per region (100 USD per m3). 
NOTE.-The regional prices are the volume weighted prices out of the country-level GFPM data. 
3.3. Modification II: distinguish certified from conventional wood 
A second modification to the single-product SEM distinguishes certified from conventional wood. 
Key to the new price mechanism is the introduction of the price premiums 
, and 
	, as 
endogenous regional variables, using equations 2-1 and 2-2. Based upon the regional price premiums, 
the SEM endogenously determines the proportion of total consumption and production which is 
certified: respectively %ℎ', and %ℎ'	,. The WTP and WTA functions for each region describe 
the relationship between the price premium and the certified share. The model uses a logistical 
distribution function for WTA and WTP because the function can be analytically integrated, which is 
not possible for the normal distribution. 
The WTP in region i is symmetrically distributed around a known mean (()*,) following a logistic 
distribution with variance +,-)*,, 3⁄ . The cumulative distribution function for this logistical 
distribution links the certified share of total consumption to the price premium level: 
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 %ℎ', = 1 −	 0
01
2(34567,289:3,) ;9:3,<
   ( 2-5 ) 
For each price premium level, the cumulative distribution function determines the certified share of the 
total wood consumption in region i. Figure 2-4 demonstrates how a low price premium 
=>? on 
top of the conventional equilibrium wood price ,∗  results in a high proportion of certified 
consumption (%ℎ',	ℎ@) in the total equilibrium wood consumption ,∗ . A high price premium 

ABA results in a small share %ℎ',	CDE. This reasoning is in accordance with the overview 
of literature on the relation between price premiums and certified market shares by Aguilar and Cai 
(2010). 
The regional parameters ()*, and -)*, are retrieved from the meta-analysis on consumers’ WTP 
for certified wood by Cai and Aguilar (2013). At global level, they found a mean WTP of 12.2% with 
a standard deviation of 8%. The logistic regression model by Jacobsen and Hanley (2009) is used to 
determine each region’s mean WTP based on the regional differences in the GDP per capita 
(Appendix A). The GDP-based approach by Jacobsen and Hanley (2009) provides a unilateral macro-
economic estimate for the regional WTP which possibly neglects other explanatory variables for WTP. 
However, this is a suitable approach given this research’s geographic aggregation at continent level. 
The aggregation would complicate the determination and estimation of other explanatory variables’ 
values, as they are person-bound. 
In accordance with the WTP approach, a cumulative distribution function of certified production is 
constructed out of a region i’s logistically distributed WTA (equation 2-6). This allows the SEM to 
determine the certified share of a region’s production and the price premium on the supply side of the 
market endogenously:  
 %ℎ'	, =	 0
01
2(34567,289:F,) ;9:F,<
    ( 2-6 ) 
Figure 2-4 visualizes how a high price premium stimulates certified wood production (%ℎ'	,ℎ@) 
and a low price premium discourages certified production (%ℎ'	,CDE).  
The regional parameters (GHI and -GHI are determined from the combination of the price 
premiums reported by the certification bodies and the actual certified percentage of forest area per 
region (Appendix B). This WTA is highest for Africa and Asia which have the lowest percentage of 
certified area. In Europe and North America the WTA is lower, in contrast to their percentage of 
certified area (Appendix B - Table B1). This research adheres a strictly economic approach towards 
certification, based on the assumption of perfect competition. Hence, the SEM only allows producers 
to switch to certified production if the cost of producing certified wood (WTA on top of production 
costs) is compensated by the received certified wood price. Experts of the ITTC (2004) confirm this 
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rationale: without ‘tangible benefits deriving from certification in terms of profitability or 
competitiveness, enterprises will have little incentive to improve forest management with higher 
costs’. This problem is found to be particularly serious in the case of tropical wood-producing 
countries (Simula et al. 2004). Also Greaker (2006) described how an insufficient willingness to pay 
for green (certified) products can endanger foreign producers’ profits. Carlson and Palmer (2016), on 
the other hand, stress the importance of less tangible benefits for eco-certified wood producers (e.g. 
community empowerment). This type of benefit is hard to capture in a monetary value. 
The outcome of these modifications is an equilibrium state for the market which is no longer two-
dimensional (price and quantity). Instead, the equilibrium consists of four dimensions: price, quantity, 
price premium, and certified share of total consumption/production. 
 
Figure 2-4: Cumulative distribution function of certified wood in total demand and supply for region i. 
NOTE.-The low and high price premium are determined arbitrarily.  
3.4. Modification III: additional welfare calculation 
The introduction of certified alongside conventional wood adds an additional welfare element to the 
objective function of the standard SEM. This standard objective function maximizes the global quasi-
welfare under the assumption of transport costs. This is done by taking the integral of the demand and 
supply function (equation 2-3 and equation 2-4) over the equilibrium quantity and price (Appendix C). 
Hence, in the modified SEM, this quasi-welfare is calculated for the consumption and production of 
both certified and conventional wood. 
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The introduction of the price premium for certified wood creates some additional consumer and 
producer value. Figure 2-4 demonstrates how a low price premium 
=>? encourages a high 
percentage of a region i’s consumers (%ℎ',ℎ@) to acquire certified wood. But this 
=>? is 
lower than most of the certified wood consumers are willing to pay for certified wood. For those 
certified wood consumers willing to pay a higher price premium, an equilibrium price premium equal 
to 
=>? creates additional consumer value. This additional consumer value is quantified by 
integrating the cumulative logistic distribution function (equation 2-5) over the right hand side of the 
equilibrium price premium. A maximum price premium of 100% is assumed41: 
 J% = K %ℎ',	L
,0 − K %ℎ',	L
,MN,    ( 2-7 ) 
This additional consumer surplus is added to the traditional consumer surplus (Appendix C). 
The same logic is applied at the supply side of the market: an equilibrium price premium (
ABA) 
creates additional producer surplus for the producers who are willing to supply certified wood at a 
lower price premium. This additional producer surplus is quantified by integrating the cumulative 
logistic distribution function of the certified share of wood production (equation 2-6) over the left 
hand side of the equilibrium price premium. This additional producer surplus is added to the standard 
producer surplus in order to construct a new objective function (Appendix C). 
 % = K %ℎ',MN, 	L%ℎ',     ( 2-8 ) 
The non-negativity constraints on prices (,∗ , 	,∗ ) and physical quantities (,∗ , 	,∗ ) placed remain 
valid and is extended to the price premiums 
, and 
	,. This implies that the 
conventional wood price is below or equal to the certified wood price. 
Both the additional consumer and producer surplus (equation 2-7 and 2-8, respectively) are multiplied 
with the regional equilibrium conventional wood price (,∗  and 	,∗ ) and the regional equilibrium 
wood quantity (,∗  and 	,∗ ). This multiplication is added to the traditional SEM’s objective function 
in order to construct the modified SEM’s objective function (Appendix C). The traditional SEM’s 
price condition for trade and the trade balances remain valid in the modified SEM. However, the 
balances do account for the certified share of demand and production, and the price premiums, if 
necessary. 
The modified SEM simultaneously solves each region’s equilibrium under the assumption of bilateral 
trade costs (Appendix C). Hence, the transport costs separate, but do not isolate different regions’ 
markets. The outcome of the modifications is an equilibrium state for the market which is no longer 
                                                     
41
 This is not a stringent assumption. It relaxes earlier findings who describe maximum price premiums of 50%. 
(Aguilar and Cai 2010). 
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two-dimensional (price and quantity). Instead, the equilibrium consists of four dimensions: price (,∗  
and 	,∗ ), quantity (,∗  and 	,∗ ), price premium (
, and 
	,), and the certified share of a 
region’s total consumption and production (%ℎ', and %ℎ'	,). This finally allows us to 
determine each region’s quasi-welfare.  
3.5. Modification IV: the trade balances 
The distinction between conventional and certified wood in the modified SEM requires the 
modification of other constraints. First, the consumption of certified (conventional) wood in region i 
cannot exceed the sum of each region j’s transported quantities of certified (conventional) wood to 
region i: HO, (HO,>P). This includes region i’s production which is destined for the domestic 
market.  
 %ℎ', ∗ ,∗ ≤ ∑ H,OO      ( 2-9 ) 
 (1 − 	%ℎ',) ∗ ,∗ ≤ ∑ HO,>PO      ( 2-10 ) 
Accordingly, region i cannot transport more certified (conventional) wood to other regions TQ!,TUVW 
(TQ!,TUXY) than it produces itself. This includes production for the domestic market: 
 %ℎ'	, ∗ 	,∗ ≤ ∑ H,OO      ( 2-11 ) 
 (1 − 	%ℎ'	,) ∗ 	,∗ ≤ ∑ H,O>PO      ( 2-12 ) 
The standard SEM’s price condition still determines whether trade of conventional wood occurs 
between two regions i and j (equation 2-13). A comparable price condition is introduced to determine 
whether trade of certified wood occurs (equation 2-14): 
 	,∗ + HJ,O ≤ ,O∗ 	→ H,O>P > 0     ( 2-13 ) 
 	,∗ ∗ ]1 + 
	,^ + HJ,O ≤ ,O∗ ∗ (1 + 
,O	) → H,O > 0  ( 2-14 ) 
These price conditions imply that the demand price in the importing region must compensate the 
supply price in the exporting region plus the per unit transport costs between both regions (HJ,O). In 
the case of certified wood, also the price premium is taken into account (HJ,O) (Appendix C). The 
non-negativity constraint for the transported quantities implies that TQ!,TUXY = 0 and TQ!,TUVW = 0 if the 
price condition of respectively conventional and certified wood is not met. 
In this setting, the transport costs separate, but do not isolate, markets in different regions. The 
parameters’ value for the bilateral transport costs are based on Buongiorno and Shushuai (2014). The 
unit costs of shipping wood between two regions comprise two parts. The first component is a fixed 
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cost of shipping one unit from one region to another (USD 20.2). The second component is a region-
dependent ad valorem percentage. This ad valorem percentage varies from 7.197% for Africa to 0% 
for Europe and North America. The transport costs are not just taken into account to determine 
whether bilateral trade flows will occur. The transport costs are also taken into account in the global 
quasi-welfare calculation (Appendix C). 
3.6. Modelled shocks 
This chapter assumes that if governments do not implement GPP, they only make use of economic 
criteria to evaluate different bids. This implies that the price is the main criterion to select one out of 
two physically homogenous products: certified versus conventional wood. Due to the non-negative 
price premium for certified products, governments will opt for the less-expensive conventional 
product if they exclusively make use of the price criteria. 
This requires a modification of equation 2-5 which determines the percentage of certified wood within 
a region’s total wood demand. In the baseline scenario, the government’s share of final consumption is 
exclusively devoted to the purchase of conventional wood. Consequently, the maximum percentage of 
certified wood equals 100 % minus the government share in final consumption (_): 
 %ℎ', = 1 − _ −	 0`a
01
2(34567,289:3,) ;9:3,<
   ( 2-15 ) 
In the GPP scenario, the European governments limit themselves to buying only certified wood. In 
equation 2-16, the government’s share in the total final consumption exclusively comprises certified 
wood. Hence, the quantity of wood purchased by governments varies according a region’s total 
consumption. This corresponds to the so-called procyclical spending where spending is cut during 
recessions and increased during expansions (Galinato and Galinato 2016). The preferences of the other 
European wood consumers remain unchanged:  
  %ℎ',bc = 1 −	 0`ade
01
2(34567,de289:3,de) ;9:3,de<
      ( 2-16 ) 
4. Results  
4.1. Certified consumption 
Table 2-2 describes the impact of GPP on the consumed quantities of conventional and certified wood, 
and on the demand prices of conventional and certified wood. The results are presented both at 
regional and global level. In the baseline scenario, certified wood consumption is especially important 
in North America and Europe (62.62% and 61.19% of final consumption respectively). The 
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explanation for these high proportions is twofold. First, the WTP for certified wood is high in these 
regions. Second, these regions’ producers produce both conventional and certified wood efficiently. 
This leads to competitive prices. There is a low demand for certified wood in Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia (0.96%, 5.93%, and 2.92% respectively). The model’s baseline scenario reports high price 
premiums for certified wood in these regions. This does not encourage the consumers of these poorer 
regions (low WTP) to purchase large quantities of certified wood. 
The impact of GPP in Europe on the certified share of consumption is remarkable. The share of 
certified wood in the total global wood consumption increases by 15.53%. Consequently, certified 
wood now accounts for 43.99% of the global wood consumption. But the consumption of certified 
wood is not boosted in each region. The increased relative certified wood price discourages some 
consumers in North America and Asia. 
In Europe, the certified share increases from 61.19% to 95.67%. Certified wood gains 34.48% of 
market share, which is above the government share of final consumption (26.88%). Hence, GPP also 
stimulates other European consumers to switch from conventional to certified wood consumption. 
This sounds counterintuitive since the increased demand by European governments has resulted in a 
certified wood price increase of 15.71% in real terms. However, this increased certified wood price is 
entirely due to the increase in the conventional wood price. In fact, certified wood consumption has 
become the standard in the GPP scenario in Europe. Following the rationale of the price premium 
function (Figure 2-4), high shares of certified consumption link to non-existing price premiums. 
Nevertheless, the price paid for certified wood must compensate the producers’ production and 
certification costs. Due to the disappearance of the price premium, the European conventional wood 
price therefore increased to the level at which it simultaneously compensates the conventional 
production costs and the additional certification costs. This explains the considerably higher 
conventional demand price in the Europe (1.52) compared to the other regional conventional demand 
prices. This makes certified and conventional wood equally expensive in Europe. Or put differently, 
certified wood has become relatively cheaper compared to conventional wood. In addition, the 
European conventional wood price is influenced by the Asian conventional wood price since European 
producers are shipping conventional wood towards Asia. A high conventional price in Asia stimulates 
the conventional wood price in Europe. 
The relative price evolutions also explain the increased certified consumption in Africa (+65.63%) and 
Latin America (+71.03%). Also in these regions, certified wood became relatively cheaper than 
conventional wood. The explanation for the steep increase in the conventional wood price is twofold. 
First, the skyrocketing conventional wood price in the dominant European market (due to the 
disappearance of the price premium) boosted the conventional wood price in Africa and Latin 
America. Second, these two regions are exporting conventional wood to Asia, which also positively 
impact the price. Note, however, that in Africa, the market share for certified wood in total wood 
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demand is still marginal: 1.62%. In Latin America, certified wood accounts for 10.32% of the total 
demand. 
The trend of growing importance of certified consumption is not observed in North America and Asia. 
In those two regions, certified wood has become relatively more expensive than conventional wood. 
This has driven a number of consumers out of the certified segment of the market. In North America, 
the conventional wood price increased by 4.05% in the GPP scenario. As in many other regions, this is 
explained by increased exports to Asia and the increased conventional wood price in Europe. 
However, in North America, the certified price increase is proportionally higher: 15.74%. This is 
because less certified wood is available for consumption in North America. The situation in Asia is 
even more distinct. In the GPP scenario, other regions’ producers gained interest in supplying 
conventional wood to the Asian market. This influx results in a collapsing conventional wood price in 
Asia. Simultaneously, the certified wood price increases in Asia due to the growing interest in certified 
wood at global level. This drives consumers towards conventional wood products. 
4.2. Certified production 
Table 2-1 describes the impact of GPP on the produced quantities of conventional and certified wood, 
on the supply prices of conventional and certified wood, and on the price premium. The results are 
presented both at regional and global level. In addition, the table presents the production cost 
(fDgh	,). The production can be lower than the received price because of the properties of the spatial 
model which prevent an infinite increase of wood production and consumption and the separation of 
the wood markets by transport costs. This allows producers to generate additional producer surplus.  
In the baseline scenario, Europe and North America are producing most certified wood. Respectively 
64.03% and 62.62% of their wood production is certified. This is much less in the other regions. The 
third biggest wood producer – Asia – is not producing certified wood. In both Africa and Latin 
America, 4.25% of the wood production is certified in the baseline situation. This corresponds to these 
regions certified wood consumption and illustrates the home-effect of consumption. Due to the 
transport costs, producers have a strong position on their domestic market and will first of all target 
domestic consumers. 
The increased demand for certified wood at global level (+14.70%) in the GPP scenario requires an 
equivalent production increase. But only Europe, Asia, and Latin America increase their certified 
wood production. In Europe and Latin America, the certified wood production follows the increased 
certified domestic demand (home-effect). The increased certified production in Asia is more peculiar. 
This region is characterized by a decreasing demand for certified wood. However, Asia is no longer 
importing certified wood in the GPP scenario while it was importing all of its certified wood 
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requirements from North America and Africa in the baseline scenario. The disappearance of certified 
wood imports is compensated for by domestic certified wood production in Asia. 
In fact, the GPP for wood in Europe creates a trade barrier for certified wood. In the GPP scenario, not 
a single bilateral trade flow for certified wood is identified (Table 2-4). However, international trade in 
conventional wood still exists in the GPP scenario. Hence, it is the price premiums, not the transport 
costs, which isolate the different regions’ certified markets. The disappearance of international trade 
also explains why the production of certified wood plummets in Africa (-70.18%) despite an increased 
demand for certified wood in the region. Africa was shipping certified wood to Latin America and 
Asia in the baseline scenario. Africa loses these export markets because it cannot produce certified 
wood efficiently enough to set a competitive price which allows trade at transport costs. 
Unfortunately, the increased demand for certified wood in Africa does not fully compensate for the 
decrease in exported volumes of certified wood. African producers are not only producing less 
certified wood in real terms. They are also expanding their conventional wood production (+7.18%). 
This additional conventional wood production is not destined for the domestic market. In the GPP 
scenario, Africa is exporting 24.88% of its conventional wood production to Asia. 
The producers in North America are facing a reduction in domestic consumption of certified wood in 
combination with the disappearance of export opportunities to Latin America and Asia. This explains 
the decreased certified wood production in this region. The production of conventional wood in North 
America skyrocketed however (+64.06%). This increased production of conventional wood is destined 
for the domestic market and export to Asia.  
Whether a region’s certified wood production increases or decreases depends upon the relative price 
change of wood again. The certified wood price increase was smaller than the conventional wood 
price increase in Africa and North America. This explains why producers in those regions are 
switching to conventional production. The opposite is true for the regions which experience increased 
certified wood production: Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Hence, the GPP for wood production 
does stimulate the production of certified wood at global level, but not in every single region. 
4.3. Welfare implications 
Equation 2-15 and 2-16 only differ in terms of their intercept with the y-axis. In the baseline scenario 
(equation 2-15), the intercept equals 100% minus the government share in final consumption. In the 
GPP scenario (equation 2-16), the intercept equals 100%. Consequently, the integral of equation 2-15 
is smaller than the integral of equation 2-16 for any value of the price premium. Or put differently, in 
the baseline scenario, not all potential quasi-welfare is tapped into because governments opted for the 
lowest priced bid. This does not allow for other dimensions of quality related to for example 
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certification (Lewis and Bajari 2011). However, the introduction of the price premium captures these 
other dimensions of quality and consequently allows quasi-welfare to increase. 
The comparison of the global quasi-welfare for both scenarios confirms this reasoning. The global 
quasi-welfare increases by 0.37% in the GPP scenario because the modified SEM’s objective function 
can tap into the previously unused potential quasi-welfare (Table 2-3). However, this is not a Pareto 
efficient improvement, since not every region’s quasi-welfare increases. Whether a region gains or 
loses wealth depends on the evolution of its consumption of certified wood. Due to the shape of the 
demand and supply functions, the importance of the consumer surplus surpasses the importance of the 
producer surplus in all regions’ quasi-welfare. Consequently, only the three regions that are 
consuming more certified wood became wealthier: Europe (+3.06%), Africa (+0.41%), and Latin 
America (+0.53%). North America (-0.78%) and Asia (-5.46%) lose quasi-welfare due to a decreased 
certified wood consumption. 
The SEM’s outcome allows the determination of the multiplier effect for Europe. If the European 
governments exclusively opt for certified wood, they face a price premium. Consequently, their 
expenses on wood purchases will augment. The SEM’s outcome indicates that their wood expenses 
increase by 0.36 welfare units (=price baseline scenario * government share in final consumption 
baseline scenario – certified price GPP scenario * government share in final consumption GPP 
scenario). Those additional expenses led to a welfare increase in Europe of 1.68 welfare units (Table 
2-3). Hence, the additional European government expenses for wood due to the GPP is the equivalent 
of 21.85% of the European welfare increase. Put differently, the tax payer’s return on investment in 
terms of wealth increase equals 4.58 (= additional government expenses / European welfare gain). 
 
  
 
Table 2-1: Production of wood, production of certified wood, supply prices (conventional), certified supply price, and supply price premiums (baseline 
scenario and GPP scenario) 
 Africa  Latin America  Asia  Europe  North America  World 
 
Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP 
Quantities:                  
Q",! .36 .38  1.88 1.95  3.88 3.34  4.44 4.61  4.41 4.58  14.97 14.87 
Q",!change (%)  +3.89   +3.86   -13.83   +3.82   +3.89   -.72 
Q",!UVW .02 .01  .08 .19  .00 .09  2.84 4.38  2.76 1.88  5.70 6.55 
Q",!UVW change (%)  -70.18   +134.12   +∞   +54.11   -32.03   +14.69 
Share",!UVW (%) 4.25 1.22  4.25 9.58  .00 2.69  64.03 95.05  62.62 40.97  38.08 43.99 
Share",!UVW change (%)  -71.29   +125.41   +∞   +48.45   -34.57   +15.53 
(Cost) Prices:                  
P",! 1.28 1.33  1.22 1.27  1.27 1.26  1.21 1.52  1.21 1.26  1.23 1.34 
P",! change (%)  +4.10   +4.06   -.53   +26.18   +4.05   +9.50 
Pcost	,! 1.00 1.05  1.00 1.05  1.27 1.05  1.00 1.05  1.00 1.05  1.07 1.05 
Pcost	,!	change (%)  +4.87   +4.87   -16.89   +4.87   +4.05   -1.79 
Pprem",! (%) 30.98 25.34  30.98 34.82  0.00 25.34  30.98 41.47  30.96 27.07  22.95 32.12 
Pprem	,! change (%)  -18.21   +12.40   +∞   +33.86   -12.56   +39.95 
P	,!UVW 1.56 1.60  1.54 1.56  1.52 1.53  1.32 1.52  1.32 1.52  1.40 1.54 
P	,!UVW change (%)  +2.69   +1.51   +.31   +15.71   +15.74   +10.00 
Pcost	",!UVW 1.32 1.32  1.32 1.42  1.27 1.32  1.32 1.49  1.32 1.34  1.32 1.39 
P",!UVWcost	 change (%)  +0.35   +7.94   +4.18   +13.27   +1.76   +5.54 
NOTE.-Prices are in 100 USD per m³. Quantities are standardized. Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. The world prices are calculated as the volume 
weighted average of each region’s prices. The percentage changes represent the change of the variable’s value in the GPP scenario compared to the baseline scenario. The displayed 
price premiums 
	, are the percentage increase on top of the conventional wood price 	,. 
 
 
  
 
Table 2-2: Consumption of wood, consumption of certified wood, demand prices (conventional), certified prices, and demand price premiums (baseline 
scenario and GPP scenario) 
 Africa  Latin America  Asia  Europe  North America  World 
 Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP  Baseline GPP 
Quantities:                  
Q ,! .29 .28  1.85 1.81  3.99 3.99  4.65 4.58  4.20 4.19  14.97 14.87 
Q,! change (%)  -1.85   -1.72   +.11   -1.43   -.22   -.72 
Q,!UVW .00 .01  .11 .19  .12 .09  2.84 4.38  2.63 1.88  5.70 6.55 
Q,!UVW change (%)  +65.63   +71.04   -24.92   +54.11   -28.85   +14.69 
Share ,!UVW (%) .96 1.62  5.93 10.32  2.92 2.19  61.19 95.67  62.63 44.83  38.08 43.99 
Share,!UVW change (%)  +68.75   +74.03   -25.00   +56.35   -28.42   +15.53 
Prices:                  
P ,! 1.28 1.33  1.22 1.27  1.27 1.26  1.21 1.52  1.21 1.26  1.23 1.34 
P ,! change (%)  +4.10   +4.06   -.53   +26.18   +4.05   +9.50 
Pprem ,! (%) 22.04 20.39  25.85 22.76  20.27 21.28  9.05 0.00  9.03 21.27  14.36 14.88 
Pprem,! change (%)  -7.49   -11.95   +4.98   -100.00   +135.55   +3.65 
P ,!UVW 1.56 1.60  1.54 1.56  1.52 1.53  1.32 1.52  1.32 1.52  1.40 1.54 
P ,!UVW	 change (%)  +2.69   +1.51   +.31   +15.71   +15.74   +10.00 
NOTE.-Prices are in 100 USD per m³. Quantities are standardized. Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. The world prices are calculated as the volume 
weighted average of each region’s prices. The percentage changes represent the change of the variable’s value in the GPP scenario compared to the baseline scenario. The 
displayed price premiums 
, are the percentage increase on top of the conventional wood price ,. 
  
  
 
Table 2-3: Percentage change of the regional welfare 
 
Welfare baseline  Welfare GPP  Change in welfare  (in %) 
Africa 0.63  0.64  +0.41 
Latin America 3.86  3.89  +0.53 
Asia 15.60  14.75  -5.46 
Europe  54.96  56.64  +3.06 
North America 50.05  49.65  -0.78 
World 125.11  125.57  +0.37 
NOTE.- Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. The welfare is based upon the standardized quantities and 
prices in 100 USD per m³ and  The percentage changes represent the change to the variable’s value in the GPP scenario 
compared to the baseline scenario and are displayed in 100%. 
Table 2-4: internationally traded quantities of wood, per wood type, per scenario 
   Destination  
Origin  
 
Africa  Latin America  Asia  Europe  North America 
  
Wood type 
Scenario  Conv Cert 
 
Conv Cert 
 
Conv Cert 
 
Conv Cert 
 
Conv Cert 
Africa Baseline 0.2863 0.0028  
 0.0058   0.0068  0.0604     
GPP 0.2791 0.0046     0.0924        
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Latin America Baseline 
  
 1.7368 0.0799     0.0648     
GPP    1.6274 0.1873  0.1395        
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Asia Baseline 
  
 
  
 3.8769 0.0003       
GPP       3.2532 0.0877       
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Europe Baseline 
  
 
  
 
  
 1.5977 2.8436    
GPP       0.0300   0.1984 4.3823    
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
North America Baseline 
  
 
 0.0239   0.1094  0.0806   1.5686 2.6294 
GPP       0.3948      2.3110 1.8777 
NOTE.- Quantities are standardized. Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Trade barrier 
As indicated, no international trade in certified wood occurs in the GPP scenario (Table 2-4). The 
existence of transport costs cannot be held responsible for this evolution for two reasons. First, the 
international trade in conventional wood increased considerably (+219.06%) in the GPP scenario 
despite the transport costs. Asia, in particular, imports conventional wood in the GPP scenario. The 
Asian imports mainly originate from North and Latin America. They respectively account for 60.11% 
and 21.25% of the Asian imports. Those regions are able to export conventional wood to Asia due to 
the efficiency of their conventional wood producers and their low bilateral transport costs to Asia. This 
results in a comparative cost advantage for North and Latin America. Second, certified wood trade is 
possible in the baseline scenario: Africa and North America are exporting certified wood to Latin 
America and Asia. Hence, the transport costs separate, but do not isolate, the different regions’ 
(certified) markets. 
However, in the GPP scenario, all regions’ demand for certified wood is fulfilled by domestic 
production. This is due to consumers’ limited WTP for certified wood. This WTP is sufficiently high 
to account for the increased price premium demanded by certified wood producers. However, the 
WTP is not sufficiently great to account for the combination of the transport costs and the increased 
price premium. This provides a competitive advantage for domestic producers over foreign producers. 
Hence, this situation is in accordance with the findings of Atkeson and Burstein (2010) who describe 
how transport costs determine to what extent producers implement innovation (i.e. the switch from 
conventional to certified production). 
The situation is especially problematic in Africa. Despite an increased African demand for certified 
wood, this region’s certified wood producers are outcompeted in the other regions’ certified wood 
markets. This leads to reduced certified wood production in Africa in the GPP scenario. Instead, 
Africa is producing more conventional wood. Also North American producers are producing more 
conventional wood instead of certified wood. This decrease is explained by the combination of the 
trade barrier and the reduced demand for certified wood in North America itself. This is seemingly 
contradictory to the initial goal of GPP which aims to encourage sustainable forest management and 
conservation worldwide through the purchase of certified wood. This finding provides a justification 
for the dominance of the home-effect applied by Fajgelbaum et al. (2011)42. 
                                                     
42
 In the research by Fajgelbaum, the richer countries also export the high-quality goods. This is not the case in 
this research, the home-effect makes trade impossible. As a consequence however, the richer countries need to 
fulfil the higher demand for high-quality products themselves. 
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Hence, the grounds for exclusion out of the certified segment of export markets are purely economic: 
the importers’ demand prices do not compensate the exporters’ supply prices plus the transport costs. 
This approach – which is based on the assumption of perfect competition – is valid: experts of the 
International Tropical Timber Council already described that without ‘tangible benefits deriving from 
certification in terms of profitability or competitiveness, enterprises will have little incentive to 
improve forest management with higher costs. Although other authors claim that the intangible 
benefits (e.g. learning, community empowerment,…) might also justify the additional certification 
costs (Carlson and Palmer 2016). The problem is particularly serious in the case of tropical wood 
producing countries’ (Simula et al. 2004). This kind of trade barrier endangers the future of 
certification. If ‘producers are forced to drop out from traditional markets, as has already happened in 
some cases, product prices are driven down’. In some regions, this can lead to a reduction in the value 
of the resource, encouraging its conversion into other uses. Hence, the trade barrier created by GPP 
stimulates forest degradation due to the slow progress of certification in tropical countries. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this chapter’s trade barrier are most likely an underestimation of 
real life’s trade barriers since consumers tend to have a preference for locally produced wood (Aguilar 
and Cai 2010).  
5.2. Leverage effect of GPP for certification 
GPP stimulates certification at global level, but whether or not GPP stimulates certification at regional 
level depends on the regional consumption and production functions. Next to Europe, certification 
only gained importance on both the demand and supply side of the market in Latin America. All other 
regions experience decreasing importance in production (Africa), consumption (Asia) or on both sides 
of the market (North America). 
The analysis of the evolution of the certified shares is important for analyzing the leverage effect of 
GPP, but the real certified market share in consumption and production is also important. In both 
scenarios, the certified share of wood consumption and production in the Southern hemisphere 
(Africa, Asia, Latin America) is equal to or below 10%. Concerning consumption, the positive 
relationship between the WTP, the GDP, and the certified share in a region’s consumption indicates 
that ‘Willingness to Pay’ is probably the wrong choice of words. It rather reflects the capacity to pay 
for certified products. A considerable local certified demand is crucial for the uptake of certified 
production in a region (Carlsen et al. 2012). Therefore, it is crucial to encourage certified consumption 
as well. 
Concerning production, the limited importance of certification is also observed in reality (Table B1). 
Certification is a market-based instrument which relies on the price premium to encourage sustainable 
forest management. This suggests that, also in reality, the price premium insufficiently compensates 
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the costs of certification of the producers in the Southern hemisphere. This is also observed by Carlson 
and Palmer (2016). In addition, the SEM demonstrates that the European governments’ market power 
as a substantial consumer does not sufficiently increase the price premium to make certification more 
inclusive at global level. 
Instead of working on the price premium, government policies can aim to reduce the costs of 
certification. A cost reduction can be effectuated by improving: the legislative framework in support of 
certification (Putz et al. 2000), the distance and convenience of the transport of wood (Gullison 2003), 
the available financial means (ITTC 2004), and the bureaucratic requirements. The later especially 
poses a problem for illiterate producers (Nussbaum and Simula 2013). 
Cooperative initiatives can also decrease the direct costs of certification for small-scale producers 
(who are typically more located in the Southern hemisphere). Small-scale producers are disadvantaged 
for two reasons. First, the direct costs are not dependent on the size of a forest/company (Ebeling and 
Yasué 2009). Consequently, the costs are relatively low for large-scale producers and relatively high 
for small-scale producers (Gullison 2003). Second, the demand for certified wood is mainly driven by 
retail, which demands large volumes, consistent quality, and low prices. Large-scale wood producers 
in the Northern hemisphere are better able to meet these requirements (Molnar and Trends 2003, 
Rametsteiner and Simula 2003, Klooster 2005, Taylor 2005, Meijaard et al. 2014). In the Southern 
hemisphere, Atyi et al. (2013) describe how large scale industrial forest concession holders, instead of 
small-scale concession holders, benefit from increased exports towards the North. 
However, a phased approach is needed for this kind of policy (Simula et al. 2004). In addition, a 
comprehensive strategy must be developed in which certification plays a complementary role in 
sustainable forest management. Other points of attention of the comprehensive strategy can focus at 
other aspects which disadvantage sustainable forestry in the tropics (e.g. weak land tenure rights), as 
they are numerous (Wang et al. 2016, Faria and Almeida 2016). 
5.3. Limitations 
The SEM’s design does not allow exact forecasting of the leverage effect of GPP on each region’s 
certified wood consumption and production for a number of reasons. First, the SEM applies regional 
aggregation. This is a mere simplification of reality, since those regions encompass a set of 
heterogeneous countries. Therefore, this research does not claim that, for example, certified production 
will decrease in every African country due to GPP in Europe. Instead, the model’s mechanisms reveal 
what the impact will be for a country with a country profile which is comparable to one of the 5 
regions’ profiles.  
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Second, the SEM neglects a number of alternative explanatory variables for the consumption and 
production of (certified) wood. The SEM is a partial model, so one important neglected factor are the 
prices and availability of substitutes for industrial roundwood. In addition, the SEM also neglects the 
origin of the wood. Industrial roundwood from one region might have better characteristics than wood 
from other regions. In reality, this might entail a higher WTP for this higher-quality industrial 
roundwood. Also the type of forest ownership (public versus private) is neglected. Publically owned 
forest are able to bear higher opportunity costs of forest and biodiversity conservation (Hily et al. 
2015).  
Third, this is a comparative static equilibrium model. The evolution from the baseline scenario’s 
equilibrium to the GPP scenario’s equilibrium will require time. More in particular, it requires the time 
for consumers and producers to reallocate their consumption and production factors from conventional 
to certified wood production and consumption (or vice versa). In addition, governments need time to 
implement GPP perfectly (Testa et al. 2012). In order to successfully implement GPP, governments 
first need to train their staff, develop practical tools and information, and acquire expertise in applying 
environmental criteria (European Commission 2016a). In addition, governments should pursue a more 
systematic implementation and integration of GPP into management systems, and co-operation 
between authorities to foster the uptake of GPP (European Commission 2016a). In addition, a static 
model might not capture the increased trustworthiness of eco-certification schemes due to GPP. 
According to Gulbrandsen (2014), governments which approve certification schemes can signal that 
those ‘schemes are credible governance systems on which private producers and buyers can rely’. This 
can increase the long run WTP, and indirectly increase GPP’s effects on the wood market. 
As such, this chapter’s findings remain indicative for the impact of GPP. In this context, note that it is 
not common to calibrate this type of research’s results due to a lack of experimental data to which they 
can be validated. The model runs under the ceteris paribus assumption which can never be observed in 
reality. Suitable data for a proper validation does not exist. Nevertheless, the different parts of the 
model have been calibrated, as real data is used in order to provide the input data for the SEM (e.g. the 
trade data by Buongiorno). The interaction between the different parts of the model is new, and is not 
calibrated. Another element which impedes validation is the fact that GPP implementation cannot 
happen overnight. Hence, it is difficult to filter the effect of GPP out of historical data.  
6. Conclusion 
According to the modified SEM presented in this chapter, the GPP for wood in Europe stimulates the 
consumption and production of certified wood at global level. However, this leverage effect is not 
transposed into each region’s consumption. In some regions, conventional wood became less 
expensive than certified wood. Those regions’ consumers increased their conventional wood 
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consumption at the expense of certified wood. Notable is the disappearance of the price premium in 
the region where certified wood became the standard: Europe. The European conventional wood price 
increased demand to the extent that it also compensated for the costs of certification. 
The leverage effect for certification is also not realized on the supply side for all regions’ markets. The 
increased certified wood price created an impenetrable trade barrier for certified wood. The 
disappearance of international certified wood trade, in combination with the home-effect of decreasing 
domestic demand for certified wood in some regions, resulted in reduced certified wood production in 
specific cases. All these findings are in line with what is currently observed in reality, suggesting that 
more attention must be devoted to the costs of certification.  
The innovative features added to traditional Spatial Equilibrium Modelling allow us to analyze the 
impact of the policy for each regions’ quasi-welfare. At global level, the quasi-welfare increased 
because GPP taps into previously unused potential consumer and producer surplus. Unfortunately, this 
is not a Pareto efficient improvement. Due to the considerable weight of the consumer surplus in 
quasi-welfare, the regions that experienced reduced consumption of certified wood also faced a 
decrease in their quasi-welfare: North America and Asia. 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
Chapter 3.  Drivers for intention to buy eco-certified 
wood and support for Green Public Procurement 
with negative consequences 
Abstract. This chapter empirically investigates to what extent consumers of eco-certified wood are 
driven by self-interest instead of environmental or altruistic concerns. This is done by making use of a 
questionnaire. The questionnaire allows to establish distinct consumer profiles in terms of 
demographics, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics. The profiles are formed using a two-step 
segmentation process combining hierarchical and K-means segmentation. The perceived consumer 
effectiveness does not drive eco-certified consumption. This is explained by the low frequency of 
wood purchases, which results in a low Perceived Consumer Effectiveness for wood. In addition, this 
chapter observes decreasing support for Green Public Procurement with negative consequences, 
especially among consumers with a high environmental concern. The high level of involvement 
implies that consumers want to perform sustainable purchases themselves, instead of transferring this 
responsibility to governments. This suggests that the traditional methods to probe for a consumer’s 
environmental (altruistic) concern capture an element of self-interest, which appears to be an 
important driver for eco-certification. 
 
Context: Chapter 2 describes a crowding-out effect of GPP on private consumption. This chapter 
further investigates the private consumers’ position towards crowding out of GPP, or increased prices 
due to GPP.
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1. Introduction 
This chapter empirically investigates to what extent consumers of eco-certified wood are driven by 
self-interest, environmental, or altruistic concerns. This is done by making use of a questionnaire, 
which allows to establish distinct consumer profiles in terms of demographics, attitudinal and 
behavioral characteristics. Attitudes are compared between these distinct profiles in different scenarios 
in order to uncover unconscious (self-centered) drivers for purchasing eco-certified wood. 
On the supply-side of the market, eco-certification of forest and wood products has become an 
important tool to improve the producers’ environmental performance (Blackman and Naranjo 2012, 
Jaung et al. 2016). Eco-certified producers must comply with various sustainability guidelines which 
are aimed towards more sustainable forest management (Cashore et al. 2006)43. As such, eco-
certification tackles deforestation and forest degradation while enhancing forest carbon stocks (FSC 
2015). Deforestation and carbon stocks are two essential elements in current discussions about climate 
change. The human exploitation of forest area accounts for 9.51% of the global environmental 
footprint in 2016. This is more than the footprint of built-up land, fisheries or grazing land. The carbon 
footprint, for which deforestation and forest degradation are also partially responsible, even accounts 
for 59.51% of the global environmental footprint (Lin et al. 2016). 
On the demand-side of the market, eco-certification schemes assume that environmentally aware 
consumers purchase sustainably produced goods (Agrawal et al. 2014) which are differentiated from 
conventional products by their credence quality. The credence quality relates to the application of 
environmental and socially responsible production practices throughout the production process. 
Hence, credence goods are vertically differentiated by process attributes, and not by physical 
characteristics (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Ferraro and Simpson 2002, Groom and Palmer 2010, Dulleck 
et al. 2011, Groom and Palmer 2014, Carlson and Palmer 2016, Brusselaers et al. 2017). Depending on 
the species and circumstances (e.g. income), consumers are even willing to pay a price premium over 
the conventional wood price as remuneration for the credence qualities (Shoji et al. 2014). Producers 
who aim to supply the environmentally aware consumer segment therefore have an interest in 
achieving certification and meeting the sustainability standards (Agrawal et al. 2014). 
Earlier research analyzed the impact of several (psychological) consumer characteristics44 on attitude 
towards, and intention to buy, certified products. In particular, the emotional component of consumer 
decision-making can increase certified consumption (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006, Kang et al. 2013, 
                                                     
43
 This includes protecting old growth forests, conserving natural habitats, and encouraging local employment. 
44
 Characteristics taken into account by earlier research: environmental knowledge, familiarity with eco-labels,  
subjective knowledge, pro-environmental self-identification, sense of personal responsibility, concern for 
negative environmental impacts of production, perceived consumer effectiveness, gender, and education 
(Vermeir and Verbeke 2006, Kang et al. 2013, Jonell et al. 2016) 
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Jonell et al. 2016). Some of these drivers have an individual-oriented focus. Examples are the 
subjective norm45 and the consumer’s attitude towards eco-certified consumption. Other drivers have 
an altruistic, environment-oriented focus. Examples are the respondents’ Perceived Consumer 
Effectiveness46 (PCE), adherence to the Dominant Social Paradigm47 or the New Environmental 
Paradigm (NEP) (Dunlap et al. 2000, Dunlap and Van Liere 1984). The PCE measures to what extent 
a person believes that his/her personal choices contribute to a reduction in the environmental impact of 
consumption. The Dominant Social Paradigm adheres the view that humans are superior to other 
species, mankind can unlimited extract resources, and (technological) progress provides solutions for 
environmental problems. In contrast, the NEP serves as a measure of ‘endorsement of a “pro-
ecological” world view’. In addition to these attitudes towards sustainable consumption, Aguilar and 
Vlosky (2007) specifically linked trust in the certificate’s positive impact and income level to eco-
certified wood consumption (Aguilar and Vlosky 2007). 
This chapter acknowledges the usefulness of these concepts as explanatory variables for the intention 
to buy eco-certified wood and measures them through the questionnaire. In addition, generic 
information (gender, education, financial position,…) is gathered. Subsequently, the collected data is 
used to establish distinct consumer segments. Each segment consists of consumers who are similar to 
each other, and dissimilar to consumers in other segments (Vanhonacker et al. 2013). The segments 
are formed using a two-step process combining hierarchical and K-means segmentation. 
Unlike previous research, the consumer profiles are not solely used to investigate the uptake of 
certified consumption. In addition, the questionnaire probes for the respondents’ support for 
government purchases of eco-certified wood in different scenarios. This policy is also known as Green 
Public Procurement (GPP) (Edler et al. 2015). Depending on the scenario, the GPP entails negative 
consequences, such as increased prices or crowding-out of private consumers (i.e. eco-certified wood 
becomes unavailable for private consumption). The design of the different scenarios depends on 
earlier research by Vermeir and Verbeke (2006) and Annunziata and Scarpato (2014). They described 
how sustainable purchases might be hindered by high prices or low perceived availability of the 
sustainable products.  
As such, this chapter investigates, for the first time, to what extent altruistic, environment-oriented 
concerns are genuine drivers for eco-certified consumption. If genuine, a high environmental concern 
should not induce a preference for own consumption of sustainable products instead of other 
consumers’ consumption of sustainable products. Theoretically, the environmental impact of 
                                                     
45
 The subjective norm indicates to what extent people feel pressured by other people in their social environment 
to perform or not perform a specific behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1977). 
46
 To what extent a person believes that his/her personal choices contribute to a reduction in the environmental 
impact of consumption (Ellen et al. 1991). 
47
 The view that humans are superior to other species, mankind can unlimited extract resources, and 
(technological) progress provides solutions for environmental problems 
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sustainable consumption is independent from the identity of the consumer. Hence, a consumer with 
high environmental concerns who purchases sustainable products will achieve exactly the same 
environmental benefit compared to other consumers’ (e.g. governments) consumption of sustainable 
products. However, it is not unimaginable that self-interest and individual concerns play a role when it 
comes to eco-certified consumption. A number of authors described how self-interest and individual 
concerns act as obstacles to environmental behavior (Follows and Jobber 2000, Kim 2011). In 
contrast, this chapter checks whether self-interest can positively impact on consumer environmental 
behavior (i.e. sustainable consumption to satisfy a personal need).  
It is a valid and relevant assumption to consider the government as a consumer who creates scarcity in 
the certified wood market for three reasons. First, governments account for a considerable share in the 
final consumption of wood products. In the EU, governments, for example, account for 26.88% of 
final wood consumption (EUROSTAT 2015). Second, governments are increasingly taking 
“environmental and sustainability criteria into account in addition to purely economic (i.e. price) 
criteria when procuring goods and services” (Brusselaers et al. 2017). Third, expert consultation 
confirms that the certified wood supply would not immediately be able to meet the increased certified 
demand if governments decide to solely purchase eco-certified wood products (FSC International 
2015). Recently, Brusselaers et al. (2017) also described how GPP can increase the price of certified 
wood and subsequently reduce private certified wood consumption. 
This chapter shows that support for GPP decreases significantly once the policy entails negative 
consequences. The loss of support appears to be positively correlated to environmental concern 
(measured as a score on the NEP). This contests the sincerity of the ecological concern and suggests 
self-interest might be more important than previously expected. These insights are important for all 
stakeholders who aim to promote the private consumption of eco-certified wood. These stakeholders 
include governments, since GPP aims to foster the private consumption of environmentally-
sustainable goods by reducing the transaction costs for adapting to new products and stimulating the 
uptake of innovations48 (Edler et al. 2015, Schaltegger et al. 2014).  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The second part describes the applied methods. 
Part three presents some descriptive statistics prior to analyzing the impact of consumer involvement, 
PCE, the consumers’ subjective norms, knowledge of the labels and demographic characteristics. 
Subsequently, the different scenarios are compared in order to check the impact of a perceived 
decreasing availability due to government purchases. Part four discusses the results, while part five 
ends with a conclusion.  
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 E.g.: Once the consumption of sustainable products becomes more common, this will decrease the required 
effort and cost related to the information search.   
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2. Data collection and methods  
2.1. Study design and subjects 
This research uses cross-sectional survey data collected through questionnaires in May 2016 and 
January 2017 in Belgium (Appendix J). The study sample consists of 274 young Belgian adults 
following higher education. The selection of this specific population is based on the threefold rationale 
by Vermeir and Verbeke (2006). First, the selection of a uniform group rules out possible interference 
from classical socio-demographic variables (e.g. age, income, social class) which are proven to impact 
on attitude and behavioral intentions with regards to sustainable consumption. Second, young adults 
are the most important consumers for the next half century. According to Vermeir and Verbeke (2006) 
it is likely that they will take their habits into their older age, which provides policy makers with 
“ample possibilities to create sustainable consumption habits within this population” in the future. 
Third, this chapter assumes that higher educated young adults have an awareness of the concept of 
sustainability. The respondents’ environmental awareness is a prerequisite for this research, as 
unaware respondents are likely to have non-existent attitudes and behavioral intentions. This would 
not allow the segmentation of the respondents.  
The awareness among the respondents is not explicitly checked. However two elements ensure 
sufficient compliance to the precondition. First, all of the respondents are enrolled in a Bachelor 
program at Ghent University. They either attended a combination of courses in ‘Ecology’ and ‘Ethics’, 
or they attended a combination of courses in ‘Ecology’, ‘Economics’, and ‘Sustainable production 
processes’. All of those courses address the concept of sustainability. In addition, Ghent University 
annually gauges for the perceived quality of its educational services through a questionnaire. At this 
occasion, over 80% of the responding students indicate that the concept of sustainability is sufficiently 
present in the University’s educational program.  
On the downside of this sampling approach, this chapter’s findings mainly apply to the sample’s 
characteristics and generalization remains speculative. Therefore, this research’s results remain 
speculative and must not be used for extrapolation of consumption in the long run. This limitation is 
further discussed in section ‘5. Limitations’. Table 3-1 presents some overall socio-demographic 
characteristics of the sample. 
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Table 3-1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample (n=274) 
Socio-demographic characteristics % of total 
Gender  
Male 51 
Female 49 
  
Age Group 18 – 22, higher educated 100 
  
Financial situation  
Below average & Average 39 
Above average 48 
Wealthy 13 
  
Living environment  
Rural 33 
Urban 67 
  
Purchasing responsibility in family  
Main responsibility 9 
Shared responsibility 33 
Someone else has more responsibility 58 
2.2. Questionnaire and scales 
The questionnaire comprises three parts (Appendix J). The first part measures the respondents’ 
environmental attitudes using the 15-item version of the NEP scale by Hawcroft and Milfont (2010). 
In addition, the final four questions of this first part gauges to what extent the respondents’ believe that 
their personal choices contribute to a reduction in the environmental impact of consumption. This is 
done by applying the 4-item Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) measurement, as described by 
Ellen et al. (1991) and Lee and Holden (1999). As such, the Both the NEP and PCE are considered as 
altruistic, environment-oriented drivers of sustainable consumption.  
The second part questions knowledge on, and attitude towards forests, sustainable forest management, 
and sustainable wood production. The questionnaire first presents some information on the 
contribution of deforestation and forest management to global CO2 emissions. Subsequently, the 
questionnaire checks whether the respondents are aware of the existence of the FSC and PEFC49 
certification schemes (the accompanying logos were also presented). FSC and PEFC are the most 
important certification schemes in terms of volume and certified forest area, both in Belgium and at 
global level (Yamamoto et al. 2014). Further questions probed the respondents’ attitudes towards the 
purchase of certified wood. This is done by combining components of both experimental and 
instrumental nature, as described by Ajzen (1991). Each component is measured on a 5-point semantic 
differential scale. The antonyms used were ‘harmful versus beneficial, ‘advantageous versus 
disadvantageous’, ‘good versus bad’, ‘worthless versus valuable’, ‘enjoyable versus unenjoyable’. In 
                                                     
49
 FSC = Forest Stewardship Council, PEFC = Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes. 
However, the abbreviations are most often used in marketing campaigns for both certification schemes, and in 
the visible certificate.  
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line with the stipulations by Ajzen (1991), part two probes for the subjective norm to purchase eco-
certified wood products. This analyses to what extent the respondents’ social environment is likely to 
influence them to opt for eco-certified products. The likelihood is measured on a 5-point interval scale 
varying from ‘not likely’ to ‘very likely’. The social groups taken into account were ‘people who are 
important to me’, ‘people whose opinion I value’, ‘friends’, ‘family’, ‘people who affect my 
purchasing decisions’. This indicates to what extent people feel pressured to perform, or not perform, a 
specific behavior (Ajzen 1991, Fishbein and Ajzen 1977).  
Subsequently, respondents had to indicate to what extent they intend to buy eco-certified wood 
products in the future (5-point scale from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’) and to what 
extent they believe the eco-certificates indeed sustain forest management and wood production (5-
point scale from ‘not sure at all’ to ‘very sure’). Trust in the eco-certification scheme’s impact is 
probed twice for each separate aspect (social, economic, and environmental) upon which the eco-
certificates aim to impact. Pappila (2013) and Van Kooten et al. (2005) described the importance of 
trust when it comes to eco-certification of wood. In fact, wood operators often opt for eco-certification 
because this is an indicator of trustworthiness (Owari et al. 2006). The followed procedure to 
transform the questions’ results into scales is further explained in Appendix K.  
At the end of part two, the respondents had to indicate to what extent they support their government 
purchasing eco-certified wood, instead of conventional wood, in different scenarios. This type of 
government policy is called Green Public Procurement (GPP). The level of support is measured on a 
5-point scale ranging from a non-supportive position to a very supportive position, with a neutral 
position in between. In the first scenario, the respondents had to indicate whether they support GPP 
when this policy had no consequence for their private wood consumption. In the second and third 
scenario, GPP entailed negative consequences: respectively the unavailability of eco-certified wood 
(crowding-out of private consumers) and increased price for eco-certified wood.  
The third part of the questionnaire collected information on the socio-demographic characteristics of 
the respondents. This included gender, age, education, financial situation, living environment, and 
purchasing responsibility in the family. A summary of these characteristics is presented in Table 3-1. 
2.3. Consumer segmentation 
This research applies segmentation analysis in order to separate the respondents into different groups 
based on their characteristics. The segmentation process aims for a high degree of similarity among 
respondents within a segment, and a high degree of dissimilarity between the segments.  
The reason to apply segmentation analysis is twofold. First, this research aims to check whether the 
identified determinants of sustainable consumption also apply to wood consumption. Those 
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explanatory variables are the respondents’ environmental concern, PCE, subjective norm, and attitude 
towards eco-certified purchases. In addition, this chapter also takes explanatory variables into account 
which specifically link to eco-certified wood consumption: trust in the certificate’s positive impact and 
income level (Aguilar and Vlosky 2007) in addition to the socio-demographic variables. The 
segmentation analysis is conducted by making use of the respondents’ score for these explanatory 
variables, on the condition that these variables significantly impact on the intention to buy eco-
certified wood. The latter is checked using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis and 
analysis of the Pearson correlation coefficient. This allows us to check for the presence of segments 
with a significantly different intention to buy eco-certified wood. Second, the consumer segmentation 
provides a solid framework for the comparison of attitudes by different consumer types towards 
government purchases of eco-certified wood (given specific scenarios).  
Segmentation analysis is only useful if the segmentation process is sufficiently efficient to result in 
stable segment solutions. This chapter applies the two-step procedure, as described by Yedla et al. 
(2010). The first step consists of hierarchical segmentation in order to determine the optimal number 
of segments, and the position of each segment’s centroid. The second step introduces those centroids 
as the initial points for a K-means segmentation. The quality of this solution is double-checked by 
analysis of the within group sum of squares for the resulting number of segments. Finally, ANOVA 
must indicate significantly different attitudes or characteristics between the segments. 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics and construct validity 
Table 3-2 presents information on the reliability of the constructs applied in this research. Each 
construct appears to be sufficiently reliable with Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.60. The high mean score 
(3.75) for the ‘environmental concern’ construct indicates that this research’s sample inclines to the 
NEP. The sample displays a high environmental concern. Hence, they are more inclined towards the 
NEP instead of the Dominant Social Paradigm. Hence, the sample does not believe that humans are 
superior to other species, the Earth provides unlimited resources for humans, and that progress is an 
inherent part of human history (Allaby and Park 2013). 
The score on the PCE is close to the neutral position 3 on the 5-point scale. The higher standard 
deviation for the PCE indicates that both consumers who believe, and consumers who do not believe 
that their individual behavior contributes to the solution of the environmental problem are present in 
this study sample. The sample also displays a positive ‘attitude towards the consumption of eco-
certified wood’. Hence they value, and enjoy this type of purchase. The mean score for the subjective 
norm is slightly lower, but nevertheless remains – significantly – above the neutral score 3 (according 
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to an ANOVA test). Hence, people in the respondents’ environment are inclined to purchase eco-
certified wood or believe that this type of consumption is the right thing to do. This could pressure the 
respondents into copying their behavior. Finally, the mean score for confidence in the eco-certification 
schemes is significantly lower than 3 (according to an ANOVA test). The respondents tend not to 
believe the claims that the eco-certification schemes ensure social, economic, and environmental 
sustainability in forest management and wood production. 
Table 3-2: Construct reliability test: Cronbach’s Alpha 
Construct Number of 
items 
Cronbach’
s Alpha 
Mean 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
Environmental concern  12 0.68 3.75A 0.39 
Perceived consumer effectiveness 3 0.67 3.03B 0.84 
Attitude towards eco-certified purchases 5 0.79 3.98C 0.54 
Subjective norm 5 0.75 3.17D 0.53 
Confidence in eco-certification schemes 6 0.70 2.88B 0.61 
NOTE.- All constructs are measured on a 5-point scale with a maximum score of 5 and minimum score of 1. 
a,b,c,d
 Scores in a column with different superscripts are significantly different (p<0.05), tested using ANOVA with Tukey post 
hoc tests. 
Table 3-3 presents the respondents’ intentions to buy eco-certified wood in future. The mean of 3.58 is 
significantly higher than the neutral score of 3. This indicates that a considerable proportion of the 
respondents are interested in purchasing eco-certified wood. Even more respondents believe that 
governments should solely purchase eco-certified wood (mean 3.79). However, this preference for 
governments purchasing eco-certified wood decreases significantly when this makes eco-certified 
wood unavailable or more expensive (respective mean score of 3.27 and 3.18).  
Table 3-3: Intention to buy eco-certified wood and attitude towards government purchases of eco-certified wood 
Agreement with statement Mean Standard 
deviation 
“In the future, I will buy eco-certified wood products” 3.58A 0.79 
“Governments should solely purchase eco-certified wood” 3.79B 0.80 
“Governments should solely purchase eco-certified wood, even if this 
implies that no eco-certified wood is available for my personal 
consumption” 
3.27C 0.89 
“Governments should solely purchase eco-certified wood, even if this 
implies that the price of eco-certified wood increases” 
3.18C 0.85 
NOTE.- All constructs are measured on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’. 
‘completely disagree’ obtains a score of 1, ‘completely agree’ obtains the maximum score of 5, while ‘neutral’ obtains the 
center score 3. 
a,b,c,d
 Scores in a column with different superscripts are significantly different (p<0.05), tested using ANOVA with Tukey post 
hoc tests. 
3.2. Consumer segmentation 
This chapter’s literature review identified environmental concern, PCE, subjective norm, and attitude 
towards eco-certified purchases as drivers for sustainable consumption. This chapter first applies OLS 
regression in order to check whether the variables indeed determine the intention to buy eco-certified 
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wood50 (Table 3-4). Note that also the significance of the socio-demographic variables was first 
checked. However, this test did not reveal any significant impact on the intention to buy eco-certified 
wood (full output is presented in Appendix D).  
In theory, it is more appropriate to apply ordinal logistic regression on an ordered discrete dependent 
variable. However, in consumer research, it is common practice to consider a 5-point scale as 
continuous. For this reason, and reason of comprehensibility of the model’s coefficients, this paper 
adheres the OLS approach. The results are cross-checked however by (the statistically more 
appropriate) ordinal logistic regression (Appendix D). The results for the ordinal logistic regression 
are in line with the initial OLS’s findings which provides additional justification for the applied OLS 
approach.  
Table 3-4: Estimation results of OLS regression (dependent variable is the intention to buy eco-certified wood) 
Variable Estimated coefficient p-value 
Intercept -0.99 0.076 
Perceived consumer effectiveness -0.01 0.90 
Environmental concern 0.46 *** 3.54 e-5 
Subjective norm 0.40 *** 1.81 e-6 
Attitude towards eco-certified purchases 0.40 *** 2.01 e-6 
NOTE.- * Statistical significance at p < 0.05, ** Statistical significance at p < 0.01, *** Statistical significance at p < 0.001. 
The regression analysis demonstrates a significant and positive impact for environmental concern, 
subjective norm, and attitude towards eco-certified purchases. The explanatory variables can 
potentially be correlated with each other. To avoid multicollinearity problems, this chapter calculated 
the Pearson correlation coefficients for each combination of explanatory variables in the model. No 
correlation above 0.3 is observed. In addition, the model is rerun with the exclusion of previously 
significant explanatory variables. In none of the cases, does PCE turn into a significant explanatory 
variable. Finally, the Variance Inflation Factor is also calculated for each explanatory variable, but 
those scores do not exceed 10. This indicates that no multicollinearity problems endanger the 
efficiency of the OLS regression model and that the PCE does not seem to impact on the intention to 
buy. For this reason, PCE is excluded as an input variable in the subsequent segmentation analysis. 
During the first step of the segmentation procedure, hierarchical segmentation of the respondents is 
based on the three remaining input variables. This results in an optimal number of four segments. The 
segments are acceptable as they are different to the input variables and have a meaningful size 
(Malhotra and Birks 2007).  
Subsequently, K-means segmentation is applied to four segments while the initial points of the K-
means segments are set at the centroids of the hierarchically determined segments. Table 3-5 presents 
                                                     
50
 The questionnaire only gauged for the intention to buy eco-certified wood, it does not measure an attempt or 
adaption of eco-certified wood purchases. Those are the two remaining possible attitudes towards sustainable 
consumption, as identified by Fishbein and Ajzen (1977). 
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the mean scores for each segment on the input variables, and other variables for which significant 
differences between the segments are detected using ANOVA and Tukey post hoc. 
Concerning the input variables, segment A has a significantly higher mean score than all other 
segments. The only exception is segment B’s score for ‘environmental concern’, but the means for 
both segments do not differ significantly. Hence, segment A’s members face the strongest incentives 
for sustainable consumption. As a consequence, segment A is the most voluntaristic and demonstrates 
a significantly higher intention to buy eco-certified wood than all the other segments. Noteworthy is 
segment A’s fairly high mean PCE (significantly higher than segments C and D, and significantly 
above the neutral score 3). The PCE was not significant in the OLS regression, but the most 
voluntaristic segment’s members do believe that their personal choices and actions can help to address 
the sustainability problems in forest management and wood production. In addition, they are the least 
pessimistic when it comes to confidence in the eco-certification schemes’ sustainability impact (mean 
score does not significantly differ from the neutral position 3). Finally, 57.33% of segment A’s 
members are female. 
Segment B is most similar to segment A. It has a comparable mean score for ‘environmental concern’ 
and also the mean score for ‘attitude towards eco-certified purchases’ is high (albeit significantly 
below segment A’s mean score). However, compared to segment A, segment B’s mean score for the 
subjective norm is much lower. This results in a mean intention to buy which ranks second. No other 
significant differences can be found between segments A and B.  
Segments C and D are also comparable for a number of input variables. No significant differences are 
detected for their mean scores for ‘environmental concern’ and ‘attitude towards eco-certified 
purchases’. Both segments significantly score lower for these variables compared to segments A and 
B. The main difference between segments C and D is their mean score for the ‘subjective norm’. 
While segment C is characterized by the, overall, second highest subjective norm, segment D has the 
lowest subjective norm. Consequently, the intention to buy for segment C ranks third, while segment 
D’s intention to buy ranks fourth. For both segments C and D, the PCE and confidence in the eco-
certification schemes is significantly lower than for the two other segments and below the neutral 
position 3. This implies that members of those segments do not believe their personal choices and 
actions, nor the certification schemes, contribute to addressing the sustainability problems in forest 
management and wood production. Finally, the segments with the lowest scores for the input 
variables, segments C and D, consist of more male than female members, although no significant 
differences are observed for the gender ratio. 
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Table 3-5: Mean score for the input variables per segment after K-means segmentation (initial point based upon 
hierarchical segmentation) 
 Segment A: 
Voluntaristic 
& Subjective 
norm 
Segment B: 
Voluntaristic   
 
Segment C: 
Poor drivers & 
Subjective 
norm 
Segment D: 
Poor drivers 
Segment size 75 87 72 38 
     
Input variables     
Environmental concern (mean) 3.89 A 3.95 A 3.46 B 3.55 B 
Subjective norm (mean) 3.60 A 3.03 C 3.33 B 2.36 D 
Attitude towards eco-certified 
purchases (mean) 
4.65 A 3.93 B 3.55 C 3.61 C 
     
Intentional behavior      
Intention to buy eco-certified wood in 
future (mean) 
4.00 A 3.69 B 3.35 C 2.92 D 
     
Other scales     
Perceived Consumer Effectiveness 
(mean) 
3.30 A 3.21 A 2.75 B 2.64 B 
Confidence in eco-certification 
impact (mean) 
3.02 A 2.93 A 2.78 A 2.65 B 
     
Socio-demographic variables     
Gender (percentage of female 
respondents) 
57.33%  50.57% 44.44% 36.84 % 
NOTE.- All variables except Gender are measured on a five-point scale: 1=low score, 5=high score.  
a,b,c,d
 Scores in a row with different superscripts are significantly different (p<0.05), tested using ANOVA with Tukey post 
hoc tests. Variables which do not significantly differ between segments are financial status, living environment, purchasing 
responsibility, knowledge of the certification schemes, and age. 
3.3. Scenarios  
This part investigates support by the different segments for government purchases of eco-certified 
wood – GPP – in different scenarios. The results are presented in Table 3-6. In the first scenario, GPP 
entails no consequences for private consumption. In this case, support for GPP appears to be 
correlated to the intention to buy eco-certified wood. The two segments with the highest intention to 
buy eco-certified wood (segments A and B) are also significantly more supportive towards GPP 
compared to the two segments with the lowest intention to buy eco-certified wood (C and D). Note 
that the level of support for GPP in this scenario is above, or equal to, the intention to buy eco-
certified wood for all segments. For segments B and D, the level of support for GPP is even 
significantly higher than their own intention to buy eco-certified wood. 
The segments with a high intention to buy eco-certified wood are more supportive towards GPP. 
Therefore, this analysis applies OLS regression in order to check whether the segmentation’s input 
variables, again including PCE, are useful explanatory variables for the level of support. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Appendix E. The level of support for GPP is positively related to 
environmental concern and attitude towards eco-certified wood. A high level of environmental 
concern and a positive attitude towards eco-certified purchases also provide a basis for supporting 
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GPP. The PCE does not impact on the level of support for GPP. This is apparent since a person might 
consider his personal consumption decisions as irrelevant, but in contrast perceive government 
purchases more considerable in volume. Nor does the subjective norm impact on the level of support. 
This is more straightforward since the subjective norm represents a perceived pressure to perform, or 
not perform, a specific behavior. In this context, the behavior by the government is irrelevant and does 
not impact a person’s individual situation. 
The support for GPP significantly decreases when this policy reduces the availability of eco-certified 
wood, or increases the eco-certified wood price. In scenario 2 (crowding-out private consumers), each 
segment’s support for GPP decreased compared to scenario 1. As a consequence, no segment has a 
significantly different mean score for GPP support. Hence, the positive stance of the most supportive 
segments A and B disappears when eco-certified wood becomes unavailable for their private 
consumption. This suggests that the decrease in support between the first and second scenario was 
greater for the segments that were initially most in favor of GPP (segments A and B). ANOVA with 
Tukey post hoc tests confirm this observation when the decrease in support by segments A and B is 
compared to the loss of support by D, but not compared to segment C (Table 3-6). Finally, the level of 
support by segments C and D no longer differs significantly from the neutral score 3. Hence, these 
segments do not have a distinctive positive stance towards GPP in scenario 2.  
Table 3-6: support for GPP, per segment and scenario 
 
 
Segment A: 
Voluntaristic 
& Subjective 
norm 
Segment B: 
Voluntaristic   
 
Segment C: 
Poor drivers & 
Subjective 
norm 
Segment D: 
Poor drivers 
Scenarios      
Scenario 1: “governments should 
solely purchase eco-certified wood” 
4.00 A 3.94 A 3.58 B 3.39 B 
Scenario 2: “Idem – no eco-certified 
wood available for private 
consumption” 
3.4 3.26 3.19 3.13 
Scenario 3: “Idem – price of eco-
certified wood increases” 
3.29 3.15 3.20 2.94 
     
Decrease of support     
Scenario 2 0.60 A 0.68 A 0.39 A 0.26 B 
Scenario 3 0.71 A 0.79 A 0.38 B 0.48 A 
NOTE.- All variables except are measured on a five-point scale: 1=no support, 5=high support.  
The findings for scenario 3 (the price of eco-certified wood increases due to GPP) are exactly the same 
except for the significant differences in the decrease in support among the segments. The only 
significant difference is observed between segments B and C. Nevertheless, the segments that were 
most supportive towards GPP in scenario 1 again experience the biggest decrease in support. OLS 
regression is also applied to analyze whether some of the segments’ characteristics impact on the 
decrease in support for GPP. Only environmental concern is significantly and positively related to the 
size of the decrease in support. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness does not drive intentional behavior 
Although the segment with the highest intention to buy eco-certified wood also has a high PCE, the 
OLS regression analysis demonstrated that the respondents’ PCE does not significantly drive their 
intention to buy eco-certified wood. This is an apparent outcome as earlier research  unambiguously 
identifies PCE as motivation for sustainable consumption of other commodities (Vermeir and Verbeke 
2006, Kang et al. 2013).  
This chapter claims that the absence of PCE as a driver for sustainable wood consumption stems from 
the low frequency of wood purchases. The wood consumption frequency is not measured in the 
questionnaire, but it is reasonable to assume that private consumers only rarely purchase wood. For 
this reason, the perceived environmental impact of private wood consumption might be rather small. A 
low PCE obviously results in a low attitude-behavior correlation (Berger and Corbin 1992). However, 
the standard PCE estimation technique by Ellen et al. (1991) and Lee and Holden (1999) is applied in 
this research, without specific reference to wood. This technique does not refer to any particular 
product or commodity. Hence, this research might be hindered by a discrepancy between the 
respondents’ general PCE and their PCE specifically in relation to wood consumption. This finding 
advocates for commodity- or product-specific estimation of a respondent’s PCE. 
Finally, it must be noted that the low frequency of wood purchases in this specific sample can be 
linked to the young age of respondents and the accompanying low purchasing responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, 42% of the respondents have main or shared purchasing responsibilities in their family, 
and this responsibility was not found significant as explanatory variable for the intention to buy 
sustainable wood. 
4.2. Public support for GPP 
Public support is essential for any type of government policy. The segmentation analysis demonstrated 
that the support for GPP without negative consequences (scenario 1) appears to be higher for the 
segments with a high intention to buy eco-certified wood. Subsequent analysis of the Pearson 
correlation coefficient and OLS regression analysis demonstrates that the subjective norm does not 
significantly explain the level of support for GPP, while it does drive the intention to buy eco-certified 
wood. This insight directly links to the conceptualization of the subjective norm itself. The subjective 
norm indicates to what extent people feel pressured by people in their social environment to perform, 
or not perform, a specific behavior (Ajzen 1991). Consumption of eco-certified wood relieves the 
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private consumer from this pressure. In this context, the behavior of the government is irrelevant. A 
high score for the subjective norm does not translate into increased support for GPP. 
In contrast, environmental concern (measured by the score on the NEP) and attitude towards eco-
certification are positively related to support for GPP. Hence, these attitudes are a motivation to 
sustain individual consumption patterns, and simultaneously create the expectancy for other 
consumers (and governments) to sustain their consumption. Building support for GPP policy can focus 
on the environmental concern of private consumers, by for example increasing awareness of the 
environmental benefits of eco-certified wood consumption. This claim especially holds since the 
segments with a higher intention to buy also demonstrated a higher trust in the impact of eco-
certification. 
4.3. Decreasing support for GPP as an indicator for self-interest 
GPP without negative consequences receives ample support by private consumers. Once negative 
consequences arise, this support decreases significantly. At present, the risk of these negative 
consequences is limited. However, expert consultation confirms that the supply of eco-certified wood 
would not be able to meet demand if governments decide to purchase solely eco-certified wood 
products (FSC International 2015). In addition, Chapter 2 described how GPP can increase the demand 
for, and consequently the price of certified wood. Hence, the negative consequences are not 
unrealistic. 
The segments with the highest intention to buy eco-certified wood are more averse towards GPP if it 
entails negative consequences. At first sight, this is a straightforward conclusion as those segments 
probably attribute most utility to eco-certified purchases and hence would lose the most due to 
negative consequences. However, this contradicts one of the main drivers of eco-certified wood 
consumption: environmental concern. Furthermore, OLS regression analysis even finds that 
environmental concern is the only significant explanatory variable for the loss of support. Respondents 
with a high environmental concern demonstrate a higher loss of support for GPP when negative 
consequences occur. Theoretically, from an environmental point of view, the identity of the consumer 
(government or private consumer) does not change the environmental benefit of eco-certification. 
Hence, consumers with purely environmental drivers for the choice of eco-certified wood should not 
be disappointed when governments purchase the remaining eco-certified wood instead of them.  
The opposite is observed however. This can be explained by the concept of involvement, or perceived 
personal importance. Involvement occurs when an object “is important to the self because it addresses 
important values and goals in peoples’ life” (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006). In this case, people with a 
high environmental concern are highly involved and invest cognitive effort in the decision-making 
process which leads to the consumption of eco-certified wood. The cognitive effort results in lengthier 
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decision making processes, extensive information search, formation of beliefs, attitudes and intentions 
and, most importantly, the behavioral outcome of purchasing a product which meets their values 
(Beharrell and Denison 1995, Jager 2000, Vermeir and Verbeke 2006). Not being able to purchase the 
eco-certified wood in this case is a deception. This suggests that the distinction between internal, 
person-oriented drivers (e.g. subjective norm), and environment-oriented drivers (e.g. environmental 
concern) for eco-certified wood consumption might not hold. The NEP probes for the respondent’s 
altruistic concern for an external factor (i.e. the environment) but it also captures an element of self-
interest. The respondents with a high environmental concern favor their personal consumption over 
government purchases. Hence, personal interest might be a more important driver for eco-certified 
consumption than previously assumed. 
The importance of self-interest as driver for eco-certified consumption is also suggested by the 
observation that albeit confidence in forest eco-certification is low, consumers tend to have a positive 
attitude towards, and intention to buy eco-certified wood products. Table 3-2 displays a mean level of 
confidence of 2.88. This represents a negative stance as it is significantly below the neutral score of 3 
according to a one sample t-test. However, the attitude towards eco-certified purchases is highly 
positive (3.98, not significantly different from the explicitly positive score of 4). Albeit the perceived 
limited effect of eco-certification, consumers appear highly interested in eco-certified purchases. This 
does not provide irrefutable evidence for, but instead suggests the presence of self-interest as driver for 
eco-certified purchases. Alternatively, consumers can have a positive attitude towards eco-certified 
purchases because they believe they support the idea of eco-certification. As such, they might improve 
the functioning of the eco-certification schemes in the long run.  
Note that this research opts for segmentation analysis because its results are interesting tools for 
stakeholders that aim to reach out to the consumers. However, also MANOVA would have been an 
appropriate type of analysis to investigate the impact of the different variables on the intention to buy 
and changes in the level of support for GPP. Appendix F presents the results of the MANOVA test for 
the impact on loss of support and intention to buy. The MANOVA’s results confirm the results of the 
segmentation analysis. 
4.4. Leverage effect of GPP 
GPP aims to foster the consumption of environmentally-sustainable goods by reducing the transaction 
costs for adapting to new products and stimulating the uptake of innovations (Edler et al. 2015, 
Schaltegger et al. 2014). This chapter’s segmentation analysis contributes by making this a realistic 
ambition. The findings provide a better understanding of consumers’ attitudes and behavior towards 
eco-certified wood consumption. These insights can be used in the development of a communication 
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strategy for the different segments in order to encourage them to opt for eco-certified wood 
consumption.  
The intention to buy eco-certified wood is explained by the consumer’s attitude towards eco-certified 
purchases, subjective norm, and environmental concern. Hence, comparable to building support for 
GPP, governments should pay adequate attention to the environmental concern of private consumers. 
Higher environmental concern encourages consumers to invest cognitive effort and to undertake 
extensive information search (Jager 2000). Under this rationale, reducing the transaction costs for 
seeking information, for example, could stimulate private consumption of eco-certified wood. Related 
to this issue, the lack of trust in the eco-certification schemes probably also obstructs the uptake of 
eco-certified wood consumption. As described by Pappila (2013), trust is essential in wood eco-
certification. 
Together with the subjective norm, this could create a self-reinforcing upward cycle. More 
environmentally concerned consumers in an individual’s environment could increase this person’s 
subjective norm and again encourage eco-certified purchases, etc. This leverage effect can only 
manifest itself when there is sufficient eco-certified wood supply. GPP’s negative consequences, such 
as reduced availability and increasing prices could prevent the uptake of eco-certified wood 
consumption and reduce support for GPP. 
5. Limitations 
This research probes for the intention to buy eco-certified wood in future, but does not explicitly 
mentions a specific price. In theory, this is not necessary because it is not this chapter’s intention to 
estimate a demand function. A demand function describes a consumer’s actual behavior, while this 
research probes for the intention. The theory of planned behavior by Ajzen (1991) clearly 
distinguishes between intention and behavior and acknowledges that, in future, discrepancy can arise 
between measured intention and performed behavior. The possible explanations for this discrepancy 
are numerous, and include for example the respondent’s future income. It is a deliberate choice to 
probe for intention instead of behavior. Research on the respondents’ actual behavior requires a more 
extensive questionnaire, including for example choice experiments leading to – for example – 
Structural Equation Models. However, this approach is more demanding and time-consuming for the 
respondents and can result in high drop-out rates among the respondents. In case of high drop-out 
rates, it is likely that the less interested consumers (with the lowest intention to buy eco-certified 
wood) drop-out first. This creates the risk of a selection bias, as data would be missing for the group of 
non-motivated consumers.  
A second limitation relates to the sampling approach. This approach results in an interesting and 
relevant sample, but on the downside the sample also has very specific characteristics. A number of 
Chapter 3 
68 
 
issues impede generalization of the research’s findings. First, all respondents are following higher 
education. So, they are more likely to end up in the higher income categories. This creates a bias but 
simultaneously also adds an interesting feature to the study sample since income level is positively 
linked to owning a house (instead of renting) (Kain and Quigley 1972). This assumption also holds in 
the Flemish region in Belgium (Vlaamse woonraad 2011). Households owning a house are in charge 
of investments in their house and property, and thus need to decide more frequently on wood 
purchases compared to households which rent a house.  
Second, the sample’s young age impedes generalization. Due to the young average age, only 42% of 
the respondents has main or shared purchasing responsibility in their respective families. This creates 
a hypothetical bias, as the remaining 58% of the respondents is not considerably involved in 
consumption decisions and thus provided hypothetical answers to the questionnaire’s questions. 
Nevertheless this study advocates that the selected sample remains sufficiently interesting due to the 
importance of the sample in future.  
Finally, one could also argue whether the respondents have sufficient insights in the functioning of the 
wood market in order to correctly assess the different scenario’s. The respondents received some brief 
information on the concept of eco-certification, but it is for example possible that they cannot link the 
increased demand by governments to increased prices. Nor has it been explicitly explained that eco-
certified consumption could stimulate eco-certified production. 
6. Conclusion 
Traditionally, the intention to buy sustainable products is explained by a consumer’s level of 
environmental concern, PCE, subjective norm, and attitude towards eco-certified purchases. This 
chapter uses these drivers as input variables in a combined hierarchical and K-means segmentation 
analysis in order to investigate two main issues. First of all, this analysis allows us to check whether 
these drivers also apply to the case of eco-certified wood consumption. The PCE turned out to be the 
only standard driver for sustainable consumption which does not significantly impact on eco-certified 
wood consumption. This is explained by the low frequency of wood purchases, which potentially 
results in a low PCE for wood, compared to the measured general PCE (unrelated to a type of 
commodity).  
Second, the segmentation analysis allows a thorough investigation of the support for GPP in different 
scenarios. GPP without negative consequences enjoys support by consumers with high environmental 
concern and a positive attitude towards eco-certified consumption. However, support for GPP 
decreases significantly when GPP entails negative consequences. It is particularly consumers with 
high environmental concern who demonstrate a large drop in support. This stems from the high level 
of involvement for these consumers. The high level of involvement results in the investment of 
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cognitive effort in the decision process towards sustainable consumption. If this type of consumer 
cannot acquire eco-certified wood, this results in high levels of disappointment (and explains the 
considerable loss of support). As such, this analysis uses the measured loss of support as a proxy 
indicator for the self-centered driver for eco-certified consumption. In contrast to earlier findings, this 
indicates that self-interest might be a more important driver for eco-certification compared to more 
altruistic drivers.  
Finally, this research describes a potential pathway from GPP to increased eco-certified private 
consumption. Highly involved consumers invest time and cognitive effort in the decision process for 
consumption. This entails some transaction costs. Lowering the transaction costs relating to this 
decision process, for example, for information seeking, could facilitate eco-certified wood 
consumption. In relation to these issues, this chapter observed a lack of trust in the positive impact of 
eco-certification. A higher involvement, trust and environmental concern, in combination with 
subjective norms, could result in a self-reinforcing upward cycle of increased eco-certified 
consumption.  
  
 
  
  
 
Chapter 4.  Implementation of the EU-Cameroon 
Voluntary Partnership Agreement: trade distortion, 
rent-seeking and anticipative behavior 
Abstract. This chapter empirically investigates the impact of the implementation process for the 
Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) in Cameroon on the volume of exported wood from 
Cameroon to the European Union (EU). This is achieved by applying time series analysis, change 
point detection, and vector autoregression with exogenous variables. No previous research has 
quantitatively analyzed the long-term impact of VPAs on traded wood. Two major conclusions are 
drawn. First, the VPA, and accompanying improved forest governance, negatively impacted on the 
wood volume exported from Cameroon when it came into force (December 2011). However, wood 
extraction in Cameroon’s neighboring countries increased as operators can still economically benefit 
from less stringent environmental standards in these countries. Second, this chapter observes 
anticipative behavior before the VPA came into effect. During the negotiations, exports decreased due 
to redirection of the trade flows, and uncertainty concerning the outcome of the negotiations. 
However, during the months before the VPA came into force, wood exports sharply increased. This is 
explained by rent-seeking behavior by operators who wished to benefit from the less stringent trade 
conditions, whilst they lasted.  
 
Context: In addition to signaling preferences as a consumer (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), governments 
can formalize sustainability standards to production in legislation. This chapter empirically 
investigates the impact of the mandatory legality verification through Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements. 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
Brusselaers, J., Buysse, J. (2017). ‘Implementation of the EU-Cameroon Voluntary Partnership 
Agreement: trade distortion, rent-seeking and anticipative behavior’. Submitted in March and 
currently in review process in Review of Environmental Economics & Policy.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter empirically investigates the impact of the implementation process for the Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement (VPA) in Cameroon on the volume of wood exported from Cameroon to the 
European Union (EU) using time series analysis, change point detection, and vector autoregression 
with exogenous variables. 
VPAs, together with the EU’s Timber Regulation (EUTR) are the two main elements in the EU’s 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT) (Lesniewska and McDermott 
2014). This action plan ‘focuses on the wood trade and enforcement of forest laws and regulation as a 
way to combat illegal logging’ and improve forest governance at global level (Tegegne et al. 2017). 
Since 2013, the EUTR has required a due diligence system (DDS) for the legality of imported wood 
and wood products (Leipold 2016). This is intended to prevent the placement of illegal wood 
(products) on the EU-market. Since the wood operators bear the cost of this DDS, these more stringent 
requirements could create a trade barrier (Xu 2000). 
While the EUTR prohibits the placement of illegal wood on the EU-market, VPAs help wood-
producing countries to ensure that the wood products they export to the EU are legal. A VPA is a 
‘legally binding trade agreement between the EU and a wood-producing country outside the EU’ 
(European Commission 2017d). These agreements combine legality licensing with multi-stakeholder 
processes51 that address underlying problems of forest governance (Lesniewska and McDermott 2014). 
A country can only award FLEGT legality licenses to its operators on the precondition of an EU-
approved legality assurance system. FLEGT licensed operators gain automatic access to the EU 
market (Carodenuto and Cerutti 2014) and avoid the costs relating to DDS. By granting automatic 
access to the EU market, a VPA has elements in common with, but is not completely similar to a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA). This can potentially be beneficial for the wood producing countries as 
renewable resources can positively impact economic growth, on the precondition of an open economy 
and well-functioning institutions (Tajibaeva 2012). 
This chapter is the first to present an analysis of the VPA’s impact on Cameroon’s wood exports to the 
EU. This is useful for two reasons. First, it is interesting to investigate the impact of any FTA, as 
FTAs do not necessarily increase trade flows and thus specific conclusions can be derived from this 
case. According to Burfisher et al. (2001), “whether or not a regional trade agreement benefits its 
members will depend on parameter values and initial economic structure — it is essentially an 
empirical issue that must be settled by data analysis”. In addition, the nature of the FTA also 
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 With, for example, a focus on support to civil society for independent forest monitoring, capacity building for 
forest ministry officials, public awareness-raising regarding the importance of reducing illegal forest activities or 
addressing legal issues, such as unclear or contradictory forest-related laws and weak community rights. 
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determines the extent of its impact (Lake and Yildiz 2016) and when FTAs involve natural resources, 
there is an additional risk for overexploitation (Ferreira 2007). Second, Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) 
identify the lack of research which specifically focusses on VPAs’ potential and their actual impact: 
“existing research regarding long-term impacts is speculative or relates to the processes preceding 
legality verification”. To date, no such research has been conducted (either for Cameroon or for other 
VPA countries). 
FTAs do not necessarily increase trade, and this is no different for the VPA in Cameroon, especially 
since the VPA comes with other responsibilities. Wood operators can only obtain a FLEGT license if 
they meet the stipulated legality criteria. This often requires considerable changes in forest 
management practices. Those changes, and the accompanying costs, might exclude some of 
Cameroon’s operators from participation in trade with the EU.  Cameroon is currently reviewing the 
first round of applications for FLEGT licenses (European Union 2016), but has, so far, not awarded 
any license. Nevertheless, the VPA is expected to have an impact, since a VPA implies governance 
reforms, legislative and policy reforms and impact monitoring (European Commission 2017d, 
Carodenuto and Cerutti 2014). Van Heeswijk and Turnhout (2013) describe the specific focus on law 
enforcement, and how this neglects sustainability issues. These changes affect every wood operator in 
Cameroon.  
This chapter does not focus solely on the point in time when the EU-Cameroon VPA was agreed or 
came into force (May 2010 and December 2011 respectively). In addition, the analysis takes into 
account the whole negotiation period (November 2007 – May 2010). This is necessary since multiple 
authors have observed increased trade volumes during the negotiation period which precedes an FTA 
coming into force (Mölders and Volz 2011, Freund and Ornelas 2010, Coulibaly 2007, Croce et al. 
2004). Magee (2008) quantifies the anticipation effect of regional trading agreements – in general – as 
about 25% throughout the four years prior to an FTA coming into force. Baier et al. (2014) even 
described how some authors reverse the causality. In this reasoning FTAs emerge as a consequence of 
intense trade.  
According to Eichengreen and Irwin (1998), the explanation for this anticipation effect is twofold. 
First, suppliers begin to redirect ‘their exports in anticipation of future market openings’. Second, less 
formal arrangements often precede the conclusion of an FTA. This stimulates trade between the 
negotiating countries and reinforces the anticipation effect. Alternatively, Csilla and Nilsson (2015) 
stress the importance of reduced trade policy uncertainty as the negotiation process proceeds. An 
uncertain trade environment does not stimulate trade (Fontagné et al. 2015). 
In the European context, the anticipation effect is observed for numerous intra- and extra-EU 
agreements. At intra-EU level, the anticipation effect first occurred prior to the formation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 (Eichengreen and Irwin 1998). Subsequently, increased 
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trade flows were observed prior to the different EU expansions, for example when Portugal joined in 
1986 (Handley and Limao 2015, Csilla and Nilsson 2015). At extra-EU level, the anticipation effect 
occurred prior to agreement on the EU-Korea FTA (Csilla and Nilsson 2015).  
Also, this chapter finds (significant) effects during the period which preceded the VPA coming into 
force. Depending on the conditions, Cameroon’s exports to the EU were positively or negatively 
affected by the VPA’s implementation process. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The second part describes the context of the 
EU-Cameroon VPA. Part three describes the data and methods applied in order to investigate the 
impact on trade flows. Part four presents the results of the analysis, while part five discusses these 
results prior to ending with a conclusion. 
2. FLEGT and the VPA in Cameroon 
The entire VPA implementation process in Cameroon consists of 3 phases. The first phase 
encompasses the VPA negotiations (November 2007 – May 2010). The second phase starts with the 
VPA agreement in May 2010 and ends with the VPA coming into force (December 2011). Hence, at 
this stage the negotiations are finalized, and the outcome of the negotiations is known. However, the 
bilateral binding agreement did not enter into force yet. The third period runs from the VPA’s entry 
into force up to the present.  
Tegegne et al. (2017) describe how this entire process has been managed by the Cameroon Ministry of 
Forests and Wildlife. The ministry created two agencies to negotiate and implement the VPA process: 
the Joint Implementation Council to oversee the VPA implementation, and a National Monitoring 
Committee to guide and assess the VPA implementation. At least one of the two agencies includes 
representatives of the Prime Minister’s office and five government ministries, the National Assembly, 
the private sector, civil society, indigenous people and community forests. The high number of 
stakeholders involved is one of the reasons why this process is often perceived as a “good” process 
(Tegegne et al. 2014, Dooley and Ozinga 2011).  
Since 2011, Cameroon has been developing its ‘Timber Legality Assurance System and methods of 
impact monitoring, and implementing transparency commitments’ (Tegegne et al. 2017). Barriers to 
VPA implementation in Cameroon are corruption, the informal nature of the domestic sector, non-
sensitive wood demand, technicalities of the legality assurance system, the high cost of legality and 
lack of awareness on the part of the private sector (Carodenuto and Ramcilovic-Suominen 2014). 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Case selection 
This chapter claims that it is relevant and necessary to individually investigate the Cameroonian case 
because each VPA is unique. A VPA is a bilateral agreement between the EU and a wood-producing 
country, hence both the process of negotiation and implementation of a VPA differ for each country 
(European Commission 2017b, Wiersum and Elands 2013, Van Heeswijk and Turnhout 2013). Also, 
the type of wood products covered by each VPA differs. Hence, different VPAs will generate 
heterogeneous impacts across the world52. Therefore this chapter does not consider VPAs 
simultaneously. 
The reason for selecting the case of Cameroon is threefold. First, the EU-Cameroon VPA came into 
force on 1st December 2011. The negotiations started in November 2007. Sufficient time has therefore 
passed to be able to assess the impact of it coming into force and the preceding implementation period. 
At global level, only the VPA with Ghana came into force earlier (December 2009), but throughout 
the period 2000 – 2015 Ghana exported 5 times less wood to the EU (EUROSTAT 2017). This is the 
second reason to opt for Cameroon: it is the most important African exporter of tropical hardwood to 
the EU (Tegegne et al. 2014) and therefore a relevant case to investigate. Third, Cameroon is 
surrounded by countries which also export wood to the EU. This creates the opportunity to compare 
Cameroon’s exports with its regional counterfactual.  
This research opts for a regional instead of a global counterfactual in order to ensure that homogenous 
trade flows are compared. Comparing Cameroon’s exports to the export by, for example, Argentina or 
Indonesia could cause some problems because those countries grow different species. Consequently, 
they produce and export different types of wood as well, and their export flows are too heterogeneous 
to compare.  
3.2. Data 
Monthly trade data for the period January 2000 – December 2015 was retrieved from the EUROSTAT 
(2017) ‘International Trade in goods – detailed data by HS2-HS4’ database. We used detailed trade 
data on the volume (not value) at the 2 digit breakdown level for product category 44; ‘Wood and 
articles of wood’. This broad category encompasses a number of product categories which are not 
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 At present, the EU has signed 6 VPAs with the following wood-producing countries: Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, and the Republic of the Congo. Nine other countries are in the 
process of negotiation: Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Laos, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam 
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subject to the EU-Cameroon VPA53. However, all of Cameroon’s exports of wood products to the EU 
are covered by the VPA except for charcoal, but charcoal only represents a negligible 0.018% of the 
wood exports to the EU. Hence, 99.982% of the exported volume represented by product classification 
44 is subject to the VPA. For this reason, we can make use of this aggregated number to analyze the 
impact of the VPA implementation process. The monthly volumes exported to the EU are indexed. 
The observation for January 2000 was set at 100.  
The counterfactual was calculated by taking the mean of the indexed monthly volumes exported to the 
EU by Cameroon’s neighbors. By making use of the indexed values, it is more straightforward to 
compare the evolution of Cameroon’s exports to the exports from its regional counterfactual. This 
chapter opted for the aggregate counterfactual in order to level out the impact of country-specific 
events in the neighboring countries. Some of the neighboring countries are, for example, also 
implementing a VPA (European Commission 2017d). Applying the mean of the indexed export 
volumes levels-out the impact of different countries entering different VPA implementation phases or 
implementing the VPA at a different speed. 
The neighboring countries taken into account include Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, 
Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Gabon. Chad is the only neighboring country which is not 
incorporated in the analysis. This is explained by the low level of wood (products) exports by Chad. 
Ghana is also an important wood producer in the West-African region, but nevertheless it is not 
incorporated in the counterfactual because its exports are too erratic (i.e. not stationary).  
3.3. Empirical specification 
This chapter starts with some general descriptive statistics on the exported volumes of wood by both 
Cameroon and its counterfactual to the EU. The descriptive statistics include a decomposition of the 
observed trade flows into a trend, seasonal and random component, and the general likelihood ratio 
method, as introduced by Hinkley (1970), in order to check for the presence of a single change point in 
the mean exported wood volumes54. This allows the detection of a change in the statistical properties 
of the sequence of observations for the exported volumes from Cameroon to the EU changed, on the 
precondition this kind of change is present.  
The change point detection does not provide irrefutable evidence for the impact of the VPA 
implementation phases. Therefore, this chapter presents a Vector Autoregression (VAR) for a more 
thorough analysis of the impact of the VPA implementation. This research uses a Seemingly Unrelated 
Model such as VAR because its autoregression part allows that a time series’ current value partially 
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 The EU-Cameroon VPA covers logs, sawn wood, veneers, plywood, railway sleepers, sleepers, furniture, fuel 
wood and wooden tools 
54
 This analysis made use of the AMOC algorithm.     
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depends upon its previous levels. In addition, its vector part can capture linear interdependence 
between the lagged values of different time series. As such, the VAR accounts for correlated errors, 
but does not assume that the current levels of the two endogenous trade flows can impact each other 
(Chan and Chung 1995). Our time series represent the physical wood flows from different countries to 
the EU. Hence, this kind of interdependence can be expected. This chapter assumes that the current 
level of exports from both Cameroon and its counterfactual in month t (respectively tuN,v and tB,v) 
depend on the previous levels of exports (tuN,v`M and tB,v`M, in which 
 stands for the lag order). 
This results in the following VAR specification: 
 wv = I0wv`0 +⋯+ IMwv`M + yv   ( 4-1 ) 
In which wv is a 2x1 matrix constructed out of the two endogenous variables tuN,v and tB,v. I is 
the time-invariant 2xp coefficient-matrix and yv is a 2x1 matrix which represents the error term. The 
Bayesian Information Criterion is used in order to determine lag order 
. 
As indicated, this chapter aims to investigate the impact of the VPA implementation process on 
Cameroon’s wood exports to the EU. Three phases are distinguished: the negotiation period, the 
period in which the VPA was agreed but had not come into force, and the period in which the VPA 
came into force. Three dummy variables are created in order to identify the respective phases: zPB,v, 
zuB,v, and z{,v. The use of dummy variables to measure the impact of the VPA is in line with earlier 
research (Baier et al. 2014, Foster et al. 2011). The exogenous dummy variables are separately 
introduced in the initial VAR in order to assess the impact of the separate phases. Introducing 
exogenous variables in a VAR transforms it into a VARX model. For the negotiation phase this would 
result in the following specification: 
  wv = I0wv`0 +⋯+ IMwv`M +|zPB,v +	yv   ( 4-2 ) 
In which | is a time-invariant 2x1 matrix which represents the impact of the dummy variable zPB,v 
on the exports to the EU by Cameroon (tuN,v) and its counterfactual (tB,v) respectively. The choice 
for the VARX approach is based on the assumption that the trade flow from Cameroon is likely to be 
affected, but not determined, by the VPA implementation. The VARX model allows the distinction 
between endogenous variables which mutually determine each other (i.e. the export variables for 
Cameroon and its counterfactual) and exogenous variables which have an influence on the endogenous 
variables (i.e. the dummy variables per VPA implementation phase). 
The possibility to include the VPA implementation phases as exogenous variable is another argument 
in favor of the Seemingly Unrelated Models such as VARX models. In Simultaneous Equation 
Models, our analysis could falsely conclude that the export flows by Cameroon and its counterfactual 
are contemporaneously correlated (even if there is no instantaneous feedback between both markets) if 
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both time series react simultaneously to the exogenous variable. This would imply that the effect of 
the exogenous variable cannot be isolated from that of common trends in the two time series. 
According to us, no instantaneous feedback should be expected between the trade flows of Cameroon 
and its counterfactual. In addition, our model does not directly capture unobservable shocks (e.g. 
political unrest). In the case exogenous shocks are unobservable, a Simultaneous Equation Model can 
yield unreliable inferences on the causal relationship between the two trade flows. Instead, Chan and 
Chung (1995) describe how VAR models can reveal the underlying process better than Simultaneous 
Equation Models when no actual contemporaneous interaction occurs between the two markets / trade 
flows. In this research’s VARX model, the counterfactual is composed as the mean of the neighboring 
countries’ trade flows. This approach dilutes the impact of country-specific disturbing factors (e.g. 
political unrest). 
In theory, it is possible to introduce a matrix of exogenous variables (vectors) in a VAR at the same 
time. In this specific case, however, introducing the three dummy variables simultaneously is not 
feasible. Once the VPA negotiations start, the different VPA implementation phases follow each other 
without delay. The end of the negotiation period coincides with the agreement of the VPA. 
Accordingly, the VPA will lose its “agreed but not in force” status at the point it does come into force. 
A VARX which includes the three dummies simultaneously confuses the observations for the dummy 
variables with the process of time. If both the time series for Cameroon and its counterfactual 
experience a comparable trend throughout 2000 – 2015, the VARX might falsely attribute an 
explanatory value to the dummy variables for this overall trend. Instead, this chapter investigates 
divergence from the general trend relating to one of the dummy variables. 
The reason to prefer a VARX model over the more conventional gravity trade models is twofold. First, 
the geographical focus on Cameroon and its neighboring countries limits the variability among the 
exporting countries. Traditional variables such as ‘distance to receiving market’ will not differ 
considerably due to the proximity of the exporting countries. Second, our research could only make 
use of data on trade flows towards the EU. This prevents the introduction of variables such as GDP of 
the different importing countries, which traditionally introduces variability in gravity trade models. In 
addition, the exclusive focus on the EU as importing country implies that it is hard to identify 
alternative explanatory variables for traditional gravity models: the diversity among the EU Member 
States (e.g. different languages, colonial ties,…) impedes the identification of variables which could 
indicate bilateral connections (e.g. common language) between a West-African country and the EU as 
a whole.  
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4. Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The upper graph in Figure 4-1 displays the observed evolution of the wood exports from Cameroon to 
the EU for the period 2000 – 2015. The second to fourth graph in Figure 4-1 decomposes this 
observed time series into a general trend for the 2000 – 2015 period, a seasonal component and a 
random term.  
 
Figure 4-1: decomposition of additive time series: Cameroon’s wood export to the EU, indexed (2000 = 100), 
period 2000 – 2015 
The decomposition uncovered a decreasing trend throughout the period under consideration. This 
suggests that the volumes of wood (products) exported from Cameroon to the EU have been 
decreasing. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test shows that the trend component of the traded volume 
time series is stationary. 
A seasonal component was also observed (third graph, Figure 4-1). This is due to Cameroon’s rainy 
season which prevents the transport of the wood. Finally, the random component of the time series is 
itself stationary (tested by making use of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test). 
Chapter 4 
80 
 
Figure 4-2 displays the indexed volume of exported wood (products) from Cameroon’s neighbors to 
the EU for the period 2000 – 2015. The first graph displays the time series observed. A downward 
sloping trend was observed, although this was less clear than for the Cameroonian time series. This is 
also demonstrated in the second graph in Figure 4-2. Note, however, that this general trend 
experienced a revival in both 2010 and 2012. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicates that the 
general trend is only stationary at 10% CI, while the overall (non-decomposed) wood exports by the 
counterfactual are stationary at 5% CI. 
 
Figure 4-2: decomposition of additive time series: regional counterfactual’s wood export to the EU, indexed 
(2000 = 100), period 2000 – 2015 
The seasonal component of the overall time series is again determined by the rainy season in Central 
and West Africa and shows a comparable pattern compared to the seasonal component in Cameroon’s 
wood exports to the EU. The correlation coefficient for the seasonal component in Cameroon’s and the 
counterfactual’s exports is 0.66 (Appendix G). Note that this finding confirms the homogeneity of the 
demarcated region. Finally, the random component of the regional counterfactual’s exports to the EU 
also deserves some attention. The mean of this random component does not differ significantly from 
the random component of Cameroon’s exported volume to the EU (tested by making use of a T-test) 
and by default equals zero. The variance of both random components, however, does differ. An F-test 
indicates that the variance in the counterfactual’s random component is significantly higher than the 
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variance for Cameroon’s random component. This suggests a more stable trade relationship between 
the EU and Cameroon compared to the trade relationship between the EU and the counterfactual.  
4.2. Change point detection 
The previous analysis revealed a decreasing trend throughout the 2000 – 2015 period. This chapter 
applies the Binary Segmentation technique, as introduced by Scott and Knott (1974), to check for the 
presence of change points. The Binary Segmentation technique is the most widely used change point 
search method (Killick et al. 2012). In this research’s rationale, a change point represents the point at 
which the long-run mean of the wood volume exported by Cameroon to the EU significantly changed. 
The result of the change point detection is presented in Figure 4-3. 
The outcome of the analysis is interesting for two reasons. First, three main change point are detected. 
Hence, the exported wood volume from Cameroon to the EU has indeed decreased significantly over 
time. Second, one of the change points for the mean was found to be in November 2007. Therefore, 
the change point coincided with the start of the VPA negotiations in Cameroon. The mean of the 
(indexed) exported wood volume from Cameroon to the EU was 85.3 before the start of the VPA 
negotiations. After November 2007, the long run-mean of Cameroon’s exported wood value decreased 
to 53.0 A drop of 32.3 index points, from which Cameroon’s exports have never recovered. 
This type of analysis does not provide irrefutable proof of the impact of the start of the VPA 
negotiations. The downward sloping trend for exported wood volumes by Cameroon to the EU implies 
that it is likely that a change point was detected in this period. It could be a coincidence that the 
change point was detected at the start of the VPA negotiations.  
Nevertheless, this analysis does suggest a negative impact of the VPA negotiations on the volume of 
wood exported by Cameroon to the EU. Moreover, it suggests that the exports did not recover from 
this setback. The suggestion is strengthened by the observation that the counterfactual’s second change 
point was only found in July 2008. Hence, the VPA negotiations could have accelerated the downward 
trend in Cameroon in comparison to the situation in its neighboring countries. In addition, the decline 
in mean exported value before and after the change point was smaller for the counterfactual. The mean 
decreased from 95.2 to 73.5, a drop of 21.7 index points (compared to 32.3 for Cameroon). We cannot 
conclude anything based on suggestive analysis, but at least this analysis indicates that our subsequent 
analysis should devote some attention to the point at which the VPA negotiations started, alongside the 
VPA agreement and it coming into force. This is in line with the literature review in section 1. 
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Figure 4-3: Change point detection for the mean exported volume of wood from Cameroon to the 
EU, indexed (2000 = 100), period 2000 – 2015.  
NOTE.- Change points detected in July 2001, November 2007, and October 2012. 
4.3. VARX Model  
The presence of a change point which coincides with the start of the VPA negotiations suggests an 
impact of the negotiation period on exports. In addition, Cameroon’s trade flow did not recover from 
this setback once the VPA was agreed or came into force. This chapter presents three VARX models 
in order to check this more thoroughly. One unique model was created for each VPA implementation 
phase (negotiation, agreement, entry into force), as specified in equation 4-2. The exogenous identifier 
variable was a dummy variable which had the value of one during a specific implementation phase.  
Prior to the construction of the VARX model, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Ljung-Box 
Test were applied in order to check the stationary conditions for the time series on Cameroon’s and the 
counterfactual’s exports. Both tests had a satisfactory outcome, which enables the use of the VARX 
approach. 
In addition to the model’s variables, two parameters of the VARX model must be specified: the order 
of the autoregressive part of the model and the number of lags of the exogenous variable. This chapter 
determines both parameters by computing the Bayesian Information Criterion for the VARX process. 
The order of the autoregression was set at 3. Hence the current trade flow was partially determined by 
the last three months’ trade flows. Accordingly, the lag for the exogenous variable was set at 0. Hence, 
no lagged impact was assumed for this variable55.  
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 The Akaike Information Criterion suggested a lag order of 12. This relates to the observed seasonality in the 
trade flows. However, applying a 12-period lag results in numerous non-significant coefficients in the VARX 
output in combination with significant and positive coefficients for lag 11 and 12. This could be expected since 
we observed seasonality, and therefore increasing the lag order does not add value to the original analysis. For 
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Figure 4-1 displays the estimated coefficients per model (Appendix H presents the full output per 
model). The constant term and the coefficients for the autoregressive part of the VARX models do not 
differ drastically from each other. Hence, the vector autoregression manages to consistently capture 
the overall trend throughout the 2000 – 2015 period.  
Both the exports by Cameroon and its counterfactual are characterized by positive autocorrelation 
(third-order for Cameroon, first-order for the counterfactual). Noteworthy are the two negative, 
significant, coefficients for cross-correlations (at first order for Cameroon and second order for the 
counterfactual). This suggests a substitution effect between Cameroon and its counterfactual as the 
EU’s wood suppliers. Or put differently, if the EU increases its imports from the counterfactual, this 
occurs at the expense of the Cameroonian exports with a lag of one month. Note that Cameroon’s 
exports reversely respond earlier to changes in the counterfactual’s export. The substitution effect 
appears to be less important (smaller estimated coefficient) for the counterfactual and only manifests 
itself at order two, hence after two months. 
The analysis of the coefficients of the exogenous variables provides insights into the effect of the VPA 
implementation phases on trade flows. Figure 4-1 displays comparable coefficients for both the VPA 
negotiations and for the VPA coming into force. On the one hand, both periods impacted negatively on 
Cameroonian exports. Hence, the downward trend which was observed previously (Figure 4-1) was 
aggravated during the VPA negotiations, as well as by the VPA coming into force. On the other hand, 
the counterfactual’s exports were not impacted by either VPA implementation phase. Finally, the 
analysis includes a satisfactory check for stationarity of the VARX’ error terms (Appendix H). 
These findings are double checked by investigating what type of trend, if any, occurred during the 
periods concerned (i.e. VPA negotiation period, and VPA coming into force). This requires the 
construction of a new vector. The vector compares, for each region and each month t in the period 
concerned, whether the exports (tuN,v and tB,v) differ from those from a year ago (tuN,v`0, and 
tB,v`0,). This results in a 30-item vector for the 30-month VPA negotiation period, and one of 49 
items for the period following the VPA coming into force. Subsequently, a t-test is applied to check 
whether the mean of these new vectors significantly differed from zero. For Cameroon, the t-test 
indicates that the mean of this vector is indeed significantly negative for the negotiation period (-
15.86) and after the VPA came into force (-2.93). Hence, exports to the EU from Cameroon are 
decreasing. The trend for the counterfactual’s exports has not been significantly affected by the 
external change of the VPA negotiation and the VPA coming into force.  
The 19 month period between negotiation and the VPA coming into force (May 2010 – November 
2011) has had an opposite impact on trade flows. The exogenous variable did not have a significant 
                                                     
this reason, this research adheres the suggestion by the Bayesian Information Criterion and applies a lag order of 
3. 
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impact on the Cameroonian exports. Instead, the exports by the counterfactual were negatively 
distorted (coefficient -8.55). The t-test approach was again applied to check this more thoroughly. A 
new vector was composed which compared the differences between each month’s export level and the 
export level from a year ago. For Cameroon, this reveals that the exports consistently increased 
throughout this 19 month period (with a significant positive mean of 7.16). Between 2000 and 2015, 
this is the longest period during which each consecutive month’s export level was higher than the 
export level from a year ago. In contrast, the mean vector for the counterfactual’s exports does not 
significantly differ from zero. Put differently, during the period between negotiation and the VPA 
coming into force, the counterfactual’s exports did not significantly change compared to the previous 
period. This appears to be in conflict with the earlier findings in the VARX model (Table 4-1). 
However, the VARX coefficients describe the impact of the concerned period on the overall trend of 
the counterfactual’s exports to the EU. Taking the differences between exported volumes over the 
period of a year is a more suggestive approach. 
Table 4-1: Coefficients per VARX model, significant at 5% confidence interval level 
 Model 1: VPA 
negotiations 
November 2007 –  
April 2010 
Model 2: VPA 
agreement, but not in 
force 
May 2010 –  
November 2011 
Model 3: VPA in force 
December 2011 - present 
 
Cameroon Counter 
factual 
Cameroon Counter 
factual 
Cameroon Counter 
factual 
Constant term 4.89 26.00 N.S. 28.74 7.69 26.00 
 
Autoregression 
coefficients matrix - 
order 1 
      
Cameroon 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.32 0.11 
Counterfactual -0.22 0.46 -0.21 0.45 -0.22 0.46 
 
Autoregression 
coefficients matrix - 
order 2 
      
Cameroon 0.27 -0.07 0.27 -0.06 0.26 -0.07 
Counterfactual 0.22 N.S. 0.21 N.S. 0.22 N.S. 
 
Autoregression 
coefficients matrix - 
order 3 
      
Cameroon 0.29 N.S. 0.31 N.S. 0.27 N.S. 
Counterfactual 
 
0.30 N.S. 0.28 N.S. 0.30 N.S. 
Coefficient of 
exogenous variable 
-3.62 N.S. N.S. -8.55 -4.18 N.S. 
NOTE.- Only the significant coefficients (at 5% confidence interval) are displayed, ‘N.S.’ indicates non-significant 
coefficient estimates. Each model’s quality is checked by calculating the multivariate Ljung-Box statistics for cross-
correlation matrices, and analysis of the residual plots. “N.S.” stands for a non-significant coefficient estimate. 
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5. Discussion 
This section discusses the impact of the three different phases of the implementation process. The 
periods are not discussed in chronological order. 
5.1. Impact of the VPA into force 
The VARX model reveals a negative impact of the VPA on Cameroonian wood exports to the EU, 
since the VPA came into force on 1st December 2011. This is not what was expected since the VPA 
creates the opportunity to award FLEGT licenses to Cameroon’s wood operators. This license grants 
the operators automatic access to the EU’s wood market and exempts them for the due diligence 
requirement (and the accompanying costs) 56. As such, a VPA has a number of elements in common 
with FTAs. Cameroon’s wood sector also expects to gain better access to the EU’s market due to the 
VPA (Cerutti et al. 2013, Carodenuto and Cerutti 2014). 
The explanation for the negative impact of the VPA – once in force – is threefold. First, as yet, 
Cameroon has been unable to develop an approved assurance system to issue FLEGT licenses. This is 
a result of the poor forest and value chain management practices in Cameroon’s wood sector. 
Anecdotal evidence by Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014), for example, describes how the market works 
without any coordination: “nobody can tell you exactly where their wood comes from; it's from 
wherever you can find it”. This is problematic for the implementation of a legality assurance system. 
The lack of an operational FLEGT licensing system does not necessarily negatively impacts 
Cameroon trading position. However, despite the lack of licensing system, the Cameroonian operators 
are facing other changes due to the VPA coming into force: governance reforms, legislative and policy 
reforms and impact monitoring (European Commission 2017d, Carodenuto and Cerutti 2014). This 
creates additional obligations and accompanying costs for Cameroon’s operators. Other countries’ 
operators do not face these additional obligations and costs. Hence, the VPA coming into force could 
negatively impact Cameroon’s competitive position. This is in line with Ferreira and Vincent (2010), 
who describe how improved forest governance can reduce wood harvest in developing countries, and 
Greaker (2006), who described how environmental standards (licensing) can damage international 
trade if producers cannot meet the requirements. Note however that other authors found that improved 
forest governance can increase wood extraction (Wendland et al. 2014). 
Second, a considerable number of (especially small-scale) Cameroonian wood operators cannot bear 
the high upfront investment costs in order to become eligible for FLEGT licensing. Carodenuto and 
Cerutti (2014) described how the underdeveloped banking system worsens this barrier to FLEGT 
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 The due diligence requirement only came into force in March 2013, which gave wood operators time to adapt.  
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licensing at company level. Large-scale operators, with access to funding, manage to comply with the 
VPA stipulations. Since they can invest upfront, they benefit from easier access to the EU’s wood 
market. This is in line with the findings of Rodrigue and Soumonni (2014), who describe how 
investments in abatement in the Indonesian wood industry improve export performance. Also 
Fontagné et al. (2015) found that larger operators are more able to attenuate the negative impact of the 
trade barrier created by environmental norms. Following Foellmi and Oechslin (2010), however, this 
phenomenon comes with a risk of increased income disparity. While wealthy entrepreneurs take 
advantage of new export opportunities, the relatively poor entrepreneurs lose wealth and market 
power.  
Third, expert consultation (Global Timber Platform 2017, European Forest Institute 2017) indicates 
that the stipulations in the current VPA’s legality grid are too vague. Consequently, operators are 
unaware of what exactly they have to comply with. This prevents exporters from shipping wood to the 
EU, even if they are eligible for FLEGT licensing or able to establish a due diligence system. Instead, 
“the haziness pushes a considerable number of operators directly to markets without due diligence 
requirements. In the long run, this is problematic since it will become gradually more difficult to 
return to the EU’s wood market.” Put differently, the unclear texts weaken the EU’s impact and 
trading position in Africa. Instead, intra-African trade is becoming more important for Cameroon’s 
producers as the total wood production in Cameroon did not plummet (FAO 2016b). 
Note that this period’s exogenous variable does not have a significant impact on the exports by the 
counterfactual. This strengthens the earlier arguments which specifically link to the Cameroonian case.  
5.2. Impact of VPA negotiations 
The VARX model indicates that Cameroon’s wood exports are negatively affected by the VPA 
negotiations, while no impact is detected on exports by the counterfactual. The detection of the 
structural change point which coincides with the start of the VPA negotiations in Cameroon provides 
additional proof for the negative impact of this period on Cameroon’s exports.  
In theory, the wood trading conditions between the EU and Cameroon should not change during the 
VPA negotiations. Nevertheless, the VPA negotiations distorted on Cameroon’s exports. The 
explanation for this phenomenon links to the initial reason that this chapter also investigated the 
impact of the period before the VPA came into force: the possibility of anticipative behavior. 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) explained the anticipation effect by arguing that suppliers redirect ‘their 
exports in anticipation of future market openings’. In the case of the VPA in Cameroon, the wood 
operators possibly feared that the costs of the additional obligations outweighed the VPA’s benefits. 
Consequently, they started to redirect their exports away from the EU, in anticipation of too stringent 
export conditions on the EU wood market.  
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A second explanation for the anticipatory effect was provided by Csilla and Nilsson (2015) and 
Fontagné et al. (2015). They argue that reduced trade policy uncertainty, also in relation to 
environmental norms, triggers anticipative behavior. The outcome of a VPA negotiation, however, is 
highly uncertain. Each VPA is tailor made according to the needs of the wood-producing country 
(European Commission 2017b). Hence, the type of products covered by each VPA, and the VPA 
implementation phase, differ from country to country (Van Heeswijk and Turnhout 2013, Wiersum 
and Elands 2013). The uncertainty which characterizes the VPA negotiation phase could have reduced 
Cameroon’s exports to the EU. In future, attention should be paid to these negative consequences of 
often lengthy57 negotiation periods, as it is difficult for vulnerable markets to recover from setbacks. 
Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) provide a number of reasons that also make Cameroon’s wood market 
vulnerable, e.g. a lack of organization, corruption, and illegal production. 
During the negotiation phase in Cameroon, the counterfactual’s wood exports to the EU did not 
decrease, despite the overall decreasing trend in 2000 – 2015. This can be explained by the 
substitution effect between Cameroon and the counterfactual as wood suppliers to the EU. Reduced 
exports by Cameroon were compensated by exports from the counterfactual. Ferreira and Vincent 
(2010) provide an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. They describe the nonmonotonic 
marginal impact of improved forest governance on wood harvests in developing countries: countries 
with improving forest governance experience reduced harvests, while harvests in countries with 
weaker governance were increased.   
5.3. Impact of the VPA agreement prior to its entry into force 
Cameroon’s wood exports to the EU seemed to revive again in the period between the VPA agreement 
and it coming into force. This contrasts with the negative impact of the VPA negotiations (due to 
uncertainty and anticipative behavior) and the VPA coming into force (too stringent trade conditions). 
Further analysis demonstrated that the monthly export levels throughout this period were significantly 
higher (7.16 index points) than the export levels for the same month in the previous year. This 
indicates that Cameroon’s exports increased significantly between the agreement and the VPA coming 
into force.  
This 19 month period of increased exports is exceptional for two reasons. First, this was the longest 
consecutive period which showed a significantly increasing trend throughout the entire 2000 – 2015 
period. The runner-up period only comprised 12 months. Second, this period of increased 
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 The negotiation period in Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire is even lengthier. 
They started in September 2010, October 2010 and February 2013, respectively, but at the time of writing have 
not yet been concluded. 
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Cameroonian exports occurred between the VPA negotiations and the VPA coming into force. Both 
periods even accelerated the decline of Cameroon’s exports. 
This chapter argues that the timing of the revival of exports by Cameroon is not coincidental. We have 
already argued that the uncertainty concerning the VPA negotiations negatively affected Cameroon’s 
exports. The conclusion of the negotiations in May 2010 ended this period of uncertainty. In addition, 
the wood operators became aware of the more stringent trading conditions they would face once the 
VPA came into force. This prepared the ground for opportunistic behavior to increase exports from 
Cameroon to the EU. This behavior corresponds to the type of behavior observed when (international) 
trade quotas for natural resources are managed according to a ‘first-come, first-served’ basis (Larabi et 
al. 2013)58. This technique is also most often applied by the EU (European Commission 2017c, De 
Gorter and Sheldon 2000). Operators export increased volumes of wood as long as the more 
advantageous trading conditions apply (as long as the quota is not filled). Once the more stringent 
trading conditions apply (or the quota is filled), exports drop. Unfortunately, this kind of short term 
opportunistic behavior threatens the sustainable management of natural resources and creates the risk 
of overexploitation (Larabi et al. 2013). 
Note that in between the VPA agreement and VPA coming into force, the VARX model indicates a 
negative impact on the counterfactual’s exports. This is again explained by the substitution effect 
between Cameroon and the counterfactual as wood suppliers to the EU. While the EU is obtaining 
more wood from Cameroon, this occurs at the expense of the counterfactual’s exports.  
5.4. Possibility to extrapolate results 
This research applies a VARX model individually for Cameroon because each VPA is unique. Our 
analysis does not allow the simultaneous analysis for different exporting countries (e.g. panel data 
including the exporting countries separately, and adding dummy variables to control for the 
implementation phases of the different VPAs). Consequently, our research results cannot easily be 
extrapolated and the conclusions remain suggestive. Therefore we repeated the analysis for those 
West-African countries which also implemented a VPA, except Liberia and Ghana. The research 
initially focused on Cameroon because of the importance of, and presence of interesting features in the 
Cameroonian case (e.g. their implementation process was much shorter, or finalized in the recent 
past). The analysis was not completed for Ghana, as this country’s exports are not stationary, nor for 
Liberia as this country only recently concluded its VPA (end of 2013, leaving only 14 observations).  
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4-2. The results cannot confirm a negative impact of 
the VPA negotiation period on the exports by the Republic of Congo and the Central African 
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 This is, for example, the case where fishery quotas are opened. The competitive nature of the sector results in 
high fill rates of the quota, and the so-called phenomenon of the “race for fish”.  
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Republic. However, this might be due to the short negotiation periods in those countries. The 
observations for the period in between the VPA agreement and its entry into force in the Republic of 
Congo are more interesting. For the Republic of Congo, this period encompasses 46 months, and 
surpasses the length of the same period in Cameroon. In accordance with our observation in 
Cameroon, this analysis finds a significant negative impact for this period on Republic of Congo’s 
counterfactual export towards the EU. In addition, we observe a positive impact on Republic of 
Congo’s own exports. This estimate was not found significant in the case of Cameroon, albeit the fact 
that we observed a significant revival of Cameroon’s exports throughout this period. Hence, the 
findings for the Republic of Congo confirm the developed rationale for short-term overexploitation of 
a VPA partner country’s forest just prior to a VPAs entry into force. Finally, the analysis finds a 
negative impact for the VPA entry into force on both Republic of Congo and Central African 
Republic, and simultaneously on the trade flows by their counterfactual. The impact on the VPA 
partner countries’ exports is considerably higher however.  
Notice as well that both Republic of Congo and Central African Republic were part of Cameroon’s 
counterfactual, for which no impact was found at the entry into force of the VPA in Cameroon. This 
seems to confirm the idea that taking the mean of the exports of a sufficient number of neighboring 
countries levels out the effect of country specific events (such as political unrest, but also a country’s 
VPA implementation process). In addition, these findings confirm that the VARX approach manages 
to capture the impact of the VPA entering into force.  
Table 4-2: Coefficients for the VARX models of all VPA implementing countries in the counterfactual 
Country Models’ coefficients 
Negotiations Agreement Into force 
Rep of the Congo N.S. (11 months) 14.697 (46 months) -67.11 
Rep of the Congo – 
counterfactual 
N.S. (11 months) -10.352 (46 months) -4.217 
CAR  N.S. (15 months) N.S. (18 months) -13.646 
CAR – counterfactual N.S. (15 months) N.S. (18 months) -6.09  
Cameroon  -3.621 (30 months) N.S. (20 months) -4.175  
Cameroon – counterfactual N.S. (30 months) -8.554 (20 months) N.S. 
NOTE.- Implementation process in Central African Republic: start negotiations in October 2009, agreement in December 
2010, entry into force in July 2012. Implementation process in the Republic of Congo: start negotiations in June 2008, 
agreement in May 2009, entry into force in March 2013. 
6. Limitations 
The limitation on the possibility to extrapolate this research findings’ is discussed and addressed in the 
previous section. An additional limitation follows the restriction to one destination country (i.e. the 
EU). This prevents the analysis of multilateral resistance terms (Behrens et al. 2012). However, the 
decreasing exports towards the EU contrast with stable or increasing wood production in Cameroon 
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between 2000 and 2015 (FAO 2016b). This suggests that Cameroon is shifting its exports towards new 
destination countries. Expert consultation confirms this finding, and identifies India and China as two 
main new destination countries (Global Timber Platform 2017). 
A vast body of literature questions whether right-hand side dummy variables can be introduced to 
represent FTA ‘treatment’. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) describe how instead countries are likely to 
select endogenously into FTA. The explanation for this self-selection might be unobservable or 
complex, but is often linked to the level of trade. This chapter nevertheless claims that VARX models 
can be applied since the number of wood producing countries which is implementing a VPA in the 
considered region is on the rise. This steadily diminishes the endogenous selection bias. In addition, 
we observed that less important wood exporting countries (e.g. Liberia, Ghana) were among the first 
to negotiate (not necessarily conclude) a VPA, while more important exporters (e.g. Gabon) only 
stepped in at later stage. Note as well that the exports by Cameroon were characterized by a downward 
trend prior to the start of the VPA negotiations as well, this does not fit the rationale of endogenous 
selection into the VPA because of trade volumes. Other observations however do point to endogenous 
selection into the VPA. First, at the start of the VPA negotiations, the EU accounted for 80% of the 
Cameroonian sawn timber exports. Second, Cameroon is the main African producer of wood 
(products) (FAO 2016b). Third, Cameroon and the EU have a stable relationship, especially in 
comparison to the EU-Gabon trade relationship which is more erratic.  
This analysis finds a negative impact for the VPA implementation process in Cameroon. However, the 
VPA implementation is part of a wider policy that eventually imposed the Due Diligence System for 
all wood producing countries in 2013. We acknowledge that it is not feasible to analyze the impact of 
the Due Diligence System at this moment as this is too recent. However, it is possible and relevant to 
investigate the impact of the VPA implementation as Cameroon started this implementation at a 
moment no other wood producing country was facing legality verification requirements. As such, the 
early VPA’s entry into force (December 2011) can provide Cameroon with a ‘head start’ over other 
countries as Cameroon prepared itself for the Due Diligence System. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
stress the importance of the diminishing exports during the VPA implementation prior to the Due 
Diligence System requirement. Once a country shifts its exports away from the EU to countries with 
less strict legality requirements, it is difficult to return to the EU. If this implies that the EU becomes a 
less important destination market, this threatens the potential impact of FLEGT, its legality 
verification, and the tool of VPA in the tropical regions. 
7. Conclusion 
Cameroon’s wood exports to the EU have been characterized by a decreasing trend throughout the 
2000 – 2015 period. However, the VPA implementation process accelerated this downward trend 
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during two phases. The most straightforward drop was initiated when the VPA came into force (1st 
December, 2011). The drop in exports is explained by the observation that wood operators in 
Cameroon faced more stringent trading conditions, but were unable to become FLEGT licensed. The 
FLEGT license is key in acquiring access to the EU’s wood market. In addition, once FLEGT 
licensing becomes possible, it will become a challenge to acquire a license. Challenges include high 
upfront costs, and the unclear prescriptions for legality. The high upfront costs also create a risk of 
increased income disparity in Cameroon, as only the most affluent operators can apply for a license 
and benefit from the new export opportunities.  
An earlier drop was observed throughout the entire VPA negotiation period (November 2007 – May 
2010). On the one hand, this drop is explained by the uncertainty of the outcome of the negotiations. 
On the other hand, anticipatory behavior could have triggered the redirection of Cameroon’s exports 
towards countries with less stringent legality requirements. Both drops are problematic, since the VPA 
actually aims to strengthen Cameroon’s competitive position in the international wood market. For a 
vulnerable wood market, it is hard to bridge longer periods with declining revenues and sales.  
Cameroon’s wood export recovered between the VPA agreement and it coming into force. 
Unfortunately, this revival was possibly due to the fact that wood operators wanted to benefit from the 
less stringent trading conditions as long as they were applied (i.e. until the VPA came into force). This 
opportunistic, and short-sighted, behavior is likely to harm sustainable forest management and could 
result in overexploitation.   
Finally, this chapter also reveals a substitution effect between Cameroon and its neighboring countries 
as wood supplier to the EU. None of the countries supplies a unique product, so this comes as no 
surprise. This finding also links to the nonmonotonic impact of increased forest governance. It raises 
harvests in regions with weak governance, while it reduces harvest in regions with strong governance. 
Nonetheless, this increases the importance of a good trading relationship (through a VPA) with the EU 
as this could become a competitive advantage.  
  
 
  
  
 
Chapter 5.  The legality requirements in the EU 
Timber Regulation: non-tariff trade barrier or 
leverage effect? 
Abstract. This chapter presents a spatial equilibrium model to analyze the leverage impact of the 
legality requirements in the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR). The EUTR is part of the EU’s FLEGT 
program, which aims to stimulate legal wood production and sustainable forest management at global 
level. This leverage effect is an argument in favor of FLEGT but it has never been investigated 
thoroughly, or for demand and supply simultaneously. The leverage effect is measured in terms of the 
market share of wood that is accompanied by a certificate approving its legality (i.e. either an eco-
certificate or a FLEGT-license through voluntary partnership agreements). Our research finds that 
FLEGT does not increase sustainable wood production and consumption. FLEGT creates a non-tariff 
trade barrier on the conventional wood markets in Europe and North America. This situation allows 
conventional wood producers to increase prices. The existence of transport costs prevents consumers 
from switching to foreign producers. In addition, producers in the South cannot compete on the 
certified market with the more efficient producers in the North. Being protectionist in nature, the 
legality requirements result in a non-optimal solution and reduce global welfare, with consumers 
especially being hit.  
 
Context: Chapter 4 describes a negative impact of the introduction of legality verification through 
bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements. This chapter further investigates the impact of legality 
verification at global level through the EU Timber Regulation.  
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
Brusselaers, J., Buysse, J. (2017). ‘The legality requirements in the EU Timber Regulation: non-tariff 
trade barrier or leverage effect?’. Submitted in April and currently in review process in Journal of 
Forest Economics 
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1. Introduction  
This chapter investigates to what extent the legality requirements in the EU’s Timber Regulation 
(EUTR) provide leverage for legal wood production and consumption at global level. Legal wood in 
this narrative implies environmental and social sustainability (Wiersum and Elands 2013). The market 
share of legal wood serves as a proxy indicator for the leverage effect of the EUTR. 
Since 2013, the EUTR has required ‘traders who place wood products on the EU market for the first 
time to exercise due diligence’ (European Commission 2015b). Setting up an operational Due 
Diligence System (DDS) must minimize the risk of placing illegally harvested wood on the EU 
market59. The EUTR is part of the “Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Programme” 
(FLEGT) which aims to stimulate ‘both legal wood production and good forest governance’ at global 
level, and particularly in tropical countries (Wodschow et al. 2016, Wan and Toppinen 2016). 
Setting up a DDS comes with a cost at company level which results in a non-tariff trade barrier 
(Global Timber Platform 2017). However, two instruments can avoid the burden of a DDS. Both 
instruments involve a type of certification. First, tropical countries can negotiate a Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU. Each VPA requires the establishment of a functional 
legality assurance system. This assurance system allows the VPA-countries to award FLEGT-licenses 
to their wood operators. The FLEGT-license grants automatic access to the EU wood market, 
bypassing the due diligence requirement (European Commission 2017b, Wodschow et al. 2016). In 
addition, the VPA requires both environmental and societal efforts to improve the sustainability of 
forest governance in wood-producing countries. Second, (eco-)certificates, such as PEFC and FSC60, 
must be in full compliance with the EUTR requirements (PEFC 2016, Trishkin et al. 2015). In fact, the 
eco-certification schemes even raised their standards in order to ensure compliance with the FLEGT 
requirements (Gulbrandsen 2014). For this reason, an eco-certificate is accepted as sufficient proof of 
legality within the EUTR (UNECE 2015), and eco-certified wood can pass a ‘due diligence light’ 
which entails lower costs.  
This chapter defines legal wood as either eco-certified or VPA-licensed wood. Hence, eco-certification 
and VPA-licenses are assumed to be mutually equivalent, entailing the same costs and benefits. This is 
a mere simplification of reality, but expert consultation in the Southern hemisphere confirms that this 
                                                     
59
 The three key elements of the "due diligence system" are: 1) Information: The operator must have access to 
information describing the wood and wood products, country of harvest, species, quantity, details of the supplier 
and information on compliance with national legislation. 2) Risk assessment: The operator should assess the risk 
of illegal wood in his supply chain, based on the information identified above and taking into account criteria set 
out in the regulation. 3) Risk mitigation: When the assessment shows that there is a risk of illegal wood in the 
supply chain that risk can be mitigated by requiring additional information and verification from the supplier. 
60
 FSC and PEFC are the two main eco-certificates for the wood industry at global level.  
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is, at present, a legitimate assumption (Global Timber Platform 2017, WWF 2015). This assumption is 
further explained in section two.  
Albeit potentially of interest for producers exporting to the EU, both eco-certification and VPA are not 
very present in the Southern hemisphere. In May 2015, 10.9% of the total global forest area was eco-
certified. However, the Northern hemisphere accounts for 89% of this certified area, while the 
Southern hemisphere only accounts for 11% (UNECE 2015). Accordingly, only 7 countries signed 
and implemented a VPA61, so far only Indonesia has managed to issue FLEGT licenses (European 
Commission 2017d). 
The poor uptake of certification (and the absence of leverage by FLEGT) in the Southern hemisphere 
is investigated by making use of a Spatial Equilibrium Model (SEM) at global level. The traditional 
SEM, as developed by Takayama and Judge (1971), has been modified according to Brusselaers et al. 
(2017). This modification is necessary to distinguish the certified (eco-certified and VPA-licensed) 
wood from the conventional wood62 and thus to investigate the leverage effect of the legality 
requirement.  
This chapter provides two essential contributions to literature. First, most of the previous research on 
the EUTR has focused on the legality aspects and principles of the EUTR (e.g. Wiersum and Elands 
(2013) or Trishkin et al. (2015)). Albeit useful, this type of research does not assess the policy 
objective: to provide leverage for sustainable wood production and consumption. Only Moiseyev et al. 
(2010) have conducted a global assessment of the VPAs’ impact by making use of a SEM. But 
Moiseyev et al. (2010) exogenously determined the share of legal (certified) wood in a region’s total 
wood consumption and production63. Instead, this chapter presents a SEM which endogenously 
determines the share of certified (legal) wood in a region’s total wood production and consumption. 
Second, previous research has predominantly investigated the impact of the EUTR at country-level 
(e.g. Atyi et al. (2013) or  Roe et al. (2014)). Stand-alone case studies are not appropriate to 
investigate the EUTR’s leverage effect, since different regions’ wood markets are ‘increasingly linked 
through international trade and global environmental policies’ (Raunikar et al. 2010). Through these 
linkages, demand and supply shocks in one region can impact on other regions’ wood markets. 
Accordingly, one region’s forest conservation policy can lead to deforestation in other regions (Gan 
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 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, Republic of the Congo.  
62
 Conventional wood is potentially, but not necessarily, illegal wood. In any case, certified wood guarantees the 
ecological and social trustworthiness of the product 
63
 Also the EU commissioned official impact-monitoring. The ITTC became responsible for an independent 
market monitoring project. The project keeps track of some global trends, and how the EU and wider 
international markets for FLEGT-licensed wood develop during the establishment of the VPAs. But the 
monitoring has two main restrictions: 1) it does not provide insights into the dynamics which explain the 
monitored evolutions, and 2) it does not take into account the situation in countries which did not negotiate a 
VPA. 
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and McCarl 2007, Sedjo and Sohngen 2013). Hence, a global assessment, through a SEM, is more 
appropriate. Note that the global interlinkages validate the EU’s assumption that its EUTR can indeed 
impact on other regions’ wood markets. This assumption is further strengthened by the importance of 
the EU as a wood consumer: the EU accounts for 20 to 40 % of wood product consumption at global 
level (depending on the type of wood products) (FAO 2015b).  
The basic framework, methods, and scenario details are described in the second part of this chapter. 
The third part discusses the outcomes of the model, while the fourth part discusses and explains some 
particularities of the outcome. The final part of the chapter provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
2. Methods 
This research applies the modified SEM according to Chapter 2 in order to investigate the impact of 
the EUTR. This chapter’s SEM is not different from the second chapter’s SEM, except for the baseline 
scenario and hence the starting point of the analysis. This chapter does not consider Green Public 
Procurement (GPP) in the baseline scenario. Consequently, there are more degrees of freedom for the 
optimization of the baseline scenario. This modified SEM is specifically designed in order to 
investigate wood markets which are characterized by the presence of certified wood alongside 
conventional wood. The technical details and limitations of the modified SEM can be found in Chapter 
2; this section only discusses the adaptations made to the model to check the impact of the legality 
requirements.  
The reasons to opt for the modified SEM are threefold. First, the SEM addresses the need for a global 
assessment of the legality requirements’ impact. This need stems from the strong interlinkages 
between regional wood markets through trade (Buongiorno et al. 2014). Five regions are taken into 
account, ensuring global coverage: Europe (including Russia), Latin America, North America, Africa, 
and Asia (including Oceania).  
Second, a SEM can distinguish a policy measure’s welfare impact on the demand side from the 
welfare impact on the supply side of a market. Since the FLEGT goal is to increase both the demand 
for, and production of, certified wood it is essential to analyze both sides of the market 
simultaneously.  
Third, applying the modified SEM allows the endogenous distinction between certified and 
conventional wood. This approach is appropriate to investigate the leverage effect of the EUTR for 
certified wood, because it allows producers and consumers to switch from one wood type to another. 
Certified (legal) wood is defined as either eco-certified or VPA-licensed wood. Hence, eco-
certification and VPA-licenses are assumed to be mutually equivalent. This assumption deserves some 
further explanation for both the demand and supply side of the market.  
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2.1. FLEGT and eco-certification on the supply side of the wood market 
On the supply side of the market, environmental- and societal-friendly production practices restrict 
forest management options and increase production costs (Van Deusen et al. 2010). Following the 
assumption of competitive behavior, producers will only apply for a certificate if the additional costs 
are compensated by a price premium 
	,. The Willingness To Accept (WTA) is a measure of 
the requested price premium on the supply side of the market64. If the additional costs related to 
certification are not compensated, wood operators will face additional losses and might cease exports 
towards the EU and redirect their exports towards countries with less strict legality requirements.  
This chapter assumes a comparable WTA for eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing. This assumption 
originates from the observation that both certification types comply with the EUTR’s minimum 
legality criteria. In addition, expert knowledge confirms that the high set-up cost of a FLEGT-
licensing system prevents the actual issuing of FLEGT-licenses (Global Timber Platform 2017), 
despite seven VPAs coming into force. As such, the VPA constitutes the supply-side measures of the 
FLEGT Action Plan. A VPA must increase the commitment to develop robust wood legality assurance 
systems, in addition to sustainable forest management practices (European External Action Service 
2016). On the other hand, eco-certification is (marginally) present in the Southern hemisphere. This 
strengthens our belief that the costs of FLEGT-licensing are at least equal to the costs of eco-
certification. If not equal, this approach could potentially underestimate the WTA for the FLEGT-
license but this still prevents hasty conclusions (Global Timber Platform 2017). 
In addition, considering both types of certification simultaneously is necessary to conduct a global 
impact assessment of the DDS on the supply side of the market. The EU negotiates VPAs at country 
level. Hence, including the possibility of eco-certification is necessary to offer countries without a 
VPA (e.g. in the Northern hemisphere) the possibility of demonstrating the legality of their wood 
exports, as is the case in reality. In specific cases, eco-certification even became a prerequisite for 
legality licensing (e.g. for state-owned forests in Indonesia, the only country which issues FLEGT 
licenses at present). 
This research uses the regional WTA estimates for eco-certification as applied in Chapter 2 (Appendix 
B). This results in a logistic distributed WTA with a mean ()*}, and accompanying variation 
+,-)*},, 3⁄  per region i. The mean WTA differs regionally due to regional differences in the indirect 
and direct costs relating to certification. The indirect costs stem from the required changes to 
management practices to meet certification standards (Bass 2001). The magnitude of the indirect cost 
                                                     
64
 The compensation of costs relating to certification is probably not the only driver for certification. Other 
literature also identified producers’ characteristics which explain the decision to opt for certification 
LOUREIRO, M. L. and ARCOS, F. D. (2012). 'Applying best–worst scaling in a stated preference analysis of 
forest management programs', Journal of Forest Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 381-394. 
Chapter 5 
98 
 
is inversely related to the quality of the current management practices. Regions with good (legal) 
standards for forest management face low indirect costs. The direct costs are the costs of the 
certification process. The nominal value of the direct costs is independent of the size of a 
forest/company (Ebeling and Yasué 2009). Consequently, the costs are relatively low for large-scale 
producers and relatively high for small-scale producers (Gullison 2003). Because large-scale 
producers and operators tend to be located in the Northern hemisphere, the average WTA in this 
hemisphere also tends to be lower.  
2.2. FLEGT and eco-certification on the demand side of the wood market 
Certified wood is a credence good which is vertically differentiated by process attributes (Dulleck et 
al. 2011). The certificate (eco-certificate or FLEGT-license) demonstrates accordance with FLEGT’s 
legality principles. The Willingness to Pay (WTP) for certified wood is a measure for the price 
premium consumers are prepared to pay in order to acquire certified wood. This turns certification into 
a market-based instrument with voluntary price signals (Pirard 2012, Veisten 2007). Note that the 
WTP is not the result of a contingent valuation method which monetarizes the environmental and 
societal gains. Instead the WTP measures the consumers’ marginal utility for the credence qualities of 
certified wood.  
This chapter assumes that eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing stimulate a similar WTP. This 
assumption is justified by the observation that the FLEGT-license, in accordance with eco-certificates, 
goes beyond the legality assurance and requires environmental and societal efforts (European 
Commission 2016f). This should provoke an equal interest from consumers. This approach has two 
limitations. First, the FLEGT-license is less of a marketing tool and less physically visible than eco-
certificates. Nevertheless, the EU considers the EUTR (which prohibits the placing of illegal wood on 
the EU’s wood market) as a demand-side measure. By setting standards to imported products in EU 
legislation, they oblige EU’s consumers to exclusively buy legality verified wood. Second, eco-
certification schemes actively pursue a price premium for eco-certified producers, whereas the price 
premium is not an explicit target of the FLEGT program. However, the ITTO (2017) reported on a 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for FLEGT-licensed wood by wood operators. Hence, this research also 
considers a WTP for FLEGT-licensed wood and equates it to the WTP for eco-certified wood. This 
research argues that if the compliance costs related to legality verification are not compensated, no 
trade will occur in the long run. Hence, a WTP should be present in order to make FLEGT-licensing 
work in the long run.  
In particular, this research applies the regional WTP estimates for eco-certification as applied in 
Chapter 2 (Appendix A). This results in a logistic distributed WTP with mean ()*,	and 
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accompanying variation +,-)*,, 3⁄  per region i. The mean WTP estimates differ regionally due to 
regional differences in income level (Greenstone and Jack 2015). 
2.3. Model specifications 
The price mechanism for certified wood prevents the use of the traditional multi-product SEMs for 
substitute goods. The certified wood price (, and 	, for demand and supply) consists of the 
conventional wood price (,>P and 	,>P) to which a price premium (
, and 
	,) is 
added. In accordance with earlier research (e.g. Cai and Aguilar (2013)), the price premium is 
expressed as a percentage increase in the conventional price: 
 , = , ∗ (1 + 
,)    ( 5-1 ) 
 	, = 	, ∗ (1 + 
	,)    ( 5-2 ) 
Hence, the standard assumption of a positive (negative) cross-price elasticity for demand (supply) for 
substitute goods does not hold (Takayama and Judge 1970, O'Sullivan et al. 2011). Chapter 2 
describes the technical details of the modified SEM, including the price premium mechanism, the 
specification of the regional demand and supply functions, and the bilateral trade costs.  
The share of certified wood in a region’s total wood demand and supply depends on two factors. First, 
the regional, and endogenously determined, price premium for demand and supply (equation 5-1 and 
5-2). Second, the logistic distribution for the WTP and WTA per region (Appendix A and B). Each 
region i’s cumulative distribution function for certified wood consumption can be constructed out of 
the known logistic distribution: 
 %ℎ', = 1 −	 0
01
2(34567,289:3,) ;9:3,<
   ( 5-3 ) 
The cumulative distribution function determines the certified share of a region’s total wood production 
for each price premium level. It has a downward slope (Figure 5-1). This implies that a low price 
premium 
=>? results in a high proportion of certified consumption (%ℎ',	ℎ@) within the 
total equilibrium wood consumption ,∗ . A high price premium 
ABA results in a small share: 
%ℎ',	CDE in Figure 5-1. 
In accordance with the WTP approach, a cumulative distribution function of certified production is 
constructed out of a region i’s logistically distributed WTA (equation 5-4). This allows the SEM to 
endogenously determine the certified share of a region’s production for each price premium:  
  %ℎ'	, =	 0
01
2(34567,289:F,) ;9:F,<
 ( 5-4 ) 
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Figure 5-1 visualizes the relationship between the price premium and the certified share of a region’s 
wood production and consumption. 
 
Figure 5-1: Cumulative distribution function of certified wood in total demand & supply for a region i. 
NOTE.-The low and high price premium are determined arbitrarily.  
2.4. Objective function 
The modified SEM optimizes global economic welfare. This welfare is defined as the sum of all 
regions’ quasi-welfare under the assumption of transport costs. A region’s quasi-welfare equals the 
integration of the demand and supply function over the equilibrium quantity (Takayama and Judge 
1971). This maximization of global welfare is retained in the modified SEM’s objective function. The 
demand and supply functions according to Chapter 2, and integration of these functions is presented in 
Appendix I. 
However, the demand and supply function do not distinguish between certified and conventional 
wood. Both certified and conventional wood are responsible for this regional quasi-welfare. The 
supply and demand function endogenously determines the response of the demanded and supplied 
quantities to price changes. The baseline values for the demanded and supplied quantities are 
calibrated to the current levels of registered production and consumption. At present, Europe, North 
America, and Asia produce the most wood (respectively 29.66%, 29.46%, and 25.89% of global 
production). Latin America and Africa produce less wood (12.57% and 2.42% respectively). The 
consumption pattern is comparable. Europe, North America, and Asia account for most of the wood 
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consumption (30.97%, 27.98%, and 26.30% respectively). Latin America and Africa account for 
smaller shares (12.72% and 2.03% respectively).  
The modified SEM adds an additional welfare element to the traditional SEM’s objective function. 
Figure 5-1 demonstrates how a low price premium 
=>? on the demand side of region i’s market 
encourages a high percentage of the consumers (%ℎ',ℎ@) to acquire certified wood. However, 
most of the certified wood consumers are willing to pay an even higher price premium. The difference 
between the equilibrium price premium 
=>? and a consumer’s individual WTP represents the 
additional consumer surplus relating to the introduction of certification and the price premium. The 
integral of the cumulative logistic distribution function (equation 5-3) over the right hand side of the 
equilibrium price premium adds all individual consumer surpluses. A maximum price premium of 
100% is assumed: 
 J% = K %ℎ',	L
,0 − K %ℎ',	L
,MN,    ( 5-5 ) 
Accordingly, an additional welfare element is calculated for the supply side of the market: 
 % = K %ℎ',MN, 	L%ℎ',     ( 5-6 ) 
Both the additional consumer and producer surplus (equation 5-5 and 5-6, respectively) are multiplied 
with the regional equilibrium conventional wood price (respectively ,∗  and 	,∗ ) and the regional 
equilibrium wood quantity (respectively ,∗  and 	,∗ ). This multiplication is added to the traditional 
SEM’s objective function in order to construct the modified SEM’s objective function (Appendix I). 
The traditional SEM’s price condition for trade and the trade balances remain valid in the modified 
SEM. However, the balances do account for the certified share of demand and production, and the 
price premiums, if necessary.  
The modified SEM simultaneously solves each region’s equilibrium under the assumption of bilateral 
trade costs (Appendix I). Hence, the transport costs separate, but do not isolate different regions’ 
markets. The transport costs are retrieved from Buongiorno and Shushuai (2014), according to Chapter 
2. The outcome of the modifications is an equilibrium state for the market which is no longer two-
dimensional (price and quantity). Instead, the equilibrium consists of four dimensions: price (,∗  and 
	,∗ ), quantity (,∗  and 	,∗ ), price premium (Pprem ,! and Pprem",!), and certified share of a region’s 
total consumption and production (Share ,!UVW and Share",!UVW). This finally allows us to determine each 
region’s quasi-welfare.  
2.5. Policy scenario 
This chapter compares a baseline scenario to the scenario in which FLEGT has come into force. In the 
baseline scenario, both conventional and certified wood can be imported into the EU. Importing wood 
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does not entail any additional costs, apart from the standard transport costs. In the FLEGT scenario, 
wood importers must provide sufficient proof of legality by establishing a DDS or by importing 
certified wood. Expert knowledge indicates that the costs of setting up a DDS at individual level 
surpass the costs of a certificate (Global Timber Platform 2017). For this reason, this chapter assumes 
that only certified wood is imported into the EU. This implies that the non-negativity constraint for the 
conventional wood quantity transported to Europe (HO,bc>P ) must be further tightened. This variable is 
set at zero for each region, except the EU: 
 ∀ ≠ :	HO,bc>P = 0      ( 5-7 ) 
European wood production is supposed to meet the EU’s legality standards. Therefore, no certificate is 
explicitly required for European wood destined for the domestic market. 
3. Results 
3.1. Certified production 
Table 5-1 presents the production (Q",!), supply price (P",!), and supply price premiums per region 
(Pprem",!) at regional and global level for both the baseline and FLEGT scenario. In addition, the 
table presents the production cost (Pcost	,!). The production cost is below the received price because 
of the properties of the spatial model. This allows producers to generate additional producer surplus.  
In a case where a region is trading wood, the difference between the production cost and the price 
originates from the transport costs. Note that the production cost can also be lower than the price 
received by consumers in cases where a region is not trading wood. In traditional welfare optimization 
without transport costs, this situation would foster an increase in both consumption and production in 
order to accomplish welfare gains by increasing both consumer and producer welfare. However, the 
spatiality in this model implies that regions cannot infinitely increase their wood production, as this 
depends on their natural capacity to produce. Accordingly, the demand for wood depends on macro-
economic indicators and cannot increase infinitely. Additionally, the existence of the potential for 
trade impacts on the received price, even in cases where a region is not trading wood. If consumers do 
not pay a price at least equal to the demand price on a foreign market minus the transport costs, 
domestic producers will benefit more if they ship their wood to export markets.  
In the baseline scenario, Europe and North America are the most important certified wood producers. 
Respectively 46.53% and 84.84% of their wood production is certified. The certified share of the three 
remaining regions’ production is below 5%. Together, Africa, Latin America, and Asia only account 
for 3.05% of global certified wood production. 
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At global level, the production of certified wood decreased by 26.69% due to FLEGT. However, the 
regional impact on certified production is ambiguous. On the one hand, FLEGT increases certified 
wood production in the Southern Hemisphere. Africa, Latin America, and Asia increase their certified 
wood production by 18.16%, 18.16%, and 17.64% respectively. This results in a combined share of 
5.17% of the global certified wood production for the Southern hemisphere in the FLEGT scenario. 
On the other hand, certified wood production decreases in North America (-41.70%) and Europe (- 
0.83%). In Europe, FLEGT prevents the import of conventional wood. Hence FLEGT releases the 
European conventional wood producers from non-European competition. This allows European 
producers to exercise market power on the conventional wood market and increase the conventional 
wood price by 0.14% (Table 5-1). The increased price attracts less efficient conventional wood 
producers (facing higher production costs) to participate in the conventional wood market. The 
maximum production cost to join the conventional market is now 1.05% above the previous level 
(Table 5-1). Consequently, conventional wood production becomes more attractive and a proportion of 
the previously certified producers switch back to conventional production. The decreased interest in 
certified wood on the supply side of the market reduces the European price premium by 1.32%.  
Certified production in North America decreases by 41.70%. This is due to the trade barrier for 
conventional wood in the EU. Consequently, the North American conventional wood is increasingly 
destined for the domestic market, which reduces the conventional price (-18.85%). This makes 
conventional wood attractive for the North American consumers who, to some extent, switch to 
conventional wood. Finally, this reintroduces the price premium in North America. However, more 
producers can sell conventional wood at a higher maximum production cost (+0.17%), which 
increases the producer surplus. The price premium simultaneously decreased by 21.23%.  Less 
producers are able to offer certified wood (maximum production costs decreased by 5.49%). But those 
certified producers receive a high price. The evolution of wood prices in North America is strongly 
related to the evolution of prices in Europe. This follows from the observation that Europe is the most 
important competitor of North America in terms of volume produced. For conventional wood, the 
price increase in Europe allows the North American producers to increase their production cost 
without losing consumers to European producers. For certified wood, the reduction in the European 
price premium has the opposite effect. If North American producers want to remain competitive they 
have to reduce their price premium. Note that the North American price premium in the baseline 
scenario (36.27%) by far surpassed the European price premium (27.83%). The converging trend in 
the FLEGT scenario drives price premiums in both regions closer to each other (to 27.46% and 
28.57% respectively). Hence, North America experiences a relatively bigger reduction in the price 
premium, which explains the sharp decrease in certified production in this region. 
Chapter 5 
104 
 
3.2. Certified consumption 
In accordance with the global certified wood production, the global consumption of certified wood 
decreases by 26.69%. Table 5-2 presents the SEM’s solution for each demand-related variable for both 
scenarios. 
In this model, consumers can make a couple of decisions in order to optimize their quasi-welfare. 
First, they can switch between conventional and certified wood if one wood type becomes relatively 
more expensive than the other. Second, consumers can switch between domestically produced wood 
and imported wood for the same reason. However, transport costs impede the switch from domestic to 
foreign wood. These transport costs create an additional margin between a region’s domestic demand 
price, and other regions’ supply prices. This margin separates, but does not isolate, the different 
regions’ markets. Due to the margin, the production cost of the most efficient region does not 
necessarily equal other regions’ demand prices. Also the transport costs between the two regions must 
be remunerated. This allows less efficient producers in a less efficient region to participate in their 
domestic wood market, as long as their production cost does not surpass the minimum of the cost price 
of more efficient foreign producers and the bilateral transport costs. Consequently, high transport costs 
make consumers more dependent on the choices made by domestic producers. 
This phenomenon is also observed in Europe and North America. The previous part provided an 
explanation for the growing interest in conventional production in both regions. North American and 
European consumers are obliged to follow this trend and consume more domestically produced 
conventional wood. In Europe, FLEGT prevents the switch towards foreign conventional wood. In 
addition, the transport costs impede consumers from substituting the previously domestically produced 
certified wood with certified wood produced abroad. Hence, the home effect of the increased 
conventional price outweighs the potential benefits of certified wood imports into Europe. This results 
in a 4.24% decrease in certified consumption in Europe, despite the relatively high European WTP for 
certified wood. 
Also, North American consumers are obliged to follow the decisions of North American producers. 
This implies a 41.7% decrease in certified wood consumption. In the baseline scenario, certified wood 
consumption was the standard in North America, even to the extent that no price premium was present 
on the demand side of the market; the conventional price was sufficiently high for certified wood. In 
the FLEGT scenario, the price premium is reintroduced, which means that the certified price differs 
from the conventional price. This makes conventional wood consumption more appealing.  
Certified wood consumption decreases in Africa and Asia. In these regions, the consumers did not 
follow the decisions of their domestic wood producers (i.e. to produce more certified wood). This 
follows the observation that most certified wood in these regions is destined for the foreign market. 
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The African and Asian WTP for certified wood is, due to their lower per capita income, which is not 
sufficiently high to ‘compete’ with the higher WTP in the export markets.  
The explanation for the increase in certified wood consumption in Latin America is twofold. First, 
Latin American consumers follow the decisions of the domestic producers to produce more certified 
wood as a response to FLEGT. Second, a reduced price premium for consumption is observed in Latin 
America. This is an indirect result of the disappearance of African and Asian exports of conventional 
wood to Europe. Those two regions had a comparative advantage in conventional wood production. In 
contrast, Latin America had a comparative advantage in certified wood, and its producers could set an 
advantageous price premium. Due to FLEGT, production decisions no longer consider the 
comparative advantage. Instead all regions focus more on certified wood production. For this reason, 
Latin America faces higher competition from African and Asian certified wood producers. 
Consequently, the price premium for the consumption of certified wood decreases in Latin America. 
This creates more interest in certified wood consumption in Latin America and explains the certified 
wood import by Latin America out of Africa and Asia. 
3.3. Welfare implication 
The global welfare for wood consumption and production decreased by 0.26%. The welfare effect is 
further analyzed at regional level. Table 5-3 displays the percentage change for each region’s total, 
consumer, and producer welfare. Some trends in Table 5-3 are apparent. At first, consumer welfare 
decreases in each region. This is a result of the increased price on the European conventional wood 
market. This increases the conventional wood prices in all regions. These increased prices, in turn, 
reduce the quantities consumed which results in decreasing consumer welfare. The only exception is 
the North American conventional wood price. In the baseline scenario, certified wood consumption 
was the standard in North America and the conventional price equaled the certified price. However, 
FLEGT initiated the reappearance of the price premium and a drop in certified wood production. The 
increased certified wood price damages North American consumer welfare. 
A second trend concerns the increased producer welfare in all regions, except North America. The 
protectionist measures drive up prices, which encourages production. This leads to increased producer 
welfare. Only North American producers experience a welfare loss. The explanation for this 
phenomenon is twofold. First, the North American producers produce less certified wood. As a 
consequence, they miss out on a considerable amount of the price premium. This drop is less 
considerable in, for example, Europe. Second, FLEGT exempts the North American conventional 
wood producers from Europe’s wood market. In the baseline scenario, North America exported 
conventional wood to Europe. The disappearance of the important European export market negatively 
impacts on North American producer welfare.  
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In General, a region’s welfare decreases if the decrease in consumer welfare outweighs the increase in 
producer welfare. This is the case in all regions, except Europe and Africa. The increase in the African 
producer surplus is mainly explained by the certified wood exports (also to Latin America). The 
considerable welfare increase for the European producers (+1.42%) is a consequence of the higher 
price from which they can benefit on the conventional market. 
 
  
 
Table 5-1: Production of wood, production of certified wood, supply prices, and supply price premiums (baseline scenario and FLEGT scenario) 
 Africa  Latin America  Asia  Europe  North America  World 
 
Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT 
 
Quantities: 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Q",! .38 .38  1.95 1.96  3.34 3.35  4.61 4.65  4.58 4.59  14.87 14.92 
Q",!change (%)  +.14   +.14   +.14   +.83   +.14   +.35 
Q",!UVW .01 .01  .04 .05  .15 .18  2.15 2.07  3.89 2.27  6.23 4.57 
Q",!UVW change (%)  +18.16   +18.16   +17.64   -3.65   -41.70   -26.69 
Share",!UVW (%) 2.12 2.51  2.12 2.51  4.52 5.31  46.53 44.46  84.84 49.39  41.94 30.63 
Share",!UVW change (%)  +18.00   +18.00   +17.48   -4.45   -41.78   -26.95 
 
(Cost) Prices: 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
P",! 1.33 1.33  1.27 1.27  1.26 1.26  1.26 1.26  1.55 1.26  1.34 1.26 
P",! change (%)  +.15   +.14   +.14   +.14   -18.81   -5.94 
Pcost	,! 1.05 1.06  1.05 1.06  1.05 1.05  1.05 1.06  1.05 1.06  1.05 1.06 
Pcost	,!	change (%)  +.17   +.17   +.17   +1.05   +.17   +.45 
Pprem",! (%) 27.83 28.57  27.83 28.57  27.83 28.57  27.83 27.46  36.27 28.57  33.10 28.07 
Pprem	,! change (%)  +2.69   +2.69   +2.69   -1.32   -21.23   -37.83 
P	,!UVW 1.65 1.66  1.66 1.58  1.52 1.57  1.55 1.56  1.55 1.56  1.55 1.56 
P	,!UVW change (%)  +.66   -4.54   +2.79   +.66   +.66   +.70 
Pcost	",!UVW 1.35 1.36  1.35 1.36  1.35 1.36  1.35 1.36  1.44 1.36  1.40 1.36 
P",!UVWcost	 change (%)  +.76   +.76   +.76   +.76   -5.49   -3.23 
NOTE.-Prices are in 100 USD per m³. Quantities are standardized. Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. The world prices are calculated as the volume weighted average 
of each region’s prices. The percentage changes represent the change of the variable’s value in the FLEGT scenario compared to the baseline scenario. The displayed price premiums are the 
percentage increase on top of the conventional wood price. 
  
  
 
Table 5-2: Consumption of wood, consumption of certified wood, demand prices, and demand price premiums (baseline scenario and FLEGT scenario) 
 Africa  Latin America  Asia  Europe  North America  World 
 Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT  Baseline FLEGT 
Quantities:                  
Q ,! .28 .28  1.81 1.81  4.00 4.00  4.64 4.64  4.13 4.19  14.87 14.92 
Q,! change (%)  -.07   -.06   -.03   -.01   +1.34   +0.35 
Q,!UVW .00 .00  .06 .19  .14 .05  2.15 2.05  3.89 2.27  6.23 4.57 
Q,!UVW change (%)  -18.54   +215.14   -59.99   -4.24   -41.70   -26.69 
Share ,!UVW (%) .80 .65  3.36 10.58  3.43 1.37  46.26 44.30  94.09 54.13  41.94 30.63 
Share,!UVW change (%)  -18.48   +215.34   -59.98   -4.24   -42.47   -26.95 
Prices:                  
P ,! 1.33 1.33  1.27 1.27  1.26 1.26  1.26 1.26  1.55 1.26  1.34 1.26 
P ,! change (%)  +.15   +.14   +.14   +.14   -18.81   -5.94 
Pprem ,! (%) 23.60 24.24  30.50 24.40  20.81 24.00  23.35 23.98  0.00 23.98  8.80 24.00 
Pprem,! change (%)  +2.71   -20.02   +15.35   +2.71   +∞   +172.76 
P ,!UVW 1.65 1.66  1.66 1.58  1.52 1.57  1.55 1.56  1.55 1.56  1.55 1.56 
P ,!UVW	 change (%)  +.66   -4.54   +2.79   +.66   +.66   +.70 
NOTE.-Prices are in 100 USD per m³. Quantities are standardized. Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. The world prices are calculated as the volume weighted average 
of each region’s prices. The percentage changes represent the change of the variable’s value in the FLEGT scenario compared to the baseline scenario. The displayed price premiums are the 
percentage increase on top of the conventional wood price. 
Table 5-3: Percentage change of the total, consumer, and producer welfare per region  
 
Regional Welfare  Producer welfare  Consumer welfare 
Africa 0.0062  0.3052  -0.1902 
Latin America -0.4228  0.3040  -0.7896 
Asia -0.1717  0.3305  -0.2604 
Europe  0.0331  1.4171  -0.0531 
North America -0.5979  -7.2989  -0.1091 
World -0.2601  -1.8366  -0.1161 
NOTE.- Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. The percentage changes represent the change to the variable’s value in the FLEGT scenario compared to the baseline 
scenario and are displayed in 100%.   
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4. Discussion 
4.1. Trade barrier 
FLEGT creates a trade barrier for conventional wood to Europe. The protectionist nature of this trade 
policy reduces global welfare (0.26%), with vulnerable consumers being particularly affected. North 
and Latin America were shipping conventional wood to Europe and are directly impacted by the 
import ban. The case of Latin America is different. The region managed to redirect its conventional 
wood flow from Europe to Asia. As such, Latin America exports an increased volume of conventional 
wood in the FLEGT scenario, which positively affects their producers’ welfare. All other regions’ 
conventional international wood exports collapsed. As a result, the international trade in conventional 
wood also decreased by 1.21%. Note that conventional wood is not necessarily illegal wood. Instead, 
this is wood produced by producers who cannot meet the environmental and societal standards set by 
eco-certification or FLEGT-licensing. Hence, the reduction in conventional trade flow does not 
necessarily represent a reduction in illegal trade.  
Concerning international trade for certified wood, FLEGT does not stimulate certified wood exports to 
Europe. This is first of all explained by the transport costs, ad valorem tariffs, and price premium. 
Those elements complicate certified wood trade towards Europe because they do not allow European 
consumers to easily switch between domestic and foreign producers, or between certified and 
conventional producers. This links to earlier research which identified transport costs as the main 
obstacle to benefitting from FLEGT licensing (Sun 2017). Second, Europe itself is an efficient 
producer of certified wood. Europe can fulfil the remaining demand for certified wood itself. This 
finding is in line with the home-effect by Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) who explain why richer countries 
specialize in high-quality goods. As such, the expensive legality requirements create a trade barrier 
around the Northern hemisphere. 
Nevertheless, the global trade in certified wood increased by 636.28%. This is due to increased exports 
of certified wood within the Southern hemisphere (i.e. from Africa and Asia to Latin America). These 
regions previously focused on conventional wood exports to the Northern regions but are not allowed 
to do this anymore. In the FLEGT scenario, the African and Asian producers are allowed to export 
conventional wood towards the EU, but cannot compete with the more efficient certified producers in 
the EU. Instead, shipping certified wood towards Latin America proofs to be the most beneficial 
alternative for a (limited) proportion of the African and Asian wood producers. Latin America became 
the export destination because this region is characterized by having the highest WTP of all Southern 
regions. The volumes of certified wood produced and traded in the Southern hemisphere remain small 
however.  
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The outcomes of this chapter’s SEM describe how the tropical regions cannot compete with certified 
wood production in the Northern hemisphere. This is also observed in reality. The International 
Tropical Timber Council describes the dangers for the future of certification: if ‘producers are forced 
to drop out from traditional markets, as has already happened in some cases, product prices are driven 
down’. In some regions, this can lead to a reduction in the value of the resource, encouraging its 
conversion into other uses (ITTC 2004).  
4.2. Price premium as an incentive for certification 
This chapter adheres to a strictly economic approach towards certification, based on the assumption of 
perfect competition. The SEM only allows producers to switch to certified production if the 
certification cost is compensated by the price premium. Experts of the ITTC (2004) confirm this 
economic approach: without ‘tangible benefits deriving from certification in terms of profitability or 
competitiveness, enterprises will have little incentive to improve forest management with higher 
costs’. This problem is found to be particularly serious in the case of tropical wood-producing 
countries (Simula et al. 2004). Also Greaker (2006) described how an insufficient willingness to pay 
for green (certified) products can endanger foreign producers’ profits.  
Carlsen et al. (2012), on the other hand, stress the importance of less tangible benefits for eco-certified 
wood producers (e.g. community empowerment) (Carlson and Palmer 2016). This type of benefit is 
hard to capture in a monetary value.  
4.3. Leverage effect 
According to our simulations, production of certified wood decreased at global level. In practice, a 
region’s certified wood production is positively linked to the region’s certified forest area. Hence, 
FLEGT does not positively impact on forest conservation and sustainable forest management practices 
at global level. However, FLEGT is specifically targeted at forests in the Southern hemisphere and 
those regions managed to expand their certified production. Nevertheless, the certified share in those 
regions’ production remains equal to or below 10%, and it is not targeted at the European market. One 
could also wonder to what extent the certification indeed enlarged the sustainably managed forest area. 
Blackman and Naranjo (2012), for example, describe how certification first tends to attract producers 
who already meet the certification standards.  
Due to the reduced volume of certified wood produced, global certified wood consumption also 
decreased. The positive relationship between the WTP, the GDP, and the certified share in a region’s 
consumption indicates that ‘Willingness to Pay’ is probably the wrong choice of words. It rather 
reflects the ‘Capacity to Pay’ for certified products. Only Latin American consumers increased their 
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certified wood consumption, but in this region the certified wood price decreased. Take note that the 
WTP is fixed in this model. However, Gulbrandsen (2014) described how government policies, by 
relying on (non-governmental) certification schemes, can award credibility to the certification 
schemes. Following this rationale, FLEGT might, in the long term, increase private consumers’ WTP 
for, and consequently consumption of eco-certified wood.  
The SEM’s outcomes (Table B1) are also observed in reality: both eco-certification and FLEGT-
licensing are not able to certificate considerable volumes of wood. This suggests that the cost of 
certification is higher than the price premium received by the producers in the Southern hemisphere. 
Government policies could aim to reduce the costs of certification to make certification more inclusive 
at global level. Potential points of attention are: the legislative framework in support of certification 
(Putz et al. 2000), the distance and convenience of wood transport (Gullison 2003), and the available 
financial means (ITTC 2004).  
Governments can also invest in group dynamics and cooperative initiatives in the forest industry. A 
higher level of vertical integration along the production chain, for example, reduces certification costs 
(Atyi and Simula 2002). Cooperative initiatives among producers can also reduce the direct 
certification costs since the direct costs are not dependent on the size of a forest/company (Ebeling and 
Yasué 2009). Consequently, the costs are relatively low for large-scale producers and relatively high 
for small-scale producers (Gullison 2003). Moreover, large-scale wood producers are also favored 
over small-scale wood producers by the buyers of certified wood. Demand for certified wood is 
mainly driven by retail, which demands large volumes, consistent quality, and low prices. Large-scale 
wood producers are better able to meet these requirements (Molnar and Trends 2003, Rametsteiner 
and Simula 2003, Klooster 2005, Taylor 2005). However, large-scale producers and operators tend to 
be located in the Northern hemisphere. Cooperative initiatives in the Southern hemisphere can tackle 
the issue of scale, although a phased approach is needed for this kind of policy (Simula et al. 2004). In 
a more comprehensive strategy, certification can play a complementary role in sustainable forest 
management. 
5. Conclusion 
According to our model, FLEGT does not stimulate the consumption and production of certified wood 
at global level. However, a modest leverage effect is observed in production in the Southern 
hemisphere. Unfortunately, the market share for certified wood in these regions remains marginal. 
These findings are in line with what is currently observed in reality, suggesting that more attention 
must be devoted to the costs of certification. The leverage effect is not realized in Europe and North 
America (the main producers of wood). In Europe, FLEGT allows producers to switch to conventional 
production and benefit price increases in this market segment. 
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On the demand side of the market, this model’s dynamics explain how, due to the transport costs, 
consumers are obliged, to some extent, to follow the production decisions of their domestic producers 
in favor of certified or conventional wood. Under this logic, the transport costs further separate the 
regional wood markets. Certified wood consumption decreased in all regions except Latin America. 
Latin America both produces and imports more certified wood. The certified wood is imported from 
Asia and Africa, who can no longer focus on the production of conventional wood, due to the 
implementation of FLEGT. The comparative advantages which are supposed to determine production 
decisions and trade flows are ruled out due to the policy. 
The innovative features added to traditional Spatial Equilibrium Modelling also allow us to analyze 
the impact of the policy for each region’s quasi-welfare. At global level, the quasi-welfare decreased 
due to FLEGT’s protectionist nature. Protectionism, by default, led to non-optimal welfare outcomes. 
The considerable weight of consumer welfare in the quasi-welfare of Latin America, Asia, and North 
America reduces their regional quasi-welfare. These reductions occur at the expense of a welfare 
increase in Europe (the initiator of FLEGT) and Africa. For both continents, the welfare increase is 
due to an improved producer surplus, since consumers are also worse off in those regions.  
This model is a simplified representation of reality. Therefore it cannot be used for exact forecasting of 
the leverage effect of FLEGT on each region’s certified share of wood consumption and production. 
The value of the model lies in revealing mechanisms which impact on a country with a profile 
comparable to one of the five regions’ profiles. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6.  Conclusions 
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1. Research objective and conclusions 
This thesis analyzed government policies that aim to sustain wood (products) consumption and 
production. More in particular, the thesis’ focus is policies that imply a set of minimum requirements 
to which the wood (products) must comply. The two policies analyzed are GPP and FLEGT. In this 
context, the minimum set of requirements must guarantee that the wood is extracted from, 
respectively, sustainable or legally managed forests. 
This chapter first provides an overview of three general conclusions that are drawn from similarities or 
comparisons between the different chapters’ conclusions. This provides insights and conclusions for 
the main research objective of this thesis. Subsequently, an overview of chapter-specific conclusions is 
provided. Hereafter, this concluding chapter provides an overview of policy recommendations 
addressing some of this thesis’ conclusions. Finally, this chapter identifies future – potential – research 
trajectories.  
1.1. Non-inclusive policies towards wood producers  
At present, both eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing are not inclusive towards producers in the 
Southern hemisphere. In the context of eco-certification, the southern hemisphere only accounts for 
13% of the globally certified forest area. In the context of FLEGT, only six wood-producing countries 
have managed to conclude a VPA with the EU. At present, only one of these six countries – Indonesia 
– has managed to issue FLEGT-licenses. Hence, neither GPP, nor FLEGT, is fully inclusive towards 
all regions’ producers. Consequently, neither of the policies increases the uptake of the sustainability 
or legality standards in forest management and wood production in the South.  
This is demonstrated in Chapter 4, which provides a historical analysis of Cameroon’s wood exports to 
the EU before, during, and after the VPA implementation process. The analysis finds that the VPA 
negatively impacted on Cameroon’s wood exports when it came into force (and during part of the 
implementation process). Also, Chapters 2 and 5 describe how the EU-wide implementation of, 
respectively, GPP and FLEGT does not promote the uptake of certification and legality criteria, 
respectively, in each region’s wood market. In the GPP scenario, certified production manages an 
increase at global level. However, certified production decreases in North America and Africa. In the 
FLEGT scenario, certified production decreases at global level, and notably in North America and the 
EU. In addition, neither policy succeeds in increasing the share of certified production in the South 
above 5% of the SEM’s global certified production. In particular situations conventional wood 
production is even stimulated. This is observed in the volume of conventional wood produced in the 
SEMs in Chapters 2 and 5, as well as in the substitution effect between Cameroon and its regional 
counterfactual as wood supplier in Chapter 4. 
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The interaction between transport costs and the compliance costs for eco-certification, or legality 
criteria are held responsible for these observations. The transport costs separate the different regions’ 
wood markets. This reduces competition between the different regions’ producers. In addition, the 
high compliance costs in the South explain the limited importance of the South in global certified 
wood production. These high costs are insufficiently compensated by a price premium. The 
explanation for the insufficient price premium is based on the assumption of perfect competition. The 
use of this approach is justified by other authors who state that without tangible benefits, the uptake of 
certification will remain limited (ITTC 2004, Simula et al. 2004). Note that in the case of FLEGT, not 
only do the high compliance costs impede trade, but also the non-operative FLEGT-licensing system 
neglects access to the EU’s wood market. 
Comparison of both policies demonstrates that GPP provides a better stimulus for sustainable wood 
production. GPP is more positive in nature as it tends to activate a latent demand for wood products. 
This still allows each region to specialize in the wood type for which they have a comparative 
advantage. In contrast, FLEGT is more negative in nature, as it restricts trade in conventional wood. In 
this case, comparative advantages do not determine the production choices. 
1.2. Non-inclusive policies towards wood consumers 
GPP aims to increase the consumption of sustainable wood (Chapter 1). The findings in Chapter 2 
demonstrate that GPP can indeed stimulate private consumption of certified wood, both in Europe and 
in other regions. Private consumption of certified wood, however, decreases in Asia and North 
America. Chapter 5 indicates that FLEGT has a more negative impact on private consumption of 
certified (legal) wood compared to GPP. Private consumption of certified wood decreases in all 
regions, except Latin America, due to FLEGT requirements for legality. 
The findings in Chapter 3 provide also useful insights in this respect. In general, private consumers 
indicate support for GPP. However, this support significantly decreases when GPP entails negative 
consequences (i.e. increased price, crowding-out of private consumption). Hence, the reductions in 
private consumption, as observed in the SEMs in Chapters 2 and 5, are likely to provoke some 
resistance. 
1.3. Interaction between non-governmental and governmental initiatives 
Chapter 1 defines eco-certification as a transnational, non-governmental approach to environmental 
regulation and development. Although non-governmental in nature, Chapters 2 and 5 describe the 
strong interlinkages between eco-certification and government policies (notably GPP and FLEGT). 
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GPP for wood relies on eco-certification for a number of reasons. The main reason is the issue of 
limited availability of universal environmental criteria for products/services (European Commission 
2016a). In addition, the use of certification can make public procurement decisions more consistent 
(Parikka-Alhola 2008). Finally, governments are increasingly interested in socially responsive forestry 
administration, next to transparency in trade. Eco-certification complies with these concerns (Atyi et 
al. 2013). Besides GPP, FLEGT also interacts with eco-certification. FLEGT acknowledges the full 
compliance of the two main eco-certification schemes – FSC and PEFC – with the EUTR 
requirements (Trishkin et al. 2015, PEFC 2016). 
Hence, some government policies rely on eco-certification, but their interest in eco-certification can 
also push the certification schemes to improve their standards. The latter is explained in Chapter 5 and 
confirmed by Gulbrandsen (2014), who noticed that ‘several certification schemes are developing 
legality assurance standards in response to the EU FLEGT and Timber Regulation, as well as member-
state procurement policies’. Hence, government policies and non-governmental eco-certification 
mutually reinforce each other. In addition, Chapters 2 and 5 describe how the approval of eco-
certification schemes by government policies can enhance the rulemaking authority and signal the 
credibility of the schemes to procurers and buyers. This could provide an important contribution to the 
uptake of private consumption of eco-certified wood, since a lack of trust prevents this uptake 
(Chapter 4). 
1.4. Chapter specific conclusions 
This section discusses chapter specific conclusions which have not been discussed previously. The 
chapters are not discussed in the correct order. 
1.4.1. Chapter 2 
Applying GPP increases global welfare in Chapter 2’s SEM. If governments opt for the lowest bid, 
they cannot tap into all potential quasi-welfare. However, applying GPP allows them to take other 
dimensions of (e.g. environmental) quality into account and purchase eco-certified wood at a price 
premium. Paying the price premium taps into previously unused quasi-welfare. 
However, increased global welfare is not a Pareto efficient improvement. Whether or not an individual 
region increases its quasi-welfare due to GPP in Europe mainly depends on the evolution of its 
consumer surplus. Europe, Africa, and Latin America managed to increase their consumer surplus and 
regional quasi-welfare, mainly due to increased certified purchases. However, quasi-welfare decreased 
in North America and Asia.  
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1.4.2. Chapter 5 
In contrast to GPP, the implementation of FLEGT reduces global welfare. Again, some regions 
manage to increase their individual quasi-welfare (Europe, Africa) while some regions experience a 
decrease in individual quasi-welfare (North America, Latin America, Asia). More apparent is the 
observation that the consumer surplus decreased in each single region. In contrast, the producer 
surplus increased in each region, except North America.  
This is due to the restrictive nature of the legality requirements in FLEGT. These requirements prevent 
conventional wood trade to Europe. This further separates the regional wood markets, which allows 
most regions’ producers to increase their prices. As such, FLEGT has elements in common with 
protectionist trade policies. Protectionism generally tends to reduce global welfare. Note that, in the 
latter situation, a region’s comparative advantage is no longer indicative of production decisions.  
1.4.3. Chapter 3 
This chapter analyses private consumers’ intentions to buy eco-certified wood in combination with 
their support for GPP. In relation to the intention to buy, Chapter 3 confirms the significance of 
environmental concern, subjective norm, and attitude towards eco-certified purchases as drivers for 
eco-certified wood consumption. However, contrary to expectations, perceived consumer effectiveness 
does not impact on intention to buy eco-certified wood. This is explained by the low frequency of 
wood purchases which reduces the perceived consumer effectiveness of wood compared to the 
perceived consumer effectiveness of products and services that are purchased more regularly. 
Private consumers, in general, support government purchases of eco-certified wood. Their level of 
support is positively correlated to attitude towards eco-certified purchases and environmental concern. 
However, the level of support significantly decreases when GPP entails negative consequences (i.e. 
increased prices, crowding-out of private consumption). This decrease in support for GPP is 
significantly and positively correlated to environmental concern. Environmental concern (measured as 
the score on the NEP) is traditionally labelled as an altruistic driver for sustainable consumption. This 
chapter’s analysis demonstrates that the score on the NEP also captures an element of self-interest. 
This self-interest is explained by the high level of involvement of the private consumers.  
1.4.4. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 for the first time analyses historical trade data to check the impact of a VPA coming into 
force. More in particular, it finds a negative impact of the VPA coming into force on Cameroonian 
wood exports to the EU. This is explained by the inability to issue FLEGT licenses, and the high, 
upfront, compliance costs for wood producers. 
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The historical analysis also reveals an unusual pattern of anticipative behavior. The negotiation period 
negatively impacts on exports because this period is marked by uncertainty about the outcome of the 
negotiations. In addition, wood operators redirect their trade flows in anticipation of more stringent 
trade conditions in future. In contrast, the exports briefly revive between the conclusion of the VPA 
negotiations and it coming into force. This short revival is a manifestation of short term, rent-seeking 
behavior by wood traders who aim to benefit from the old, less stringent, export conditions. This leads 
to increased wood extraction, and threatens long term, sustainable forest management. 
2. Policy recommendations 
2.1. Uptake of eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing in wood production 
The economic approach applied by this thesis implies that producers will only switch to certified, or 
FLEGT-licensed, wood production once the compliance costs are compensated by a price premium. 
The validity of this approach is confirmed by numerous authors (ITTC 2004, Simula et al. 2004). 
Since the uptake of eco-certification and FLEGT-licensed production in the Southern hemisphere 
remains marginal, this suggests that inclusive policies should also aim to reduce compliance costs. 
Numerous policies that aim to reduce compliance costs are listed throughout this thesis. 
At individual producer level, a cost reduction can be effected by improving: the legislative framework 
in support of certification, weak land tenure rights, the distance and convenience of transporting wood, 
the bureaucratic requirements for eco-certification and legality assurance, and the available financial 
means (Chapter 2 and Chapter 5). Addressing these issues requires a comprehensive strategy in which 
certification or FLEGT licensing plays a complementary role to sustainable forest management. This 
type of strategy requires a phased approach (Simula et al. 2004). According to Meijaard et al. (2014), 
an important part of this comprehensive approach should focus on the simplification of the criteria and 
indicators. This would allow less costly monitoring and auditing systems.  
Instead of focusing at the individual producer level, cooperative initiatives can address the same issues 
for four reasons. First, cooperative initiatives can reduce the direct costs of certification by distributing 
these costs over a higher number of producers. This could be especially beneficial for the small-scale 
producers in the Southern hemisphere. At present, the South’s large-scale forest enterprises, rather 
than small-scale concession holders, particularly benefit from export opportunities to the North (Atyi 
et al. 2013). Second, the demand for eco-certified wood is mainly driven by retail, which demands 
large volumes, consistent quality, and low prices (Chapter 2). Cooperative initiatives better allow these 
requirements to be met. Third, a high level of vertical integration along the production chain reduces 
certification costs (Chapter 5). In addition, cooperative initiatives might reverse the trend of power 
concentration in the large concession groupings. Carodenuto and Cerutti (2014) indicated that 
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international forest policies such as FLEGT (and its VPAs) may cause further expansion of this power 
concentration and lead to fragmentation of smaller forestry enterprises in the Congo Basin. Fourth, 
giving voice to the small and medium forest enterprises reinforces the integrity of the proposed 
legality assurance system (and eco-certification) and allows those enterprises to reap benefits from the 
schemes’ implementation (Carodenuto and Cerutti 2014). 
Numerous authors have investigated obstacles for cooperatives, both in the context of eco-certification 
and FLEGT-licensing. Future policies should avoid these pitfalls. The main obstacles are potential 
conflicts between centralized forestland ownership and decentralized forest tenure, identification of 
plantation or natural forest, monitoring of potential effects of forest management, decreases in cost 
efficiency, weak legitimation, and identification and conservation of high conservation value forests 
(He et al. 2015, Nurrochmat et al. 2016). 
2.2. Uptake of eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing in wood consumption 
In addition to addressing the compliance costs, policies can stimulate demand and WTP for 
sustainable wood. The lack of demand for certified wood in the South is a considerable constraint for 
certified production, and hard to address given the positive correlation between the WTP and income 
(Chapter 2). However, the WTP by consumers in the North also insufficiently compensates the 
compliance costs. Chapter 3 identifies three drivers for a (European, Belgian) private consumer’s 
intention to buy eco-certified wood: environmental concern, subjective norm, and attitude towards 
eco-certified purchases. A government can try to increase environmental concern, by, for example, 
improving knowledge of environmental issues and trust in eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing 
(Pagiaslis and Krontalis 2014). Note that Chapter 3 also stresses the importance of trust in eco-
certification schemes for the intention to buy eco-certified wood.  
Finally, Chapter 3 identifies different segments of private consumers. These insights can be used to 
develop specific communication strategies for the distinct segments in order to encourage the 
consumption of sustainable wood (e.g. focus on knowledge transfer to the least interested segment, 
and focus on attitude towards eco-certified consumption for the more interested segments). 
2.3. GPP 
The EU set an indicative target that, by 2010, 50% of all public tendering should be green (Chapter 2). 
However, the uptake of GPP has been estimated once in 2011, and is not systematically monitored. 
Better monitoring would allow a trustworthy assessment of the importance of GPP across the EU. The 
European Commission (2016b) stresses the importance of trustworthy monitoring of GPP because this 
allows the improvement of GPP activities. Standard points of attention are the training of staff, 
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development of practical tools and information, a more systematic implementation and integration of 
GPP into management systems and cooperation between authorities to foster the uptake of GPP 
(European Commission 2016a). 
Ideally, GPP enjoys ample support by private consumers. Chapter 3 described how this support tends 
to decrease when GPP entails negative consequences. The policy recommendations on the uptake of 
eco-certification can avoid the emergence of these negative consequences. The issue of building trust 
in eco-certification and FLEGT-licensing among private consumers, as described above, is crucial in 
reversing this negative trend. 
2.4. FLEGT 
Chapter 4 identified an unusual pattern of anticipative behavior prior to the VPA coming into force. 
This pattern provides insights for present and future negotiations on VPAs between the EU and wood-
producing countries in the South.  
Less lengthy negotiation periods could restrict the uncertain period and the redirection of trade flows. 
This is important because the reduced trade flow also reduces the relevance of the EU as an export 
market for Cameroonian wood producers. If the EU loses part of its relevance, this might also restrict 
the potential impact of a VPA in the producing countries. In addition, the EU could also pay attention 
to the negative perceptions of the impact of the VPA when it comes into force, which drives the 
redirection of trade flows (Chapter 4).  
The few months prior to the VPA coming into force are marked by increased exports to the EU. The 
EU should prevent this short term, rent-seeking behavior as it jeopardizes long term sustainable forest 
management in the VPA countries. For example by increasing the number of trading partners in one 
single VPA. 
A region-wide approach, instead of negotiating VPAs at individual country level, could be more useful 
in addressing sustainability issues in forest management in the South. The country-level approach risks 
the transfer of non-sustainable practices to neighboring countries. This is indicated by the substitution 
effect between Cameroon and its regional counterfactual as wood supplier. This effect suggests that 
more stringent conditions in Cameroon entail higher production levels in its surrounding countries 
(Chapter 4). This can potentially result in deforestation in the surrounding countries (Gan and McCarl 
2007, Sedjo and Sohngen 2013). An alternative explanation for the substitution effect between 
Cameroon and its neighbors is the smuggling of wood from Cameroon to its neighboring countries 
(Jianbang et al. 2016, Maryudi 2016). The region-wide approach can prevent the transfer of 
unsustainable practices to the surrounding regions.  
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Finally, the wood-producing countries need more assistance in the establishment of an approved 
FLEGT licensing system. At present, none of the VPA countries, except Indonesia, manages to issue 
FLEGT licenses. In addition, Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that compliance to FLEGT criteria entails 
considerable costs throughout the wood value chain. However, FLEGT does not specifically 
acknowledge these costs, nor does it aim for a price premium as compensation for the additional costs. 
This attributes all responsibility and burden to the supply side of the market, which already occupies 
the weaker position in the wood value chain (Meijaard et al. 2014).   
2.5. Trade barrier 
Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 introduce transport costs in the modified SEM. The transport costs 
consist of per unit shipment costs and an ad-valorem tariff. Both chapters’ analyses demonstrate how 
the transport costs further separate the different regions’ wood markets. This leads to a non-optimal 
solution for the SEMs in terms of global welfare maximization. Lower ad-valorem tariffs allow an 
increase in global welfare.  
3. Future research 
3.1. Modelling challenges 
This thesis presents two comparative static partial SEMs. These entail a number of limitations which 
can be addressed by future research. First, comparative static models do not allow the incorporation of 
dynamics within the models’ parameters. Chapter 2 describes how public procurement and legality 
assurance, which rely on eco-certification, can increase the trustworthiness of the certification 
schemes. To what extent this increases private consumers’ trust in the certification schemes, and 
subsequently their WTP for eco-certified wood, has not been estimated. While Gulbrandsen (2014) 
suggests that procurement policies have had a broad effect on the uptake of eco-certification, 
Georghiou et al. (2014) claim that there is currently no theoretical or empirical basis for the impact of 
GPP. 
Second, the SEMs do not allow a price reduction for certified wood, once certified wood gains 
importance in a region’s total wood production and consumption. Nevertheless, such a trend could be 
expected. First of all, there are indicators that if price premiums exceed the direct operational costs of 
certification, the excess profit will disappear when more producers enter the market (Nebel et al. 
2005). Second, once certified wood acquires a strong position in a region’s wood market, it could be 
more beneficial to pursue a type of horizontal specialization within a region’s wood sector and entirely 
switch to certification. This would allow benefits to be gained from “collective efficiency” (Giuliani et 
al. 2005, Schmitz 1995) through economies of scale, and avoid the costs of separating the value chains 
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for conventional and certified wood. Modelling these kind of dynamics in trade models can provide 
relevant insights in future.  
Third, a general, instead of a partial, equilibrium model could take different sectors’ behavior, and 
substitutes for wood into account. But this would not contribute to the main issues addressed in this 
thesis. 
Finally, the SEMs in Chapters 2 and 5 do not take into account preferences relating to the geographical 
origin of the wood produced. This could be done by introducing Armington elasticities which would 
entail rigidity in the adaptation to new circumstances (Armington 1969). The analysis of historical 
trade data in Chapter 4 indicates a substitution effect between suppliers. Hence Europe’s foreign wood 
suppliers appear to be highly interchangeable within a region (e.g. Africa, or West-Africa). 
Nevertheless, Armington elasticities can introduce a preference for domestically produced wood, as 
described by Aguilar and Cai (2010), or wood produced in a specific region. Armington elasticities are 
not introduced in this thesis’ SEMs because of a lack of appropriate estimates for (industrial round-) 
wood at global level. It can be expected that they would increase the existing trade barriers, and 
impede the uptake of certification even more.   
3.2. Cooperative initiatives 
As indicated, cooperative initiatives are an interesting tool to promote the uptake of eco-certification 
and legality assurance in the South. However, research on this type of forest management initiatives is 
limited, and predominantly focuses on Asian case studies (Fujiwara et al. 2015, Ota and Kamakura 
2016, He et al. 2015). Further research could investigate this potential pathway towards lower 
compliance costs. One particularly interesting cooperative initiative aims for the simplification of the 
criteria and indicators through self-monitoring at community level. This would allow less costly 
monitoring and auditing systems and could substantially reduce compliance costs Meijaard et al. 
(2014). According to Fry (2011), ‘locally based monitoring has the potential to shape the future of 
conservation management. Depending on the monitoring requirements and the social/geographical 
dynamic of the site, local involvement can be included to varying degrees and appropriate techniques 
can be employed. This all relies on careful and participatory planning before any monitoring activity 
begins’. However, Fry (2011) described the possibility of self-monitoring in the context of REDD+. 
Albeit interesting, further research on self-monitoring is required since this would still require external 
auditing to check compliance, as this is also required within the context of REDD+.  
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3.3. Historical data 
Chapter 4 uses EUROSTAT (2017) data on bilateral trade flows between the EU, on the one hand, and 
Cameroon and its neighboring countries on the other hand. This analysis could be improved by 
making use of databases which do not solely provide bilateral trade flows between the EU and its trade 
partners. Making use of more comprehensive databases such as GTAP would allow the analysis of 
Cameroon’s exports to other countries as well as the EU. This could quantify the magnitude and 
destination of the redirected trade flows. Export knowledge indicates that intra-African trade, and 
exports to Asia are becoming increasingly important (Global Timber Platform 2017), but this has not 
been checked thoroughly in this thesis. However, the observation that Cameroon’s wood production 
did not decrease (FAO 2016b) in combination with the negative impact of the VPA on the Cameroon-
EU wood trade flow provides sufficient evidence for the redirection of Cameroonian exports.  
4. Concluding remarks 
This thesis does not intend to provide arguments against eco-certification, nor against GPP for eco-
certified wood or legality assurance systems. Instead, this thesis provides arguments in favor of more 
guidance towards sustainable forest management and wood production. The models presented cannot 
be used for exact forecasting of a policy’s impact. However, they reveal mechanisms which, at 
present, prevent the uptake of sustainable wood production and forest management in specific regions, 
or which can reduce the incentive for sustainable wood production and forest management.  
According to my personal opinion, an improved form of eco-certification and supportive policies 
should remain important instruments towards better forest management because of its specific 
properties. First of all, its non-governmental nature turns eco-certification into an interesting 
instrument in regions which lack strong governments. Second, its transnational approach, and the 
required involvement on the demand side of the market can turn eco-certification into a collective 
effort towards sustainable forest management. The latter is necessary because of the strong 
international linkages between regional wood markets, and the internationalization of the wood value 
chain. 
According to this thesis’ results, GPP appears to entail less negative consequences compared to 
FLEGT. While governments can exert their preferences as wood consumers through GPP, FLEGT is 
much more restrictive in nature. FLEGT sets stringent conditions for trade which entail high costs, 
without providing remuneration for those costs. This excludes an important number of producers from 
one of the world’s most important wood markets. 
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Appendix A: Determination of mean regional WTP and scale factor 
To our knowledge, no comparative research on the WTP for certified wood exists at global level. 
However, Cai and Aguilar (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of the regional WTP assessments to gain 
a global picture of WTP. They found a global mean WTP for certified wood products of 12.2 % with a 
standard deviation of 8 %. 
Each region’s WTP distribution is determined based on the findings of Cai and Aguilar (2013). This is 
done by linking the WTP to the regional GDP per capita by making use of the double logistic 
regression model by Jacobsen and Hanley (2009). One of their models uses the GDP per capita as the 
sole explanatory variable for the WTP for ecosystem services. Their model estimates a coefficient of 
0.38 for the GDP per capita. This coefficient describes the percentage change in the WTP following a 
one percentage change in the GDP per capita. 
Hence, the percentage deviation for each region’s WTP from the global mean WTP of 12.2 % is 
determined from the regional percentage deviation of the GPD per capita to the global mean GDP per 
capita:  
GH = 0.122 ∗ (1 + 0.38 ∗ ∆%_) 
The results of these calculations are presented in Table A1.  
Table A1: Calculation of the regional WTP and scale parameter estimates based on the regional GDP 
per capita.  
Region Annual GDP per 
capita 
(1000 USD) 
Percentage 
deviation to 
global GDP per 
capita 
WTP estimate 
(%) 
 
Scale parameter 
(%) 
Africa 1.56 -77.44 8.61 3.11 
Latin America 9.25 33.85 13.77 4.98 
Asia  2.78 -59.78 9.43 3.41 
Europe  21.75 214.54 22.15 8.01 
North America 26.76 287.07 25.51 9.22 
World 6.91 - 12.20 - 
SOURCE.-Cai and Aguilar (2013): Meta-analysis of consumer's willingness-to-pay premiums for certified wood 
products, and own calculation. 
NOTE.-Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. If the percentage deviation to global GDP 
per capita is named u, the WTP estimate per region is found by 0.122*(1+0.38*u). If the percentage deviation to 
global GDP per capita is named μWTP!, the scale parameter is found by 0.08/0.122*	μWTP*√3/	π.  
Subsequently, it is necessary to determine the scale factor for the WTP logistic distribution. Cai and 
Aguilar (2013) found a standard deviation of 8 %. Transforming a normal distribution into a logistic 
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distribution requires the modification of the standard deviation into the logistic distribution’s scale 
factor. In practice, this requires the multiplication of the standard deviation with factor √3 +⁄ . Hence, 
the scale factor for the global WTP’s logistic distribution becomes 4.41 %. In order to determine the 
regional scale factors, this chapter continues to apply the 8% 12.2%⁄  fraction for the regional WTP 
estimate. The results are presented in Table A1.  
Appendix B: Determination of mean regional WTA and scale factor 
The price premium received at producer level varies depending on the type of forest product and 
country of production. Previous research estimates price premiums ranging from 1 % to 30 % on top 
of the conventional wood price (Yamamoto et al. 2014). FSC (2012) reported price premiums ranging 
between 15 and 25 %. This research follows the most optimistic estimate and assumes a price 
premium of 25%. 
The data by UNECE/FAO (2014) demonstrates that the certified forest area per region varies 
considerably (Table B1). Only a marginal fraction of the forest in the Southern hemisphere is certified. 
In contrast, certification is more common in the Northern hemisphere. The regional differences are 
explained by the regional differences in WTA. The WTA expresses the price premiums producers 
require in order to produce certified wood. The higher the costs associated with certification, the 
higher the WTA.  
Table B1: Calculation of the regional WTA and scale parameter estimates based upon the certified 
forest area 
 Africa Latin 
America 
Asia Europe North 
America 
World 
Certified forest area 
(%) 
1.0 1.8 2.2 65.2 35.4 10.9 
WTA estimate (%) 44.64 41.80 41.08 21.88 27.96 25.0 
Scale variable 9.86 9.44 9.28 4.94 6.32 8.00 
SOURCE.-UNECE/FAO (2015): Forest Products Annual Market Review 2014 – 2015, and own calculation 
NOTE.-Asia encompasses Oceania and Europe encompasses Russia. If the regional WTA estimate is named 
(GHI	, the scale variable is found by (0.08/0.122)*	(GHI	*√3/	+. 
It is assumed that for each region, the WTA is symmetrically distributed around an unknown mean. 
With a known received 
	, of 25 %, and known share of certified forests %ℎ'	, it is then 
possible to determine the mean WTA per region ((GHI	,): 
%ℎ'	, ∗ -GHI	, + 0.25 = (GHI	, 
The standard deviation from the demand side of the market is also applied to the supply side of the 
market. However, the WTA distribution is transformed into a logistic distribution by computing new 
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scale variables. This is done by multiplying with √3 +⁄  and simultaneously safeguarding the 
proportion 8% 12.2%⁄ . 
Appendix C: Mathematical construction of the objective function 
A. Baseline scenario 
The objective function in the modified SEM respects the logic of the standard SEM’s objective 
function, as first developed by Takayama and Judge (1971). The standard SEM’s objective function 
maximizes global quasi-welfare through the simultaneous solution of all regions’ equilibria under the 
assumption of bilateral trade costs. This first requires the calculation of each region’s quasi-welfare by 
integrating the regional demand (equation 2-3) and supply functions (equation 2-4) over the region’s 
equilibrium price and quantity. Those integrals respectively represent the regional consumer and 
producer surplus. Equation 2-3 can be rewritten and subsequently integrated:  
J%>P =  (,
∗ ∗ P ,!Q ,! ∗ e ,! −
P ,!e ,!
,∗

+ P ,! − P ,!∗ )d,∗ = Q ,!∗ ∗ (	P ,! ∗ 1 − 1e ,! − P ,!
∗ 	) + ,∗
, ∗ P ,!2 ∗ e ,! ∗ Q ,!  
Accordingly, equation 2-4 is rewritten and integrated: 
%>P =  (	,
∗ ∗ P	,!Q	,! ∗ e	,! −
P	,!e	,!
,∗

+ P",! − P	,!∗ )d	,∗ = Q	,!∗ ∗ (	P	,! ∗ 1 − 1e",! − P	,!
∗ 	) + 	,∗
, ∗ P	,!2 ∗ e	,! ∗ Q",!  
The standard SEM’s objective function takes the difference of those two integrals to determine each 
region’s quasi-welfare. 
In addition, the modified SEM’s objective function introduces the integrals of the logistic distribution 
function of the certified share of consumption and production in order to capture the welfare related to 
the price premium. In the baseline scenario, the consumer surplus represents what the current 
consumers of certified wood are willing to pay on top of the equilibrium price premium. This is the 
integral of the cumulative distribution function at the right hand side of the price premium. This 
integral is found by taking the difference of the integral over a maximum value for the price premium 
of 1 and the integral over the equilibrium price premium (as calculated above). The price premium’s 
maximum value of 1 is not attained in the SEM. The additional consumer surplus relating to the 
purchases of certified wood is then: 
J% =  %ℎ',	L
,
0

− %ℎ',	L
,
MN,

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Calculation of the integrals leads to: 
J% = 1 − _ − (1 − _) ∗ -)*, ∗ ln]9:3, 9:3,⁄ + 0 9:3,⁄ ^ − (1 − _) ∗ 
,
+ (1 − _) ∗ -)*, ∗ ln]9:3, 9:3,⁄ + MN, 9:3,⁄ ^ 
For the actual quasi-welfare calculation, J% is multiplied with the equilibrium conventional wood 
price of demand and the equilibrium consumed quantity.  
Simultaneously, the additional producer surplus relating to the production of certified wood is 
the integral of the logistic distribution function of the WTA (equation 2-16):  
% =  Share ,!UVW
MN,

	LShare ,!UVW 
This equals: 
%, = -)*}, ∗ ln]9:F, 9:F,⁄ + MN, 9:F,⁄ ^ − ()*}, 
Also %,	 is multiplied with 	,∗  and 	,∗  to find the additional producer surplus. 
Finally, the modified SEM’s objective function takes all transport costs into account for each bilateral 
trade flow between the 5 regions. For conventional wood, the per unit bilateral transport costs HJ,O 
consist of a fixed per unit cost @CHJ,O and an ad valorem transport costs I,O: 
HJ,O = @C	HJ,O +		, ∗ I,O 
The price condition for bilateral certified wood trade takes the price premium into account: 
HJ,O = @C	HJ,O +		, ∗ ]1 + 
	,^ ∗ I,O 
The combination of the standard SEM’s objective function and the additional elements added due to 
the modifications then results in the following objective function: 
'z	_G = ∑ J%>P + ∑ (,∗ ∗ ,∗ ∗ J%) +∑ %>P + ∑ (	,∗ ∗ 	,∗ ∗ %) −
∑ ∑ (H,O>PO ∗ HJ,O + H,O ∗ HJ,O)       (A1) 
This objective function maximizes the global quasi-welfare _G. 
B. GPP scenario 
Due to GPP for wood in Europe, the maximum certified share of wood consumption becomes 100% 
(instead of 100% - _bc). This requires the substitution of the additional welfare calculation related to 
the purchases of certified in equation A1 (for Europe only) by: 
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J%bc = 1 − (1 − _bc) ∗ -)*,bc ∗ ln]9:3,de 9:3,de⁄ + 0 9:3,de⁄ ^ − 
,bc + (1 − _bc)
∗ -)*,bc ∗ ln]9:3,de 9:3,de⁄ + MN,de 9:3,de⁄ ^ 
Appendix D: OLS regression on intention to buy eco-certified wood 
The following output is the result of an OLS regression analysis conducted in R. The abbreviations 
and measurement scale per variable are:  
• ITB = Intention To Buy eco-certified wood (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• PCE = Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• NEP = Environmental concern (calculated as the score on the New Environmental Paradigm, 
5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• SubNorm = Subjective Norm (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• ATE = Attitude towards eco-certified purchases (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
Formula: ITB = PCE + NEP + SubNorm + ATE 
   
 
Residuals: 
Min       1Q    Median  3Q       Max  
-3.8897  -0.3427   0.1028   0.4327   1.3783  
  
Coefficients: 
               Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)   -0.990158    0.555427   -1.783    0.0758 .   
PCE      -0.006394    0.051126   -0.125    0.9006     
NEP   0.461985    0.109821    4.207   3.54e-05 *** 
SubNorm   0.402033    0.082353    4.882   1.81e-06 *** 
ATE       0.396371    0.081560    4.860   2.01e-06 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.6706 on 267 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.2952, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2847  
F-statistic: 27.96 on 4 and 267 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
The following output is the result of an OLS regression analysis conducted in R, explaining the 
Intention to Buy eco-certified wood and including socio-demographic variables as explanatory 
variables. The abbreviations and measurement scale per variable are:  
• ITB = Intention To Buy eco-certified wood (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• PCE = Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• NEP = Environmental concern (calculated as the score on the New Environmental Paradigm, 5-
point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• SubNorm = Subjective Norm (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• ATE = Attitude towards eco-certified purchases (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• Conf = Confidence in eco-certification 
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• Fin = Self-assessed financial status 
• Rur = living in rural area (0 = living in urban area): self-assessed 
• Pur = Purchasing responsibility 
• AGE = Age 
• GENDER = Gender 
Formula: ITB ~ PCE + NEP + SubNorm +  
    ATE + Conf + Fin + Rur +  
    Pur + AGE + GENDER) 
Residuals: 
Min       1Q    Median       3Q       Max  
-3.8173  -0.3474   0.0512   0.4357   1.3461  
Coefficients: 
                   Estimate   Std. Error  t value   Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept)        -2.047109   1.017235    -2.012     0.0452 *   
PCE                -0.004656   0.051675    -0.090     0.9283     
NEP                0.496632    0.111297    4.462   1.21e-05 *** 
SubNorm            0.386778    0.085303    4.534   8.82e-06 *** 
ATE                0.408027    0.083436    4.890   1.76e-06 *** 
Conf               0.038048    0.069657    0.546     0.5854     
Fin                0.054062    0.054412    0.994     0.3214     
Rur                0.043274    0.087835    0.493     0.6227     
Pur                0.025972    0.054824    0.474     0.6361     
AGE                0.023265    0.041625    0.559     0.5767     
GENDER             0.138305    0.083982    1.647     0.1008     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.6717 on 261 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.3087, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2823  
F-statistic: 11.66 on 10 and 261 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
The findings for the OLS regression above are cross-checked by making use of ordinal logistic 
regression, which is more appropriate for the analysis of an ordinal dependent variable. The findings 
are fully in line with the earlier findings: 
Formula: ITB ~ PCE + NEP + SubNorm + ATE + GENDER + Fin + Pur + AGE + Rur + 
Conf,  
data = data, Hess = TRUE) 
 
Coefficients: 
                 Value     Std. Error   t value 
PCE           -0.06187     0.1607   -0.3850 
NEP            1.61302     0.3535    4.5632 
SubNorm        1.20716     0.2794    4.3208 
ATE            1.71597     0.2905    5.9068 
GENDER         0.46934     0.2595    1.8084 
Fin            0.10592     0.1656    0.6395 
Pur           -0.09799     0.1791   -0.5473 
AGE            0.04768     0.1221    0.3903 
Rur            0.08219     0.2707    0.3036 
Conf           0.12277     0.2197    0.5587 
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Intercepts: 
    Value    Std. Error   t value 
0|1 12.2221  3.2570       3.7525 
1|2 12.9453  3.2219       4.0179 
2|3 14.5674  3.2065       4.5431 
3|4 17.6668  3.2655       5.4101 
4|5 21.6194  3.3736       6.4085 
 
Residual Deviance: 489.2653  
AIC: 519.2653  
 
Related confidence intervals: 
                    2.5 %    97.5 % 
PCE           -0.37810108 0.2528724 
NEP            0.92872020 2.3165970 
SubNorm        0.66703470 1.7643289 
ATE            1.15746618 2.2983766 
GENDER        -0.03758715 0.9812929 
Fin           -0.21855759 0.4316401 
Pur           -0.46717581 0.2418715 
AGE           -0.19095898 0.2956132 
Rur           -0.44863212 0.6143437 
Conf          -0.30700675 0.5558121 
 
Coefficients (Odds) 
PCE         NEP        SubNorm         ATE          GENDER        Fin  
0.9400044   5.0179222  3.3439606       5.5620855    1.5989395     1.1117298  
Pur               AGE           Rur           Conf  
0.9066569         1.0488305     1.0856645     1.1306235 
Appendix E: OLS regression on the support for GPP 
The following output is the result of an OLS regression analysis conducted in R. The abbreviations 
and measurement scale per variable are:  
• GOV = Support for GPP (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• PCE = Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• NEP = Environmental concern (calculated as the score on the New Environmental Paradigm, 
5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• SubNorm = Subjective Norm (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
• ATE = Attitude towards eco-certified purchases (5-point scale, minimum of 1, maximum of 5) 
Formula: GOV = NEP + SubNorm + ATE + PCE 
Residuals: 
Min        1Q     Median     3Q       Max  
-1.98261  -0.43190   0.06332   0.44272   1.97675  
 
Coefficients: 
            Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)   0.79496     0.61407    1.295   0.196585     
NEP       0.47929     0.12142    3.948   0.000101 *** 
ATE       0.29902     0.09017    3.316   0.001039 **  
SubNorm   0.07654     0.09105    0.841   0.401307     
PCE      -0.08046     0.05652   -1.423   0.155759     
--- 
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Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.7414 on 267 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.1547, Adjusted R-squared:  0.142  
F-statistic: 12.21 on 4 and 267 DF,  p-value: 3.915e-09 
Appendix F: MANOVA on the intention to buy and support for GPP  
The following analysis applies MANOVA since the correlation between the consumers’ intention to 
buy certified wood, the support for GPP, and the loss of support when GPP entails negative 
consequences for private consumption are not sufficiently correlated to apply ANOVA. The analysis 
considers three dependent variables: consumers’ intention to buy certified wood (ITB), the support for 
GPP (SUPGPP), and the loss of support when GPP entails negative consequences for private 
consumption (LOSS). In addition, it considers four independent variables: environmental concern 
(NEP), perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE), subjective norm (SUB), and attitude towards 
certified purchases (ATE).  
The analysis demonstrates that PCE does not significantly impact the intention to buy certified wood, 
nor does it affect the support for GPP. The extent to which consumers lose support for GPP is only 
influenced by their environmental concern. 
            Df  Pillai    approx       F num  Df den Df    Pr(>F)     
NEP         1   0.195983  21.5317      3      265          1.641e-12 *** 
SUB         1   0.152120  15.8481      3      265          1.656e-09 *** 
ATE         1   0.111253  11.0576      3      265          7.303e-07 *** 
PCE         1   0.008517   0.7588      3      265          0.5181     
Residuals   267                                               
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 Response 1 : ITB 
               Df   Sum Sq Mean  Sq          F value    Pr(>F)     
NEP            1    16.269       16.2685     29.5943    1.204e-07 *** 
SUB            1    2.751        2.7508      5.0039     0.0261153 *   
ATE            1    6.724        6.7245      12.2326    0.0005499 *** 
PCE            1    1.114        1.1139      2.0263     0.1557592     
Residuals      267  146.775      0.5497                       
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 Response 2 : LOSS 
              Df   Sum Sq Mean   Sq         F value     Pr(>F)     
NEP           1    11.330        11.3297    14.9251     0.0001405 *** 
SUB           1    0.604         0.6044     0.7962      0.3730224     
ATE           1    0.435         0.4355     0.5737      0.4494644     
PCE           1    0.818         0.8181     1.0777      0.3001529     
Residuals     267  202.680       0.7591                       
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 Response 3 : SUPGPP 
              Df   Sum Sq Mean   Sq        F value    Pr(>F)     
NEP           1    18.863        18.8632   41.9423    4.496e-10 *** 
SUB           1    20.609        20.6086   45.8232    8.190e-11 *** 
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ATE           1    10.819        10.8191   24.0563    1.628e-06 *** 
PCE           1    0.007         0.0070    0.0156     0.9006     
Residuals     267  120.081       0.4497                       
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Appendix G: Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for stationarity and 
correlation tests on the components of Cameroon’s and the 
counterfactual’s exports 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests 
CAMEROON 
Cameroon’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -4.0507, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
warning message:  p-value smaller than printed p-value 
Random component Cameroon’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -8.5758, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Warning message:  p-value smaller than printed p-value 
 
General trend Cameroon’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -3.9284, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.0142 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
 
Seasonal component Cameroon’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -6.8137, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Warning message:  p-value smaller than printed p-value 
 
COUNTERFACTUAL 
Counterfactual’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -7.2301, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Warning message:  p-value smaller than printed p-value 
 
Random component Counterfactual’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -8.8032, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Warning message:  p-value smaller than printed p-value 
 
General trend Counterfactual’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -3.2743, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.07753 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
 
 
Appendices 
135 
 
Seasonal component Counterfactual’s exports 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -12.657, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Warning message:  p-value smaller than printed p-value 
 
T-test to check whether the mean of the random terms of both decomposed    
time series equal each other 
Welch Two Sample t-test 
t = -0.20244, df = 246.73, p-value = 0.8397 
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 -3.296430  2.681952 
sample estimates: 
 mean of x  mean of y  
-0.2012231  0.1060161  
 
F test to compare two variances (of the random terms of both decomposed  
Time series equal each other): 
F = 4.2347, num df = 179, denom df = 179, p-value < 2.2e-16 
alternative hypothesis: true ratio of variances is not equal to 1 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 3.156259 5.681618 
 
sample estimates: 
ratio of variances  
          4.234697  
 
Further exploration of seasonal component of both time series 
Table G1: Seasonal component of Cameroon’s and the counterfactual’s exports 
 Cameroon Counterfactual 
January -0.673 4.451 
February -8.691 -5.407 
March -0.030 9.146 
April 4.048 16.078 
May 5.165 14.825 
June 3.308 18.972 
July 4.818 3.783 
August -8.838 -17.857 
September 11.420 -2.484 
October 7.158 -1.225 
November -4.384 -18.440 
December -13.301 -21.843 
 
Correlation test and simple OLS between seasonal components of both time series demonstrates 
significant positive correlation (tsseason = seasonal component counterfactual’s exports, tsseasonc = 
seasonal component Cameroon’s exports):  
 
Correlation: (tsseason,tsseasonc) 
[1] 0.6659934 
 
OLS: summary(lm(tsseason~tsseasonc)) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = tsseason ~ tsseasonc) 
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Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-16.704  -7.674   1.537   8.592  14.853  
 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 9.976e-18  7.208e-01    0.00        1     
tsseasonc   1.245e+00  1.012e-01   12.31   <2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 9.988 on 190 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.4435, Adjusted R-squared:  0.4406  
F-statistic: 151.4 on 1 and 190 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Appendix H: Output VARX model 
Exogenous variable = VPA 
negotiation 
Exogenous variable = VPA 
agreed but not into 
force 
Exogenous variable = VPA 
into force 
constant term:   
est:  4.8906 26.0027  
 se:  3.437  5.4308  
AR( 1 ) matrix  
       [,1]  [,2] 
[1,]  0.322 0.111 
[2,] -0.219 0.460 
standard errors  
      [,1]  [,2] 
[1,] 0.076 0.048 
[2,] 0.131 0.076 
AR( 2 ) matrix  
      [,1]   [,2] 
[1,] 0.265 -0.072 
[2,] 0.215  0.000 
 
standard errors  
      [,1]  [,2] 
[1,] 0.082 0.048 
[2,] 0.123 1.000 
AR( 3 ) matrix  
      [,1] [,2] 
[1,] 0.290    0 
[2,] 0.295    0 
standard errors  
      [,1] [,2] 
[1,] 0.066    1 
[2,] 0.113    1 
Coefficients of 
exogenous  
lag- 0  coefficient 
matrix  
[1] -3.621 
[2]  0.000 
standard errors  
[1]  2.642 
[2]  1 
Residual Covariance 
Matrix  
         tsiicam  
tsiireg 
tsiicam 167.2331 
143.9404 
tsiireg 143.9404 
503.9470 
===========  
Information criteria:   
AIC:  11.18669  
BIC:  11.39251  
constant term:   
est:  0  28.7416  
 se:  1  5.6821  
AR( 1 ) matrix  
       [,1]  [,2] 
[1,]  0.320 0.128 
[2,] -0.211 0.446 
standard errors  
      [,1]  [,2] 
[1,] 0.076 0.045 
[2,] 0.131 0.076 
AR( 2 ) matrix  
      [,1]   [,2] 
[1,] 0.267 -0.055 
[2,] 0.211  0.000 
 
standard errors  
      [,1]  [,2] 
[1,] 0.082 0.046 
[2,] 0.122 1.000 
AR( 3 ) matrix  
      [,1] [,2] 
[1,] 0.305    0 
[2,] 0.281    0 
standard errors  
      [,1] [,2] 
[1,] 0.065    1 
[2,] 0.112    1 
Coefficients of exogenous  
lag- 0  coefficient matrix  
[1] 0 
[2] -8.554 
standard errors  
[1] 1 
[2] 5.551 
Residual Covariance Matrix  
         tsiicam  tsiireg 
tsiicam 170.0078 143.7355 
tsiireg 143.7355 497.6940 
===========  
Information criteria:   
AIC:  11.18229  
BIC:  11.37096 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
constant term:   
est:  7.6875 26.0027  
 se:  4.2062 5.4308  
AR( 1 ) matrix  
       [,1]  [,2] 
[1,]  0.317 0.108 
[2,] -0.219 0.460 
standard errors  
      [,1]  [,2] 
[1,] 0.077 0.048 
[2,] 0.131 0.076 
AR( 2 ) matrix  
      [,1]   [,2] 
[1,] 0.257 -0.073 
[2,] 0.215  0.000 
 
standard errors  
      [,1]  [,2] 
[1,] 0.082 0.048 
[2,] 0.123 1.000 
AR( 3 ) matrix  
      [,1] [,2] 
[1,] 0.274    0 
[2,] 0.295    0 
standard errors  
      [,1] [,2] 
[1,] 0.067    1 
[2,] 0.113    1 
Coefficients of exogenous  
lag- 0  coefficient matrix 
[1] -4.175 
[0]  0 
standard errors  
[1] 2.718 
[2] 1 
Residual Covariance Matrix 
         tsiicam  tsiireg 
tsiicam 166.8128 142.8839 
tsiireg 142.8839 503.9470 
===========  
Information criteria:   
AIC:  11.18812  
BIC:  11.39395  
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Analysis of stationarity of error terms of VARX model 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -7.2064, Lag order = 5, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
Appendix I: Main equations of the modified SEM 
The demand and supply function are retrieved from Chapter 2. The demand function calculates the 
equilibrium consumption ,∗  and equilibrium conventional wood price ,∗  from the baseline demand 
quantity ,  and the baseline demand price ,  as a function of the response to a price change 
(△ , = ,∗ −	, ). The extent to which the demand quantity responds to price changes is 
determined by each region’s price elasticity for demand ,: 
,∗ = , 1 + , △ ,,  
Simultaneously, the supply function is constructed:  
 	,∗ = 	, 1 + 	, △,,   
The baseline value of each region’s ,, 	,, , , 	, , , , and 	,  is based on Buongiorno and 
Shushuai (2014)65. 
Integration of both the demand and supply function over the equilibrium quantities leads to the 
consumer surplus J% and producer surplus %	related to a region’s total wood production and 
consumption (no distinction between certified and conventional wood is made): 
J% =  (,
∗ ∗ P ,!Q ,! ∗ e ,! −
P ,!e ,!
,∗

+ P ,! − P ,!∗ )d,∗ = Q ,!∗ (	P ,! 1 − 1e ,! − P ,!
∗ 	) + ,∗
, ∗ P ,!2 ∗ e ,! ∗ Q ,!  
                                                     
65
 Buongiorno et al. (2014) developed the Global Forests Product Model (GFPM). This is a dynamic economic 
model which determines production, consumption, trade, and prices for the most important forest products in 
world markets. This chapter only considers industrial roundwood and will abstract the necessary data for this 
wood product. This still allows the analysis of GPP, since Input-Output parameters in the GFPM ensure that an 
increased share of certified end products requires an increasing share of certified raw material (e.g. industrial 
roundwood). In reality, the certifications’ Chain of Custody policies also stipulate that certified material must be 
tracked throughout the entire value chain.  
The data by Buongiorno et al. (2014) provides information at country level. This chapter calculates regional 
weighted means (based on volume) from their data. This is necessary, since country level information does not 
exist for all other parameters (e.g. the WTP and WTA). 
The GFPM cannot be used to analyse our research question, because it does not differentiate between certified 
and conventional wood. Nor has it ever been developed to distinguish public from private procurement.  
65
 This finding is in line with the standard theory that price elasticity is positively related to the importance of a 
product in the overall consumer budget (GORDON, B. R., GOLDFARB, A. and LI, Y. (2013). 'Does price 
elasticity vary with economic growth? A cross-category analysis', Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 50, pp. 
4-23.). 
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% =  (	,
∗ ∗ P	,!Q	,! ∗ e	,! −
P	,!e	,!
,∗

+ P",! − P	,!∗ )d	,∗ = Q	,!∗ (	P	,! 1 − 1e",! − P	,!
∗ 	) + 	,∗
, ∗ P	,!2 ∗ e	,! ∗ Q",!  
Equation 5-5 and Equation 5-6 describe how additional consumer surplus J% and producer surplus 
% is calculated due to the introduction of the price premium. Calculating these integrals results in: 
J% =  %ℎ',	L
,
0

− %ℎ',	L
,
MN,

 
= 1 − -)*, ∗ ln]9:3, 9:3,⁄ + 0 9:3,⁄ ^ − 
, + -)*,
∗ ln]9:3, 9:3,⁄ + MN, 9:3,⁄ ^ 
And: 
% =  %ℎ',	L
,
MN,

 
= -)*}, ∗ ln]9:F, 9:F,⁄ + MN, 9:F,⁄ ^ − ()*}, 
Both the J% and % still need to be multiplied by the equilibrium price and quantity in order to 
quantify these surpluses at the same scale as the J% and %. 
The modified SEM’s objective function also takes the transport costs for each bilateral trade flow 
between the regions into account. Bilateral transport costs are the per unit transport costs between the 
two regions (HJ,O) multiplied with the traded quantities of certified and conventional wood 
(respectively H,O and H,O>P): 
(H,O
O
+ H,O>P) ∗ 	HJ,O 
The combination of the standard SEM’s objective function and the additional elements added due to 
the modifications then results in the following objective function which maximizes the global quasi-
welfare _G: 
'z	_G =J%

+(,∗ ∗ ,∗ ∗ J%)

+%

+(	,∗ ∗ 	,∗ ∗ %)

−((H,O
O
+ H,O>P) ∗ 	HJ,O) 
Whether a region i transports wood towards region j depends on the trade balances. These trade 
balances stipulate that trade can only occur if the importing region’s demand price at least 
compensates the exporting region’s supply price and the bilateral trade costs. For conventional wood 
this results in the following trade balance: 
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	,∗ + HJ,O ≤ ,O∗ 	→ H,O>P > 0 
No trade occurs (H,O>P = 0) in the alternative scenario. The trade balance for certified wood takes the 
price premium into account: 
	,∗ + 
	, + HJ,O ≤ ,O∗ + 
,O 	→ H,O>P > 0 
The unit costs of shipping wood between two regions comprise two parts. This data is retrieved from 
Buongiorno and Shushuai (2014) as applied in Chapter 2. The first component is a fixed cost of 
shipping one unit from one region to another (USD 20.2). The second component is a region-
dependent ad valorem percentage. This ad valorem percentage varies from 7.197% for Africa to 0% 
for Europe and North America. 
A region cannot export more than it produces. This leads to the following constraints on the export of 
respectively conventional and certified wood: 
(1 − 	%ℎ'	,) ∗ 	,∗ ≤H,O>P
O
 
%ℎ'	, ∗ 	,∗ ≤H,O
O
 
These equations also include the production for the domestic market (H,). A region cannot 
simultaneously import more than it consumes:  
%ℎ', ∗ ,∗ ≤H,O
O
 
%ℎ'	, ∗ 	,∗ ≤H,O
O
 
Finally, a non-negativity constraint is set for the following variables: ,∗  	,∗ , ,∗ , 	,∗ , and H,O∗ . The 
SEM also assumes that the price premiums 
, and 
	, are non-negative. This implies 
that the price of conventional wood is below, or equal to, the certified wood price.  
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Appendix J: Questionnaire 
Dear consumer, 
This questionnaire probes for the attitude of consumers concerning sustainable wood purchases. 
Completing the questionnaire requires 15 minutes of your time. The results will be treated 
anonymously, and only for research purposes. Thank you in advance, and good luck 
Part 1: Attitude towards environment 
 This first part probes for your attitude concerning the environment. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements? 
1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the Earth can support. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do not make the Earth unlivable. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
5. Humans are seriously abusing the environment 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
6. The Earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
9. Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
10. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
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11. The Earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
12.  Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
13.  The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
14.  Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
15. Things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
16.  A single person cannot do much for the environment. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
17.  One person’s efforts in support of the environment are useless as long as other persons do nothing. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
18.  Refusing to use products which harm the environment is good practice to change the value chain the offer of 
products. 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
19.  Each individual can make a difference for nature by choosing environmental-friendly products  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely Agree 
O O O O O 
 
Part 2: Forests 
This part probes for your attitude towards forests. 
Deforestation is one of the main causes of climate change. It accounts for over 18% of the current carbon 
emissions, this is a more important contribution than for example the transport sector. Simultaneously, forest can 
play an important role in climate change mitigation. The last decennia, forests managed to store 33% of the 
global carbon emissions.  
FSC and PEFC are two eco-certification schemes. Their labels indicate that products are produced by making 
use of sustainably produced wood. You can find their labels on paper, books, furniture, wood,… Sustainable in 
this narrative has both an environmental and societal aspect. The eco-certification schemes operate at global 
level, from Flanders to the tropical forests.  
20.  Did you know the FSC label?    
o YEs 
o No 
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21. Did you know the PEFC label?     
o Yes 
o No 
 
22. “For me to buy eco-certified wood in future is…” 
Valuable O  O  O  O  O  Worthless 
Harmful O  O  O  O  O  Beneficial 
Good O  O  O  O  O  Bad 
Enjoyable O  O  O  O  O  Unenjoyable 
Unpleasant O  O  O  O  O  Pleasant 
 
23. Next time I buy a wood product, I will opt for an eco-certified product. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
O O O O O 
 
24. Do you trust thee co-certification schemes 
To what extent do you believe that eco-certified 
wood products are…?  
Not sure 
at all 
Not sure Neutral Sure 
Very 
sure 
… produced in an environmental-friendly way      
… supporting rural development      
… generating a fair income for wood producers       
… produced without interfering in the natural 
habitat of animals  
     
… a good choice for me as private consumer       
… not aggravating climate change       
 
25. Does your social environment value eco-certification? Assume your environment is aware of the concept of 
eco-certification of wood products.  
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Most people who are important to me buy eco-
certified wood 
     
The people in my life whose opinions I value 
would buy eco-certified wood 
     
My friends never buy eco-certified wood       
My family appreciates it when I buy eco-certified 
wood.  
     
Persons who influence my consumption decisions 
buy eco-certified wood.  
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Also governments buy important volumes of wood products (e.g. paper, furniture for its employees, wood for 
construction projects…). Within Europe, governments account for approximately 26% of all purchases of wood 
products. 
26. The government should only buy eco-certified wood.  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
O O O O O 
27. The government should only buy eco-certified wood, even when this increases the price of eco-certified 
wood 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
O O O O O 
28. The government should only buy eco-certified wood, even when this implies no eco-certified wood is 
available for my personal consumption.   
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
O O O O O 
 
Part 3: General information 
29. What is your gender?  
o Male 
o Female 
 
30. What is your age?  
            ………  
31. How would you describe your financial situation?  
 
Difficult     Average  Well-off 
   
 
O O O O O   
32. Where do you live?  
o Rural: village,, small community, countryside 
o Urban: Metropolis, city, urban village 
33. Are you the main responsible for consumption decisions at home or your student residence?  
o Yes  
o Shared responsibility 
o No, somebody else is more responsibly 
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Appendix K: Constructs 
New Environmental Paradigm 
This research uses the revised New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) statements in order to determine 
the NEP construct. This procedure is fully described by Dunlap et al. (2000). The fifteen required – 
generic - statements for the NEP construct are questions 1 to 15 in the questionnaire (Appendix J). The 
seven even numbered statements endorse the dominant social paradigm (which is opposite to the 
NEP). The eight odd numbered statements endorse the NEP. Hence, the scores for the seven even 
statements are reversed prior to running the Cronbach Alpha test, and eventually compiling all scores.  
Perceived Consumer Effectiveness 
This research applies the procedures as described by Ellen et al. (1991) in order to construct the 
Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) scale. The four required statements for this scale are 
question 16 to 19 in the questionnaire (Appendix J). Question 16 and 17, if agreed with, endorse the 
idea that a person does not believe that his/her personal choices contribute to a reduction in the 
environmental impact of consumption. In contrast, question 18 and 19, if agreed with, endorse the 
feeling that an individual’s choices can contribute to a reduction in the environmental impact of 
consumption. Subsequently, the scores of question 16 and 17 are reversed, prior to running the 
Cronbach Alpha test on the four questions, and compiling the scores.  
Attitude towards eco-certified purchases 
The score for the attitude towards eco-certified purchases is determined according to Ajzen (1991). 
The required statements are listed in question 22 of the questionnaire (Appendix J). In the 
questionnaire, we ensure that the questionnaire counterbalances the positive and negative endpoints, in 
order to counteract possible response sets. As such, the scores for the last sample are first reversed 
prior to running the Cronbach Alpha test, and compiling the scores.  
In addition, the type of endpoints is also selected based upon Ajzen (1991). He describes how the final 
set of scales should include a generic good-bad scale which tends to capture overall evaluation well. In 
addition, both instrumental and experiential components must be present. Instrumental components are 
represented by adjective pairs as valuable-worthless and harmful-beneficial. Experiential components 
are represented by adjective pairs such as pleasant-unpleasant and enjoyable-unenjoyable.  
Subjective Norm 
According to Ajzen (1991), good measurements for the subjective norm should probe for the 
injunctive quality of other persons’ approval of specific behavior. This is done in the fourth statement 
of question 25 of the questionnaire (Appendix J). However, this might result in low variability as 
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‘important others generally approve desirable behaviors and disapprove undesirable behavior’. 
Therefore, the questionnaire also probes for descriptive norms in the remaining statements of question 
25, i.e. whether important others themselves perform the behavior in question. 
Confidence in eco-certification schemes 
The belief of the respondents in the sustainable character of eco-certified wood is measured in 
accordance with the methodology applied by Vermeir and Verbeke (2006). They assessed the belief 
about the sustainable character of cheese products by using a 6-point scale. Our questionnaire applies a 
5-point scale for reasons of consistency: the 5-point scale is also applied for the other constructs. The 
measurement pays attention to different aspects of sustainability: ecology, rural development, income, 
personal benefit. 
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Forests provide services which are key in halting climate change, and mitigating the current and future 
effects of climate change on people. For this reason, numerous governmental and non-governmental 
initiatives aim to sustain forest management and achieve afforestation. Those initiatives differ in terms 
of scale, funding, geographical focus, and approach. The initiatives considered in this thesis 
acknowledge that forests can contribute to climate change protection as well as offering economic, 
environmental, and sociocultural benefits. In their rationale, forests must not necessarily become non-
productive. Instead, forests are, and should be, ‘more than trees’ and are essential for food security and 
improving livelihoods. 
However, productive forests can only contribute to climate change protection when they are 
sustainably managed. Therefore, demand for wood which is extracted legally, or out of sustainably 
managed forests must be stimulated. This requires a level of involvement at the demand side of the 
wood market.  
In this context, two strategies are widely promoted: state-based legality initiatives and non-state eco-
certification. The distinction between governmental and non-governmental initiatives is useful, but in 
the EU, both types of initiatives often interact and mutually reinforce each other. On the one hand, two 
important governmental initiatives in support of legal or sustainable wood production and 
consumption rely upon non-governmental eco-certification. First, eco-certified wood is acknowledged 
as the green alternative in public procurement policies which take environmental criteria into account. 
This type of policy is called Green Public Procurement (GPP). Second, the EU acknowledges 
compliance of non-governmental eco-certification schemes to its legality requirements. On the other 
hand, several certification schemes developed more ambitious legality assurance standards in response 
to the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme and the EU Timber 
Regulation, as well as member-state procurement policies. 
This thesis quantifies the leverage effect of Green Public Procurement and state-based legality 
initiatives in the EU on the global consumption and production of sustainable wood. This is necessary 
because the state-based legality initiatives and non-state eco-certification in the North are expected to 
stimulate the uptake of sustainable wood production and forest management practices both in the 
North and in the South. It is widely accepted that the strong interlinkages between the different 
regional wood markets through trade effectuate this kind of pass-through effect of one regional policy 
to other regions’ wood markets. 
However, at present, the Southern hemisphere only accounts for 11% of the globally certified area. 
Simultaneously, only six countries concluded a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU. 
A VPA combines legality licensing with multi-stakeholder processes which aim to address underlying 
problems of forest governance in the country concerned. The legality licensing must assure the legal 
origin of wood and award access to the EU’s wood market.  
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The limited importance of the South in global certified, or legality verified wood production is 
explained by the high compliance costs in the South. The magnitude of the compliance cost is 
inversely related to the quality of the current management practices. Regions with good (legal) 
standards for forest management face low indirect costs, those regions are predominantly situated in 
the Northern hemisphere. 
This thesis presents two comparative Spatial Equilibrium Models that investigate the impact of GPP in 
the EU, respectively legality initiatives by the EU’s FLEGT on the uptake of eco-certified or legality 
verified wood production and consumption. Neither policy succeeds in increasing the share of certified 
production in the South above 5% of the SEM’s global certified production. In contrast, some regions 
experience an increased conventional wood production. Both models reveal the decision mechanism 
which impedes an important shift towards sustainable forest management and wood production 
practices: the high compliance costs in the South are insufficiently compensated by a higher price. 
Thorough comparison of both models demonstrates important differences in both policies’ impact. In 
general, GPP provides a better stimulus for sustainable wood production. GPP is more positive in 
nature as it tends to activate a latent demand for wood products. This still allows each region to 
specialize in the wood type (i.e. conventional or eco-certified) for which they have a comparative 
advantage. Activating the latent demand also allows an increase in global welfare. In contrast, FLEGT 
is more negative in nature, as it restricts trade in conventional wood. In this case, comparative 
advantages do not determine the production choices. Consequently, some conventional wood 
producers can benefit from increased prices and increase their conventional production. The restrictive 
nature of FLEGT negatively impact the global welfare. 
In the context of FLEGT, the models’ results are supported by the historical analysis of Cameroon’s 
volume of exported wood to the EU. The analysis finds that the VPA negatively impacted on 
Cameroon’s wood exports when it came into force. Furthermore, the historical analysis identifies a 
unique anticipative pattern in the Cameroonian exports. During the VPA negotiations, wood operators 
redirect their trade flows in anticipation of more stringent trade conditions in future. In contrast, the 
exports briefly revive between the VPA agreement and it coming into force. This short revival is a 
manifestation of short term, rent-seeking behavior by wood traders who aim to benefit from the old, 
less stringent, export conditions. This leads to increased wood extraction, and threatens long term, 
sustainable forest management. 
In the context of GPP, the models indicate that increased government purchases of eco-certified wood 
stimulates the uptake of eco-certified consumption and production at global level. However, the 
increased purchases by governments push up prices for eco-certified wood and drive consumers out of 
the eco-certified market segment. However, GPP initially aims to foster consumption of eco-certified 
wood by reducing the transaction costs for adapting to new products and stimulate the uptake of 
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innovations. Therefore, this thesis further investigates private consumers’ level of support towards 
government purchases of eco-certified wood. This analysis distinguishes different segments of private 
consumers. The consumer segment with a high environmental awareness, subjective norm, and 
attitude towards eco-certified wood also displays the highest intention to buy eco-certified wood. In 
general, all consumers are supportive towards GPP. However, the level of support significantly 
decreases when GPP entails negative consequences (i.e. increased prices, crowding-out private 
consumers). This decrease in support for GPP is significantly and positively correlated to 
environmental concern. Environmental concern is traditionally labelled as an altruistic driver for 
sustainable consumption. This analysis demonstrates that the score on the New Environmental 
Paradigm, as measure for environmental concern, also captures an element of self-interest.
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Bossen leveren een essentiële bijdrage in de strijd tegen klimaatopwarming. Bovendien kunnen ze 
ervoor zorgen dat de huidige en toekomstige impact van klimaatopwarming voor de mens beperkt 
blijft. Om deze redenen streven verschillende initiatieven naar (her)bebossing en een verduurzaming 
van het bosbeheer. Deze initiatieven verschillen echter sterk in aard. Zo kan een overheid 
gouvernementele initiatieven initiëren, maar kunnen hiernaast ook niet-gouvernementele initiatieven 
ontstaan. Verder kunnen initiatieven verschillen in – bijvoorbeeld – omvang (schaal), geografisch 
doelgebied, benadering en financiering. Een zogenaamd Market-Based Initiatief (MBI) veronderstelt 
dat bossen een bijdrage kunnen leveren in de strijd tegen klimaatopwarming en tegelijkertijd een 
economische, ecologische en socio-culturele meerwaarde kunnen creëren. In dit opzicht zijn bossen 
‘meer dan bomen’ en worden ze gebruikt in de productie van goederen en diensten. Op deze manier 
beschermen en verhogen ze de levensomstandigheden en voedselzekerheid van verschillende 
huishoudens. 
Productieve bossen kunnen enkel een bijdrage leveren in de strijd tegen klimaatopwarming wanneer ze 
duurzaam worden beheerd. MBI-en stimuleren duurzaam beheer door gebruik te maken van de 
werking van de houtmarkt (prijsvorming en andere economische variabelen). Meer in het bijzonder 
hoopt een MBI de vraag naar legaal en duurzaam hout te verhogen. Dit vereist een zeker engagement 
aan de vraagzijde van de houtmarkt. 
Twee strategieën worden steeds meer naar voor geschoven in de context van MBI-en: legaliteitseisen 
opgelegd door een overheid en niet-gouvernementele duurzaamheid labels. Theoretisch is het 
onderscheid tussen overheids- en niet-gouvernementele initiatieven duidelijk, maar binnen de EU 
interageren beide types initiatieven vaak met elkaar. Zo steunen twee belangrijke overheidsinitiatieven 
ter promotie van legale en duurzame houthandel sterk op niet-gouvernementele duurzaamheid labels. 
Ten eerste wordt aangenomen dat gelabeld hout voldoet aan de legaliteitsprincipes van de EU. Ten 
tweede fungeert gelabeld hout vaak als ‘groen alternatief’ in richtlijnen voor duurzame 
overheidsaankopen. Duurzame overheidsaankopen beschouwen naast economische ook ecologische 
criteria tijdens de selectie van leveranciers/producten voor de overheid. Anderzijds versterken de 
vermelde overheidsinitiatieven ook de werking van de duurzaamheidslabel. Zowel FSC als PEFC, de 
twee meest bekende duurzaamheid labels, verstrengden hun legaliteitsnormen om te voldoen aan de 
vereisten van de EU Timber Regulation en duurzame overheidsaankopen in de EU-lidstaten. 
Deze thesis kwantificeert het hefboomeffect van duurzame overheidsaankopen enerzijds en 
overheidseisen inzake de legaliteit van hout producten anderzijds. In de thesis wordt steeds vertrokken 
vanuit beleid dat zijn oorsprong vindt in de EU, maar tegelijkertijd wordt ook erkend dat het beleid 
een impact kan hebben op de globale consumptie en productie van duurzaam en/of legaal hout. Deze 
globale aanpak is nodig omdat de legaliteitsvereisten en duurzame overheidsaankopen in de EU ook 
daadwerkelijk de intentie hebben om de productie van duurzaam hout en duurzaam bosbeheer op 
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globaal niveau te stimuleren. Bovendien wordt algemeen aangenomen dat de houtmarkten van de 
verschillende regio’s sterk met elkaar verbonden zijn door handelsstromen. Dit maakt het mogelijk dat 
de vraag en/of aanbodschokken in een bepaald regio (eventueel geïnitieerd door overheidsbeleid) een 
impact hebben op de houtmarkt van andere regio’s.  
Ondanks de goede intenties hebben de aangehaalde initiatieven tot op heden nog niet geleid tot een 
sterke toename van duurzame of legale houtproductie in het Zuidelijke halfrond. Slechts 11% van de 
wereldwijde eco-gecertificeerde houtproductie vindt plaats in Afrika, Azië of Latijns-Amerika. Ook 
zijn er slechts 6 landen die er in slaagden om een Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) in werking 
te laten treden. Een VPA is bilaterale overeenkomst tussen de EU en een hout-producerend land in het 
Globale Zuiden. Het combineert een certificerings-systeem met een multi-stakeholder proces. De 
uitgereikte certificaten moeten aantonen dat het gecertificeerde hout 100% legaal hout is. Op deze 
manier verlenen de certificaten automatische toegang tot de Europese houtmarkt. Het multi-
stakeholder proces moet specifieke problemen in de houtsector van het hout-producerende land 
oplossen. 
De kosten verbonden aan legale of duurzame houtproductie zijn veel hoger in het Zuidelijke halfrond 
dan in het Noordelijke halfrond. Dit verklaart het beperkte succes van duurzame of legale 
houtproductie in het globale Zuiden. De kosten ligger hoger komt omdat de kosten omgekeerde 
evenredig verbonden zijn met de kwaliteit van de huidige bosbeheerpraktijken. Landen en regio’s die 
goede standaarden ontwikkelden voor (legale) houtproductie worden met lagere indirecte kosten 
geconfronteerd. Deze regio’s vind je hoofdzakelijk in het Noordelijke halfrond. 
Deze thesis beschrijft de resultaten van twee vergelijkende ‘Spatial Equilibrium’ Modellen. De 
modellen onderzoeken de impact van duurzame overheidsaankopen en legaliteitsvereisten in de EU op 
de globale productie en consumptie van respectievelijk duurzaam en legaal hout. Geen van de 
vermelde initiatieven slaagt er in om het aandeel van het Zuidelijke halfrond te vergroten tot 5% van 
de globale legale of duurzame houtproductie. In sommige regio’s daalt het belang van de legale of 
duurzame houtproductie zelfs. Beide modellen onthullen het beslissingspatroon die een verschuiving 
richting duurzame en legale bosbeheer praktijken verhinderd: de hoge kosten verbonden aan duurzame 
of legale houtproductie worden onvoldoende gecompenseerd door een verhoogde prijs voor duurzaam 
of legaal hout. 
Een vergelijking tussen de twee modellen toont aan dat de impact van beide initiatieven sterk 
verschilt. Algemeen gesteld zijn duurzame overheidsaankopen de beste stimulus voor de productie van 
duurzaam hout. Duurzame overheidsaankopen zijn een positief beleid dat een latent aanwezige vraag 
naar duurzaam hout hoopt te activeren. Het activeren van de latent aanwezige vraag leidt uiteindelijk 
ook tot een verhoging van de globale welvaart. Dit beleid laat ook nog toe dat elke regio zich kan 
specialiseren in het type hout, conventioneel of duurzaam, waarvoor zij een comparatief voordeel 
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heeft. Hier tegenover staan de legaliteitsvereisten die resulteren uit FLEGT. Legaliteitsvereisten 
verhinderen de import van hout waarvan de legaliteit niet expliciet kan aangetoond worden. Dit wil 
niet noodzakelijk zeggen dat het verbannen hout per definitie illegaal is. Het verbod op handel voor 
dat niet aantoonbaar legaal is zorgt maakt dat legaliteitsvereisten een restrictiever (negatief) karkater 
hebben. In deze situatie zijn de comparatieve voordelen van de verschillende landen minder belangrijk 
in hun productiekeuze voor conventionele of aangetoond-legale productie. Hierdoor profiteren 
sommige conventionele houtproducenten van stijgende prijzen en verhogen ze hun conventionele 
houtproductie. De restrictieve aard van de legaliteitsvereisten verkleint de globale welvaart. 
De resultaten van beide modellen worden geruggesteund door de resultaten van een analyse van de 
verhandelde hoeveelheid hout van Cameroon naar de EU sinds 2000. Deze analyse toont aan dat de 
invoering van het VPA in Cameroon de export naar de EU deed dalen. Bovendien onthulde de analyse 
een bijzondere vorm van anticipatief gedrag voor de invoering van het VPA. De houthandelaren 
verschoven hun handelsstromen reeds tijdens de onderhandelingen van het VPA. Hierdoor ging steeds 
minder hout naar de EU. Ze anticipeerden hiermee op de strengen handelsvoorwaarden waarmee ze in 
de toekomst zouden geconfronteerd worden. Echter, de export van Cameroon naar de EU herleefde 
gedurende de korte periode tussen afronding van de onderhandelingen en voor de effectieve 
inwerkingtreding van het VPA. Deze heropflakkering van de houtexport is het gevolg van korte-
termijn denken van de houthandelaren waarbij ze op zoek gaan naar korte termijn voordelen/winsten. 
Nu duidelijk is waarmee ze in de toekomst geconfronteerd zullen worden willen ze nog even genieten 
van de minder strenge handelsvoorwaarden. Hierdoor wordt er tijdens deze korte periode meer hout 
geproduceerd worden, wat een bedreiging vormt voor het duurzame (lange termijn) bosbeheer in 
Cameroon. Dit effect werd ook geobserveerd in de Republiek Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). 
Het model dat de impact van overheidsaankopen analyseert toont aan dat dit beleid de globale 
productie en consumptie van duurzaam hout kan doen toenemen. De verhoogde overheidsaankopen 
resulteren echter in een verhoogde prijs voor duurzaam hout. De particuliere consumenten die deze 
hogere prijs niet kunnen of willen betalen worden op deze manier uit de markt voor duurzaam hout 
gedreven. Dit effect conflicteert met de initiële logica van duurzame overheidsaankopen. Duurzame 
overheidsaankopen hopen de transactiekosten voor de aankoop van nieuwe – duurzame – producten te 
verlagen en innovaties te stimuleren. Op deze manier hoopt de overheid ook de (privé) consumptie van 
duurzaam hout te verhogen. Deze tegenstrijdigheid tussen intentie en effect wordt verder bestudeerd in 
een studie naar de steun van particuliere consumenten voor duurzame overheidsaankopen. Deze laatste 
analyse deelt consumenten op in verschillende segmenten op basis van hun karakteristieken, meer 
bepaald op basis van hun ecologische bekommernis, sociale druk om duurzame producten aan te 
kopen en houding (positief of negatief) ten opzichte van duurzame aankopen. Op deze manier kan een 
voluntaristisch segment worden geïdentificeerd die ook een sterke intentie signaleert om in de 
toekomst duurzaam hout aan te kopen. Algemeen gesteld steunen consumenten een duurzaam 
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aankoopbeleid van hun overheid. Deze steun daalt echter significant wanneer het duurzame 
aankoopbeleid negatieve gevolgen heeft voor hun persoonlijke situatie. Voorbeelden van negatieve 
gevolgen zijn een stijgende prijs voor duurzaam hout, of een beperkte beschikbaarheid van duurzaam 
hout. Opvallend genoeg is de mate waarin de steun voor het duurzame aankoopbeleid daalt positief 
gecorreleerd met de ecologische bekommernis van een consument. Traditioneel wordt de ecologische 
bekommernis van een consument beschouwd als een altruïstische drijfveer voor duurzame 
consumptie. Bovenstaande analyse suggereert echter dat de score op het ‘New Environmental 
Paradigm’, als maatstaaf voor het ecologische bewustzijn, ook een element van eigenbelang omvat. 
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